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ISLAMIZATION AND THE KHOJAH ISMĀ'ĪLĪ COMMUNITY IN PAKISTAN

by

Diamond Rattansi

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
and Research in partial fulfilment of the requirement
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Institute of Islamic Studies
McGill University
Montreal, Quebec

July 1987

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ABSTRACT

Author: Diamond Rattansi

Title of Thesis: Islamization and the Khojah Ismā'īlī Community in Pakistan

Department: Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University

Degree: Ph.D.

The Muslims of Pakistan and other countries such as Egypt are groping for ways to change their situation. The phenomenon of Islamic Resurgence in Pakistan is one major expression of this frantic desire of the Muslims to improve their lot through the acquisition of the control of the nation's political machinery. This political concern is something new and volatile. It has affected the life of Pakistan as a whole and that of the various Muslim groups within it. The Khojah Ismā'īlī response to the process of Islamization in Pakistan is reflected in their re-thinking of many aspects of religious traditions and beliefs, mainly those related to the concept of religious authority. The transition in the community's self-definition is that from the emphasis on its inherited traditional beliefs concerning the authority of the Imām to a posture more accommodating to the ethos of Pakistānī Islam. Tensions have been generated as a consequence of this transition, as well as social and economic mechanisms to cushion these tensions. The nature of Ismā'īlī response to the changing situation can be grasped through the understanding of their religious beliefs.

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RÉSUMÉ

Auteur: Diamond Rattansi

Titre: L'Islamisation et la communauté Khojah Ismā'īlī au Pakistan

Département: Institut des études islamiques, Université McGill

Niveau: Ph.D.

Les musulmans du Pakistan et d'autres pays tels que l'Egypte s'efforcent de transformer leur condition de vie. Le phénomène du renouveau de l'Islam au Pakistan est une expression prédominante du désir ardent de la part des Musulmans d'améliorer leur sort en s'accaparant le pouvoir politique dans ces pays. Cette préoccupation politique sans précédent est de nature plûtôt imprévisible. Déjà elle touche la vie au Pakistan à tous les niveaux ansi que les multiples groupes musulmans qui en font partie. La réaction chez les Khojah Ismā'īlī au phénomène de l'Islamisation du Pakistan se manifeste dans leur remise en question de plusieurs aspects de leurs traditions et croyances religieuses, particulièrement ceux liés au concept de l'autorité de l'Imām. L'évolution dans l'auto-identification de la communauté va d'une retraite graduelle des croyances traditionnelles transmises concernant l'autorité de l'Imām vers une position plus conciliante envers l'état d'âme de l'Islam au Pakistan. Cette transition a engendré des tensions mais aussi des mécanismes sociaux et économiques destinés à amortir celles-ci. Une compréhension des croyances religieuses Ismā'īlī permet de mieux évaluer la réaction Ismā'īlī face à cette situation inconstante.

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I am grateful to Steve Millier who proof read my thesis several times and came up with valuable suggestions. I am indebted to my colleagues both at the Institute of Islamic and Ismaili Studies, Centre for Developing Area Studies, McGill University and the participants of the dissertation workshop organised by the American Social Science Research Council at New York. I am thankful to Dr. Paul Walker for his comments on the thesis.

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I wish to express my profound indebtedness to the two persons who in spite of their very advanced age, sat with me for many days translating some old Gujrātī documents. They are Mr. Hussein Karmali (my father) and Mr. Khan Mohammad Jinnah.

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TRANSLITERATION

The transliteration scheme used in the thesis for Arabic, Urdū, and Persian terms is that of Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University. For those Gujrātī words which have equivalents in Arabic the same scheme is followed. For other Gujrātī words, I have transliterated them using the above scheme as far as possible. For instance, the long Gujrātī vowels ા , ી , ૂ , and ે or ો are transliterated with ā; ū; and ī respectively. Unfortunately, in cases where strict adherence to the above transliteration scheme has not been possible, attempts have been made to transliterate the words as they would sound when read aloud.

Words that commonly occur in English including the names of persons and places, eg. Islam, Zulfiqar, Karachi, etc., are not transliterated but appear as they commonly occur. The names of authors, for the purpose of clarity, have been kept as they appear on the title pages of their books.

As far as the transliteration of Arabic and Urdū is concerned, the transliteration scheme of the Institute is used, except in a few cases where the distinction in Urdū between ح and خ as in Khāna (place) or Khyāl and in Khāna (food) respectively is not kept. In both cases, 'Kh' without the '_' under them is used. Many foreign words, such as Firmān, Wa'z, Wa'izāt, Sunnī, Ithnā 'asharī, etc., have not been italicized since they appear frequently.

The extracts from the Gināns, Wa'izāt, etc., have been translated into English by the author unless otherwise stated in the footnote. The foreign words in the translated quotations appear in italics. Since the Wa'izāt are on magnetic tapes, the bibliographical references in the footnotes do not contain information on publishers or page numbers.

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The only abbreviation used in this work is for the **The Encyclopedia of Islam**, new edition, which is abbreviated as EI2.

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

The dissertation examines the nature of the Khojah Ismā'īlī response to the process of Islamization in Pakistan as reflected in the changing Khojah Ismā'īlī concept of religious authority. The notion of religious authority is central and basic to every religious system.[1] Traditionally, the basis of religious authority in the Ismā'īlī system has been located in the Imām. The Ismā'īlī perception of the Imām and their response to him is indicative of the Imām's capacity to effect changes among the Ismā'īlīs. Recently, the traditional Ismā'īlī view of religious authority has come into conflict with the revivalist and conservative trends of thought being promoted and implemented by the state through its social, economic, legal, media and other policies. The study focuses on the issues emerging from the Ismā'īlī attempt at adjusting their traditional concept of religious authority to the impact of Islamic resurgence in Pakistan.

Islam has assumed an increasingly important role in the life of Pakistan after the latter's creation in 1947. It had also provided fuel to the Pakistan Movement in pre-partition days. The Pakistan Movement, which gained momentum only after 1936, assumed an increasingly anti-Hindu communalist posture. Prior to 1937, the role of the Muslim League, the party which led the movement, was confined to a struggle for sufficient seats for Muslims in the legislative assemblies on the basis of separate electorates. The objectives and the intentions of the Muslim League[2] did not envisage

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1 For a discussion on "Authority", see Manabu Waida, "Authority", in the **Encyclopedia of Religion,** vol. 1 ed. by Mircea Eliade, New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1987, p. 1-7.

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an Islamic State in the normative religious sense nor did its manifestos and other statements attempt to spell out in detail the nature of an Islamic Society based on the Sharī'ah. The elections of 1936-1937, in which the League was heavily defeated even in the Muslim majority provinces, indicated that the League did not receive the support of the Muslim masses.[3] The Indian National Congress, which claimed a secular nationalist basis for itself upon which the Hindus and Muslims could join together in a nationalist struggle, rejected the League's demand that it be considered the sole representative of the Muslims of India.[4] The Congress, by breaking its promise to give some ministries to Muslims after the elections of 1936-1937 to safeguard its minority status, excited anger among the Muslims. The failure by Congress to keep its word led to the power of the Muslim League.[5] The League began to cultivate a sense of religiously based nationalism and appealed directly to the Muslims' sense of religiousness, eventually mobilizing mass support for the creation of Pakistan.

The idea of creating the nation of Pakistan was strongly opposed by the Jamā'at-i-Islāmī and some *'ulamā'* groups, such as the Ahrār and Jam'īyat-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind. Mawdūdī had argued that the idea of 'Nation' and the claims based on it were essentially Western. In this type of nationalism, Mawdūdī argued, "the Muslim loyalty, which is religious, can never be given to an entity such as the nation".[6] He claimed instead that the only nationality for the Muslims is Islam. This did not stop the Muslim

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2 R. Symonds, **The Making of Pakistan,** London: Faber and Faber, 1950, p. 41; for a more recent work see M.J. Akbar, **India: The Siege Within,** New York: Penguin Book, 1985, p. 30.

3 Cantwell Smith, **Modern Islam in India,** London: Victor Gollancz Inc., 1946.

4 M.J. Akbar, **The Siege Within.**' p. 30.

5 For details, see Syed Nur Ahmad, **From Martial Law to Martial Law: Politics in the Punjab, 1919-1958,** ed. by Craig Baxter, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985, p. 135-150.

6 See Charles Adams, "The Ideology of Mowlana Mawdudi" in **South Asian Politics and Religion,** ed. by D.E. Smith, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, p. 374.

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League, whose leadership was decidedly modernist, from pressing for the creation of Pakistan. Jinnāh, who led the Muslim League, according to Muhammad Munir, envisaged a secular democratic Government and not a "theocracy".[7] After independence, the history of the Pakistan Movement came to be viewed as a struggle for the creation of a religious (Islamic) State.[8] "It is only in retrospect", Hamza Alavi writes, "that Jinnāh is pictured as a religious bigot. The fact remains that Islam was not at the center of Muslim nationalism in India, but was brought into the political debate in Pakistan after the nation was created".[9]

When Pakistan emerged in 1947, a number of *'ulamā'* - some of whom had opposed the creation of Pakistan and some who had supported it - migrated to Pakistan where they undertook to define an Islamic State. They did not form a united or a monolithic group. It was Mawdūdī who managed to bring them together, even though they did not consider him an *'ālim*.[10] Thus they assumed a politically active posture with a view to systematically introducing Sunnī orthodoxy as normative Islam in Pakistan. They succeeded in forming a strong opposition to the successive modernist régimes which, they claimed, were directed by *Kāfirs* (unbelievers).[11] Their influence was seen in such matters as the demand for an Islamic Constitution; amendments to Pakistan's various constitutions to incorporate Islamic injunctions;

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7 M. Munir, **From Jinnah to Zia,** Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1980, p. 30.

8 Charles Adams, "Islam in Pakistan", reprint from **Modern Trends in World Religions,** Lahore: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1959, p. 38; for more recent work see Louis D. Hayes, **Politics in Pakistan: The Struggle for Legitimacy,** Colorado: Westview Press, 1984.

9 Hamza Alavi, "Ethnicity, Muslim Society, and the Pakistan Ideology", in **Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan,** ed. by Anita Weiss, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1986, p. 8.

10 Leonard Binder, **Religion and Politics in Pakistan,** Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961, p. 276.

11 The view was mainly held by Mawdūdī. Adams, "The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi", p. 389.

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mobilization of the masses on religious grounds against minority Muslim groups, such as the Ahmadîyah sect; opposition to Government ordinances to reform laws (such as the family law prohibiting polygamy); etc.. The modernist régimes, in an attempt to placate this religious sentiment and even to co-opt it, adopted such measures as the promulgation of the constitution in 1956, which declared Pakistan an Islamic State; and the establishment of the Central Institute of Islamic Research, by Ayūb Khān, to define the role of Islam in Pakistan; etc..

The course of Pakistan's history has no doubt witnessed the increasing importance of Islam as a political force, but, on the whole, the modernists have been the most important element in the country's life. Although Pakistan was officially declared an Islamic State in the 1956, 1962, and 1973 constitutions with the provision 'that no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam', the succeeding régimes of Ayūb and Bhutto were clearly dedicated to secular development through the continued adoption of Western modes of economy (capitalist or socialist), political reforms, industrialization, education etc..[12] Bhutto, in the nineteen-seventies, came under strong criticism from the religious parties which claimed that his government was anti-Islamic. He began to introduce Islamic measures, such as declaring Friday as a holiday instead of Sunday, paving the way for the introduction of Sharî'ah laws, and even declaring the Ahmadîyah sect to be non-Muslim.[13] Soon after Zia al-Haq came to power in 1977, he declared his government's commitment to the introduction of the Nizām-i-Islām. Toward this end, Zia began to introduce legal, social, economic, and political reforms, including the establishment of Sharî'ah and *Qādī* Courts; the promulgation of *hudūd* punishments for adultery, drinking, theft, etc.; the enforcement of observation of religious practices, such as *namāz* and *rōzah* (fasting); the

12 Anita Weiss, "The Historical Debate on Islam and the State in South Asia", in **Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan,** ed. by Anita Weiss, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1986, p. 8.

13 M. Munir, **From Jinnah to Zia,** Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1980, p. 30.

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introduction of interest-free banking and *zakāt/'ushr* taxes; and the compulsory teaching of *Islāmīyāt* (religious education) at all the levels of education.[14]

These measures have fostered a deeper consciousness of Islam in Pakistan; the Islam that has come to the fore is that espoused by Sunnî conservatist and (mainly) revivalist trends of thought. It is the legal stance, the authoritarianism and the narrowness as well as the militancy of these revivalist groups that causes problems for the non-Sunnî Muslim minorities. This resurgence of Islam, which advocates return to the fundamentals of Islam (or Islamic ideology), is something new with which the Muslim minority groups must come to grips. The Khojah Ismā'îlîs with whom we are concerned here have come under intense pressure to show that they are truly Muslims. The effort to create a place for themselves in Pakistānî society and to avoid a conflict with the Sunnî majority has compelled them to reconsider many aspects of Ismā'îlî faith and practice, including even the fundamentals. The issue that will occupy us here is that of religious authority which, for Ismā'îlîs, has always been indissolubly tied to the person of the Imām. Sunnî Islam by contrast recognizes no Imām, but rather derives its guidance and the substantive aspects of both its theology and its law from the Qur'ān and the Sunnah of the Prophet. Indeed for many Sunnîs with a strict cast of mind the Ismā'îlî exaltation of the Imām is straightforward deviation from Islam, and in their view all who recognize the authority of the Ismā'îlî Imām are not genuinely Muslim. In the atmosphere of religious resurgence in Pakistan the Ismā'îlîs have been forced to rethink and reformulate the relation between their belief in the Imāmate and the basic sources of Islamic piety, the Qur'ān and Sunnah. In the following pages we shall examine the emerging debate on this issue in the internal counsels of the Ismā'îlî community. The issue for the community is no less than that of its very survival as a distinctive religious entity. Will it be able sufficiently to accommodate itself to the

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14 John L. Esposito, "Islamization: Religion and Politics in Pakistan", **Muslim World**, vol. 72(1980) No. 3 and 4.

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revivalist vision of Islam without compromising its identity and forsaking the most basic tenets of its faith? Must it choose between persecution and rejection at the hands of the majority and abandonment of its ancestral religious commitment?

The Khojah Ismā'īlīs belong to the Nizārī Ismā'īlī branch of Islam; their roots lie in the eclectic experience of Hindu converts to the Nizārī Ismā'īlī faith. Ismā'īlism spread to India beginning in eleventh century and attracted Hindu converts through the *da'wah* system that operated first under the Fatimids in Eygpt and later under the Nizārī Ismā'īlīs in Iran.[15]

The *da'wah* aimed at converting individuals or groups through a process of translating the Ismā'īlī doctrine into terms already accepted by the converts.[16] In India, the converts were not discouraged from retaining many Hindu customs and rituals even after they had come within the Ismā'īlī fold. This syncretic character of the Khojah Ismā'īlīs in the pre-partition Indian context finds expression in the Ginānic traditions of the community. The Gināns (derivative of the Sanskrit word *'jñāna'* meaning 'contemplative or meditative knowledge') have traditionally enjoyed the status of a sacred literature supporting and exalting the Imām's authority. The Khojah Ismā'īlīs derive their religious and moral world view from the Gināns also. For instance, the following verses from the two Gināns, attributed to Shamsī Sayyid Fateh 'Alī and *Pīr* Sadr al-Dīn respectively, state:

1. The awaited one *(naklank)* about whom only a handful know,

   Whoever follows the *satgūr* (the true teacher) to him is the truth known,...

   repeat his name whose praises cannot be written,

---

15 Azim Nanji, **The Nizārī Ismā'īlī Traditions in the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent**, New York: Caravan Books, 1978.

16 ibid.

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Shāh (lord) fulfils the ultimate desire and bestows his *darshan* (vision)[17]

2. O my master even if the seas are filled with water,

How can we drink (from it) without your command,...

O my master, whatever (you) bestowed,

We carried it on our *sar* (head),

What you commanded *(Firmāya)* so we did.[18]

These passages from the Gināns are understood by the Ismā'īlīs to refer to the Imām. The term *Firmāya,* for instance, is understood as 'divine guidance of the Imām' rather than just as 'commandment'. The term *naklank,* connotes the culmination of nine *avatārs* (or the forms which the God Vishnu assumed on earth) in the tenth *avatār* or *naklank* who is identified with the Imām in the Khojah Ismā'īlī system. The terms *satgūr* and *Shāh* symbolize a characteristically Sūfī type *pīrī-murīdī* relationship which, when developed, yields ultimately the experience of the reality of the Imām's *darshan.*

The Shī'ī doctrine of the Imāmah had developed partly through an ongoing dialectical process in which the Islamic belief system, revolving around the concept of revealed guidance, had to be modified in accordance with the changing political and physical situation in which the Muslims found themselves. The process contributed toward the formation of two major traits among the Shī'ah. First the Shī'ah attitude toward history was characterized by the view that, although the delivery of verbal

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17 Quoted from **The Collection of Gināns,** Bombay: The Ismailia Association for India, 1954, p. 235.

18 The **Collection of Gināns,** (second edition) Bombay: The Ismailia Association for India, 1969, p. 147.

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revelation was completed with the Prophet Muhammad, the revelatory process was finalized only after the divine decree appointing 'Alī to perpetuate the divine message. This view not only implied that belief in the guidance of the Imām of the time is a prerequisite to becoming a *mu'min,* but also orients the *mu'min's* attention toward history, not in terms of reliving the past during the present, but rather in terms of viewing the present as the continuation of the past. Second, such a view of history embodies a wholly different concept of guidance from the one espoused by Sunnī Islam in the sense that (i) revelation is not seen as having been perfected as a whole with the demise of the Prophet and (ii) the basis of religious authority is centrally located in the Imām as opposed to the *Ijmā'* (consensus) of the community or scholars.

To this development of the Shī'ī doctrine of Imāmah there was added a wide range of Sūfī and esoteric influences. Ideas, such as *al-Qā'im al-dā'im* (the ever living guide) and *Walī* ('friend of God') defined the Imām as the "esoteric aspect of prophecy. The Imām thus came to be viewed as the initiator into mystical truths by virtue of the theophanic quality of his essential nature, as well as by his teaching..."[19]

> The Imām in his eternal essence was defined as a manifestation (mazhar) of the Word (Kalimah) or command (amr) of God, causes of the spiritual world. The believer attains his spiritual birth or resurrection, through the recognition of the essence of the Imām..[20]

In the Indian context, the doctrine of the Imām came to include ancillary ideas, such as those of *avatāra* and *mazhar,* formulated in the mystical vein of the Ginānic traditions: The term *avatāra,* for example, was drawn from the Vishnava system which holds that God assumes "different forms, man or animal...." In this system "Vishnu came down to earth and lived on it until the purpose for which he had descended into the universe was fulfilled."[21] Vishnu took the form of ten *avatārs* covering the ten

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19 W. Madelung, "Imāma", EI 2, p. 1168.

20 ibid.

21 ibid. p. 110-113.

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historical epochs or yugas. The Imām, in the Ginān called *Dasa Avaṭāra,* is identified with the tenth *avatār* or *naklank.*[22]

In Pakistan, such ideas raise problems for the Ismā'īlī community which has increasingly emphasized its Islamic identity in recent years. The problems emerge at two levels. First, the Khojah perception of the Imām, inherited in the syncretic form and in terms that attribute divinity to him, is antithetical to the generally accepted norms posited in the wake of Islamic renaissance. Moreover, the Hindu elements in the Ginānic traditions may also contribute to the formation of negative attitudes in the general Muslim population towards the Khojahs since Hinduism is viewed as the religion of the enemy, especially in the light of pre-partition memories. Second, at the Khojah community level, the traditional concept of the Imām is too inseparable from the group's own consciousness and the sense of identity to permit its reformulation without weakening the solidarity of the community.

In India, the inherited traditional Ginānic basis of the Imām's authority and its recognition by the British in the court proceedings of 1866 (the Khojah Case) and 1908 (the Haji Bibi Case) contributed significantly toward establishing the Imām/Āghā Khān as the absolute religious authority in all matters concerning the Ismā'īlī community. This further strengthened the traditional Ismā'īlī view of the Imām's authority which was utilized by the Imāms to help direct their charges through the problems posed by modernization. Their exposure to the West had convinced them of the benefits of modernizing the community. The Āghā Khān III, Sulṭān Muḥammad Shāh (1877-1957), and Āghā Ḳhān IV, Shāh Karîm al-Ḥusaynî (1957-), as Imāms of the Ismā'īlī community, have thus been able effectively to mobilize large segments of the Ismā'īlī population to facilitate modernizing reforms which have greatly changed the lives of the Ismā'īlīs within a relatively short time.

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22 ibid.

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When Pakistan was born, a large number of Khojah Ismā'īlīs emigrated from India, many of them coming to hold important jobs in banks and other commercial enterprises in their new homeland. Those Ismā'īlīs who already lived within the areas that formed Pakistan, stayed there. Available figures on the population of Nizārī Ismā'īlīs in Pakistan vary too greatly to permit more than a mere approximation of the numbers involved. The estimates range from six percent of a total population of forty million, i.e. 2,400,000[23] to 600,000.[24] The significance of the group, however, lies not in its size but in its economic and social activities.[25] While only five percent of industrial investments in Pakistan are in their hands,[26] in comparison to their size they represent a significant business oriented group. Hanna Papanek maintains that, proportionately, there are fewer poor and lower middle class families among Khojah Ismā'īlīs than in the general population and, concomitantly, more middle class and wealthy families among Khojah Ismā'īlīs.[27] She describes the Ismā'īlīs as:

> A well-defined organized social unit, with its own houses of prayers, social welfare institutions and economic organizations... They had more child health centres, maternity hospitals, schools, than any comparable groups; their women were freer, and their children, specially girls, getting more education. Most men aimed to be self-employed businessmen, rather than be employees and many had succeeded in this.[28]

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23 Rounaq Jahan, **Pakistan: Failure of National Integration,** New York: Columbia University Press, 1972, p. 27.

24 These are the author's estimates based on interviews conducted in Pakistan in 1984.

25 For an excellent study on the influence of urban commercial groups on Pakistānī politics, see Robert Laporte, "Urban Groups and the Zia Regime" in **Zia's Pakistan: Politics and Stability in a Frontline State,** ed. by Craig Baxter, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1985, p. 7-22.

26 G.F Papanek, "The Development of Entrepreneurship", **Proceedings of the American Economic Association,** Dec., 27 1961, Table II.

27 Hanna Papanek, "Leadership and Social Change in the Khojah Ismaili Community", unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Harvard University, Boston 1962, p.17.

28 ibid. p. III.

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Presently, the Ismā'īlīs are actively engaged in aiding the efforts of the Government of Pakistan to address the social and economic problems of the country as a whole by extending the services of their social (health, education, etc.) and economic institutions (banks, insurance) to others. The recent opening of the Aga Khan University Hospital, in 1985, was a major addition to the network of several hundreds of Ismā'īlī schools, health units, village organizations, etc., in Pakistan. The Aga Khan Foundation which manages these institutions is recognized by both the Government and international humanitarian agencies such as CIDA, WHO, UNICEF, and UNDP, as a major contributor to the social and economic life of Pakistan.[29]

The Khojah Ismā'īlīs form a highly differentiated community with distinct religious beliefs and practices. They are a conspicuous minority group of Muslims in the midst of the majority Sunnī milieu of Pakistan; their conspicuousness has become all the more evident against the background of the recent Islamization efforts in the country. The Khojah Ismā'īlīs attend their own Jamā'at Khānahs instead of Mosques, pray in a style different from that of Sunnīs, pray three rather than five times daily, supplicate the Imām for guidance and blessing, and do not undertake the rituals of *hajj* and other religious obligations considered essential to being Muslim by the majority Sunnī community.

The Khojah Ismā'īlīs view themselves as a *tarīqah* in Islam with emphasis on the cultivation of spiritual consciousness within the Jamā'at. The ultimate goal of each *murīd* (follower) is to attain the highest spiritual experience of union with the *nūr* (light) of the Imām. To achieve that state, the *murīd* must participate in the religious rituals corresponding to the two complementary levels of purification and contemplation. These religious practices occupy a central position within the activities of the Jamā'at Khānah. At the purification level, the rituals include, among others, the partaking of *āb-i-ṣafā'* (the holy or pure water), the reciting of prayers *(du'ā')* and

29 "Interview", **Pakistan and Gulf Economist,** March 12-18, 1983, p. 16-17.

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Ginans, and listening attentively to the readings of the Firmans and *Wa'izat* (the sermons); etc.. These rituals encompass a whole range of ideas - power, vision, divine grace or blessing, the Imam's personal presence, etc.. More important, they signify that the truth lies within oneself and that by purifying the self, the light of the Imam or God will radiate from it. The rituals also signify that through their performance, the impact of the calamities *(mushkilat)* that might befall or have befallen them will be minimized *(asan* - -literally: made easy).

At the contemplative level, those Isma'ilis who feel that they have achieved a level of maturity in moral consciousness volunteer to join a *majlis* called *bayt al-Khayal* (the abode of contemplation). The *murid* performs *dhikr* (repeats) *ism-i-a'zam* (the most majestic word - usually one of the ninety-nine names of Allah) given to him by the Imam. The general understanding is that the experience of the ultimate truth is not one's right, nor will it occur within a specific period after undertaking the spiritual journey. The ultimate meaning of reality will dawn upon whomsoever God wills at whatever time he wills. These are some of the standard Sufi practices.

The self-image of the Khojah Isma'ilis is characterized by the emphasis placed on the inner, spiritual dimension of Islam (perceived by the Khojahs as the 'true Islam'), by the sense of being more liberal and morally conscientious, as well as more progressive, tolerant, organized, and well placed economically and socially than the other communities of Pakistan. The Isma'ili self-image is attributed by the Khojahs to their being favoured by the divine guidance of the *hadir* (present) Imam. The relationship between the Isma'ili self-perception and their desire to be seen by other Pakistanis as genuine Muslims is an essential element in the Isma'ili response to the contemporary drive for Islamization in Pakistan.

The Khojah Isma'ili view of the Imam, couched in the language of Ginanic literature and reflecting Hindu ideas, is currently being assessed and debated by the

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community in their attempt at projecting themselves as Muslims. The Ismā'īlīs are concerned with the issue of whether and/or to what extent they ought to leave behind their earlier orientations and eliminate or modify them for the sake of fitting themselves into the fabric of norms and values being posited in the process of Islamization and its definition of what it is to be a 'Muslim.'

The Khojah Ismā'īlīs have taken various measures towards projecting themselves as Muslims, including setting aside those Gināns with a high Hindu content which view the Imām as the *avatār.* In other Gināns Hindu terms, such as *swamī* and *Harī,* have been replaced with the Muslim terms, *mawlā* and 'Alī respectively in order to give them an Islamic character. To this end the Āghā Khān and the Khojah Ismā'īlīs have also publicly declared that they believe in the principal beliefs of the Muslims:

> In common with all Muslims throughout the world, the Ismailis affirm the fundamental Islamic testimony of truth, the Shahada, that there is no God but Allah and that Muhammad was the last and final Prophet of Allah - the monotheistic deity to whom all Muslims direct their prayers, and that the Holy Qur'ān, is Allah's final message to mankind, was revealed through him.[30]

More important, this statement pertaining to Ismā'īlī beliefs has been enshrined in the 1987 Ismā'īlī Constitution (see appendix A).

Problems of religious authority have arisen for the Ismā'īlī community in Pakistan as it has more and more emphasized its Islamic heritage and nature. Whereas the affirmation of the Qur'ān and the Sunnah as the ultimate sources of authority is crucial for the Ismā'īlī community if it is to integrate itself into the process of Islamization and also to avoid the suspicion and possible hostile action of the majority in Pakistan, the continuing espousal of the inherited traditional authority of the Imām is equally important for the survival of the Khojah Ismā'īlīs as a community in Pakistan. The two concepts of authority are, however, in conflict with each other. How the Ismā'īlīs accommodate themselves to the process of Islamization while retaining their traditional

30 The statement was issued by the Āghā Khān's secretariat in response to write-up on the Aghā Khān by **Life Magazine,** Feb. 1980, p. 15.

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concept of the Imām's authority is the major problem confronting the Ismā'īlīs of Pakistan to-day.

The main purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to analyze the Ismā'īlī response to Islamization in Pakistan as it finds expression in the debate within the Ismā'īlī community about the basis of religious authority. The problem of religious authority is of vital importance for the Ismā'īlīs themselves as well as for others who wish to understand the nature of their response to the drive toward Islamization.

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Chapter II

THE ISMĀ'ĪLĪ CONCEPT OF RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY

(1885-1947)

In this chapter, we will examine the development of the concept of religious authority among the Khojah Ismā'īlīs from 1885, when the Āghā Khān III, Sultān Muhammad Shāh (1877-1957), ascended the throne of the Imāmat, until 1947, when Pakistan came into existence. Two factors will be examined, namely: (1) the sectarian challenges to the loose identity structure of the Khojah Ismā'īlīs, and (2) the modernist orientations of the Imām/the Āghā Khān III in the improvement of the material conditions of the community which provided the Khojahs with a new scope for defining their Shī'ī identity in India. Since the notion of religious authority is central and basic to the definition of the identity of every religious group, the examination of the factors which helped crystallize the Khojah religious identity will reveal the development of the concept of religious authority and its location among the Khojah Ismā'īlīs.

2.1 The Khojah Response to Sectarianism

The bonds of authority holding the Khojah community together do not appear to have been clearly defined when the Āghā Khān I, Imām Hasan 'Alī Shāh, migrated from Persia with some of his Persian followers to India in 1848.[31] At the time, there was

31 Earlier in 1848, Hasan 'Alī Shāh, the Āghā Khān I, had escaped from Persia and settled down in Bombay. He had been the Governor of Qūm and Mahallat until differences between him and the Qajar Shāh of Persia, in 1838, led to his forced departure from Persia. For details on the migration of Aghā Khān I to India, see Navroji Dumasia, **The Aga Khan and His Ancestors**, Bombay: Bombay Times of India Press, 1939. Also see H. Algar, "The revolt of Aghā Khān Mahallātī and the Transference of the Ismā'īlī Imamate to India" in **Studia Islamica**, vol 24(1969), p. 55-81. On the changes in the Hindu customs, see John N. Hollister, **The Shi'a**

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already a large group of Khojah Ismā'īlīs living in India. They were loosely held together by diverse Hindu, Sunnī, and Shī'ah customs, including those of marriages and burials. This diversity may have caused some tensions to rise within the Khojah community itself. We do not know a great deal about the tensions except for the fact that between 1846-1848 litigation took place concerning "the rights of female inheritance among the Khojahs (called Sajun-Mir-Ali's Case)".[32] The community was divided on the question of whether it should adhere to the Hindu or the Muslim customary law of inheritance. The Āghā Khān supported the right of inheritance of the Khojah female based on the Qur'ānic injunctions. The judgement of Sir Eskine Perry, however, went against the rights of Khojah females to inherit, but favoured those Khojahs who had upheld the Hindu customary law of inheritance.[33] The Āghā Khān I responded by attempting to crystallize the identity of the Khojah Ismā'īlīs. He eliminated certain prevailing Hindu customs, such as observance of the Hindu Law of inheritance, and some Sunnī burial and marriage customs.[34] In 1862, he circulated a paper in which he asked all Khojahs "who wished openly to pursue the tenets of the sect in accordance with the established Imāmi Ismaili faith to sign their names on the paper".[35] It seems that these reforms by the Āghā Khān were aimed at purging certain Hindu and Sunnī influences which were coming into conflict with the religious authority of the Āghā Khān I which in Shī'ah tradition was final. The Āghā Khān's emphasis on the Shī'ī identity of the Khojahs was first resisted in 1866 by a Khojah

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of India, London: Luzac Co., 1953, p. 400.

32 This Case has been refered to in the "Khojah Case", see the following foot note..

33 For details, see "Khojah Case", in **Cases of Muhammadan Law of India and Pakistan,** ed. by Asaf Fayzi, London: Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 531.

34 According to Justice Arnould's observation "the Khojas have observed these practices...out of Takiah - concealment of their own religious views and adoption of alien religious ceremonies out of dread of persecution for religion's sake". **Cases of Muhammadan Law of India and Pakistan,** for the above quotation see p. 539.

35 ibid. p. 532.

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splinter group known as Bārbhai,[36] which claimed that the Khojahs were Sunnī Muslims and not Shī'ī Muslims. The judgement in the court case (the Khojah Case) in India which considered this issue declared that the Āghā Khān was the Imām of the Khojah Ismā'īlīs as proven by the Ginānic heritage of the Khojah Ismā'īlīs. Justice Arnould, citing a Ginān called *dasa avatārā* (the ten incarnations), described how the Ismā'īlī *pīrs* had carried on their *da'wah* activities in the Indian sub-continent.[37]

> What is Dasavatar? It is a treatise in 10 chapters containing (as, indeed, its name imports) the account of ten avatars or incarnations of the Hindu God Vishnu; the tenth chapter treats of the incarnation of the Most Holy Ali... On the other hand, it is precisely such a book as a Dai of missionary of the Ismailis would compose or adapt if he wished to convert a body of not very learned Hindus to the Ismaili faith. It precisely carries out what, it has already been shown, were the standing instructions to the Dai of the Ismailis, viz, to procure conversion by assuming, as in great part true, the religious standpoint of the intended convert. This is exactly what this book does: It assumes the nine incarnations of Vishnu to be true as far as they go, but not the whole truth, and then supplements the imperfect Vishnuvite system by superadding the cardinal doctrine of the Ismailis, the incarnation and coming manifestation (or Avatar) of the 'Most Holy' Ali.[38]

The decision in the Khojah court case to recognize officially the religious authority of the Āghā Khān contributed significantly toward directing the focus of Khojah attention to the Ginānic traditions, and it reinforced the syncretic Khojah identity against the powerful puritanical Sunnī currents of the 19th century.[39]

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36 For more information on Bārbhai see John N. Hollister, **The Shi'a of India**, London, Luzac 1953.

37 ibid. p. 504-505.

38 ibid.

39 For detailed Analysis on the Sunnī puritanical movements, see W. Cantwell Smith, **Modern Islam in India**, London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1946; Harlan O. Pearson, "Islamic Reform and Revival in Nineteenth Century India: the Tariqah-i-Muhammadiyah", Ph.D. Thesis, Duke University, 1979; Aziz Ahmad, **Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment**, London: Oxford University Press, 1966; and more recently, a very good M.A. Thesis on "The Religious Thought of Shāh Ismā'īl Dihlawī", by Abdullah Khān, McGill University, Montreal 1984.

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The 19th century puritanical Sunnî movement responded to the collapsing Mughal rule and the advent of British supremacy in India by offering the Muslims scope to seek new but limited alternatives to the existing structures of religious authority. It tried to restrict the scope of religious authority by insisting on a return to the Qur'ān and the Sunnah of the Prophet as the basis for the Muslims to guide their lives and to reject all other authorities invoked by certain Sūfī *tarīqahs*, Sunnî conservatism *(taqlīd)*, and Shî'î syncreticism.[40] The puritanical posture condemned outright the heterodox practices picked up by Muslims through their interaction with Hindus, practices which were seen to be mainly responsible for decadence within Muslim society and therefore to be purged. The movement's central doctrine of *tawhīd* was contrasted with the concept of *Shirk* (heresy). The latter referred to any act of heterodoxy involving the invocation of authority other than God. Aziz Ahmad lists four kinds of *shirk* which constituted the act of associating partnership to God. These are:

> *Ishrāk fi'l-'ilm* (association in Divine Knowledge) such as invocation of a saint, or a study of his name *(Shugl)*, or concentration on his image *(tassawur-i Shaykh)* - all these savouring of a presumption that the saint shares with God His knowledge of the unrevealed; *Ishrāk fi'l-tasarruf* (association in Divine Power) as a belief that a Prophet or a saint could grant wishes or solve problems or alleviate miseries; *Ishrāk fi'l-'ibādat* (association in worship) such as paying homage to living or dead saints, or diverting to them in any other way the ritual of worship which is due to God alone; and *Ishrāk fi'l-adab* (association in respect) such as associating the name of a Prophet or a Saint with that of God in a wish or a resolution.[41]

The puritanical posture of the reformist movement became popular, although its military efforts *(jihād)* did not succeed. While some syncretic Muslim groups, including some pockets of Khojah Ismā'îlîs, were being attracted to the powerful puritanical current,[42] other Muslim syncretic groups - particularly, some Shî'î and Sūfî groups -

40 Aziz Ahmad, **Islamic Culture,** p. 211.

41 ibid. p. 212.

42 R.E. Enthoven, in his article on "Khojahs" in **Tribes and Castes of Bombay,** Delhi: Cosmo Publications, 1975, indicates that some Khojahs from Punjab were beginning to incline towards Sunnîsm. p. 223.

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held on to their syncretic identity. The British provided the umbrella for these minority Muslim groups to articulate their identities through their policy of encouraging freedom of religious practice in India.[43] Francis Robinson suggests that British religious sensibility in India was probably due to the evangelical religious background of the British administrators themselves.[44] Indian nationalist Muslims and Hindus, however, came in retrospect to view this British policy as a means to keep Indians divided.

The crisis of identity continued to prevail among the Khojahs with the ascendance of the Āghā Khān III, Sulṭān Muḥammad Shāh (1877-1957), to the imāmat at the age of eight in 1885.[45] Following the conversion of some Khojah Ismā'īlīs to Sunnism in 1901, in 1905 some members of the Āghā Khān's family, with the support of certain Khojahs, claimed that the Khojahs were Ithnā 'asharîs and not Ismā'īlīs.[46] The verdict of the Bombay High Court (in the Haji Bibi Case)[47] was in favour of the beliefs of the majority of Khojahs in the Imāmate of the Āghā Khān - both as *avatār* and as *nūr* (light) of Allāh, Muḥammad and 'Alī.

In response to the sectarian challenges from without and factionalism from within, the Āghā Khān began to reorganize the community, adopting new patterns of social mobilization. Social mobilization is "a process in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded and broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behaviour".[48] When these changes

43. Fayzi, **Muhammadan Law,** p. 532.

44 See the "Discussion" in **Islam in Southern Asia,** ed. Dietmar Rothermund, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1975, p. 42.

45 See **Bombay High Court Reports,** (1908), Suit No. 729, p. 12-18.

46 ibid.

47 Hājī Bī'ī was the Āghā Khān's cousin and the sister of Shahzādī - the first wife of the Āghā Khān whom he had earlier divorced. ibid.

48 Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development", in **Comparative Politics,** eds. Roy Macridis and Bernard Brown, Illinois: Dorsey Press 1977, p. 420.

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occur, Karl Deutsch argues that organizational arrangements must be made to "absorb the unsettling experiences of uprooting or breaking away from old settings, habits and commitments".[49]

The Āghā Khān first established a network of hierarchical organizations - called councils - throughout India. A constitution, drafted in 1905, governed the councils at district, regional, and national levels. Their function was to act as channels for the Imām's policies through their involvement in the activities and problems of the Jamā'ats both at the individual and group levels. All issues ranging from divorce and property settlement to the distribution of grants, and educational and family allowances, fell under the jurisdiction of the councils concerned.[50] The role of these council institutions in reforming the community is beyond the scope of this study. However, it is significant to note here that the Āghā Khān recruited Khojah Ismā'īlīs in each locality to help to organize the *Jamā'atī* institutions on a voluntary basis. The institution handling the religious affairs of the community was manned mostly by a group of voluntary preachers *(Wā'izīn)*. This group of *Wā'izīn,* composed principally of Khojah traders, was instrumental in the dissemination of religious ideas about the authority of the Imām and the Gināns. By appealing to the cultural sensibilities of the Khojahs, the new local Khojah leadership was gradually able to replace the influential Persian clerical and military class which had accompanied the Āghā Khān I to India and which had continued to pose a threat to Khojah identity and, in turn, to the reformist policies of the Āghā Khān III. The Āghā Khān III reports in his **Memoirs,** that these followers of Persian descent, who numbered about two thousand, had eventually become his dependents and often sparked sectarian and family clashes

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49 Quoted from Khalid b. Sayeed, **Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change,** New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980, p. 57.

50 For an interesting background on the functions of the Councils, see Azim Nanji, "Modernization and Change in the Nizārī Ismā'īlī Community in East Africa - a Perspective", **Journal of Religion in Africa,** vol. 6(1974), p. 123-139.

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which had proved dangerous and embarassing for the Āghā Khān.

> With nothing to do and nothing to occupy them, with no background and no roots..., their dependent status was taken for granted...Long years of this raffish, irresponsible life, in and around the rapidly growing city and port of Bombay, had not tended to make particularly worthy or useful citizens of them. But they came of high-spirited, proud stock, and their natural energies and abilities were now being dissipated in intrigues and feuds... my attempt to control this nest of hornets... met with fierce threats.[51]

One of the effects of the Āghā Khān's policy of mobilizing the local Khojah Ismā'īlīs to organize themselves against sectarian challenges was the proliferation of a vast Gujrātī literature dealing mainly with those ideas aimed at demonstrating the truth of the Ismā'īlī religious beliefs and of the Imām's divine authority.[52] The Khojah Ismā'īlīs utilized many ideals prevalent in Hindu and Muslim mystical orders to reconstruct the Ismā'īlī hierarchical and spiritual world view. Recent studies on the Ginānic traditions suggest that some important Gināns were, in fact, transliterated into Gujrātī script for the first time at the beginning of this century.[53] They are, however, said by the Khojahs to have been composed much earlier by the Ismā'īlī *pīrs.*[54]

The Ginānic concept of the Imām encompasses a wide range of functions from that of God manifested (the *avatār*) to that of the ideal man *(al-insān al-kāmil).*[55] In the *Moto Das Avatār* attributed to Sayyid Imām Shāh and published by Lāljī Devrāj in 1923, Hz. 'Alī is viewed as the tenth and the last, long awaited *(naklankī) avatār* of

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51 Āghā Khān Sultān Muhammad Shāh, **The Memoirs of Aga Khan,** London: Cassell and Co., 1954, p. 69-71.

52 For instance, Master Hasham Boga, **Ismā'īlī Darpan,** first published in 1908; and Jumabhai, Suratwala, **Maqsad-i-Haqīqat,** Bombay, 1910; etc., reflect the attempts of the Khojah Ismā'īlīs at defining the Ismā'īlī identity.

53 See Hasina Jamani's Master's Thesis, on "Brahm Prakāsh. A Translation and Analysis", submitted to the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill, 1985, p. 14.

54 G. Allana, **Ginans of Ismaili Pirs,** vol. 1, Ismailia Association for Pakistan, Karachi, 1984.

55 Azim Nanji, **The Nizārī Ismā'īlī Tradition in the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent,** New York: Caravan Books, 1978, p. 110-111.

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Lord Vishnū in the *Kalī yuga* (the present age).[56] He, the Imām, when he comes, will then kill the evil force *(da'int kaliga)* and save "man from the shackles of the cycle of rebirth".[57] At the spiritual level, this cycle represents the stages of a mystical path - the highest stage being that of attaining the Imām's *darshan* (religious experience of the true reality of the Imām).

> Let your devotion be directed to your Lord and teacher so that you may feel his presence.
>
> Purify yourself, so that there may be light upon light.
>
> Meditate on the Name of the Lord and let light illuminate your being.
>
> Taste the nectar of love, and let joy fill your heart.[58]

The Gināns, for instance *Brahm prakāsh* (The Light of God) and *Būjh niranjan* (The Knowledge of the Unknown), describe the nature of the *Imām-Mu'minīn* relationship in spiritual and moral terms and present the different stages of the spiritual journey that the *mu'min* must undertake to actualize his relationship with the Imām. Many Gināns, such as *Sloko Nāno* and *Sī Harfī,* strongly suggest the cultivation of faith and love for the *Murshid* (the teacher) as a prerequisite for experiencing the *darshan.*

> The lord says: we came into this world and have brought with us the secrets of deliverance,
>
> but many are lost in glamour and worldly pleasures,
>
> only a few *ashik* (lovers) comprehend (the secrets).[59]

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56 Lāljī Devrāj, **Moto Dash Avtār** (a Ginān by Sayyid Imām Shāh). Second Edition, Bombay: Khojah Sindhi Press, 1923.

57 Azim Nanji, Nizārī Ismā'īlī Traditions, p. 113.

58 Quoted from Azım Nanji, ibid. p. 127-28.

59 'Abd al-Rasūl Sulemān, **Chirāgh-i-Ma'arifat,** Karachi: 1914, draws parallels between the selected verses of *Diwān-i-Shams* and Gināns on the theme of *Imām-Mu'min* relationship.

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Apart from studies on the Gināns, no other serious study of the Gujrātī literature of the Khojah Ismā'īlīs during this period has so far been made. While the Gināns provided the Khojah Ismā'īlīs with a tool to relate the Shī'ī concept of the Imām to the Indian environment, the other Gujrātī works by Khojah Ismā'īlīs, such as **Maqsad-i-Haqīqat (1910), Ismā'īlī darpan (1906), Chirāgh-i-Mā'arifat, (1914) Nūr-i-Mūbīn (1936),** etc., mirror the Ismā'īlī response to the sectarian challenges and also to the changing political scene in India.[60] While the Ginānic concept of the Imām transcended history[61] - - indicating a Hindu trait of seeking salvation by leaping out of history - such texts as **Ismā'īlī darpan** and **Nūr-i-Mūbīn** link the concept of the Imām to the past with the purpose not only of emphasizing its historical continuity but of discouraging any formation of splinter groups. Such groups are seen as a break from the normal historical development of a society attempting to realize its ideals.[62]

Therefore, the significance of the non-Ginānic literature produced by the Khojah Ismā'īlīs during this period lies in its having provided the Khojah Ismā'īlīs with the crucial 'historical' element missing in the Ginānic concept of the Imām and, thus, in the definition of Ismā'īlī identity. **Nūr-i-Mūbīn,** recommended by the Āghā Khān III to the Khojahs to be read in order to understand their faith, was the first detailed history of the Imāms available to Khojahs in the Gujrātī language.[63] Following the Shī'ī tradition, **Nūr-i-Mūbīn** traces how Hz. 'Alī and his *ahl* were divinely appointed to lead

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60 See the section on 'Primary Sources' in the Bibliography.

61 The Gināns, as seen earlier, emphasize the themes representing the *bātin* (inner or deeper) meaning of the *zāhir* (external or outward) doctrinal formulations of religions in that it transcends the limits of the historically revealed authority.

62 For an excellent analysis on the relationship between historical continuity and the formation of the splinter groups in Judaism and Christianity, see Edwin Burtt, **Types of Religious Philosophy,** New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951.

63 Chunara, Vazir A J., **Nūr-i-Mūbīn,** first published in 1936 by the Bombay Ismailia Association. It has been edited four times; the last one appeared in 1961. It contains 600 pages. Presently, in Pakistan, the **Tārīkh al-A'immah Ismā'iliyya, (4 volumes),** Karachi: The Ismailia Association for Pakistan, 1983, is used as a text of Ismā'īlī history instead of **Nūr-i-Mūbīn.**

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the Muslim community. Its approach is metahistorical. It combines facts with Ṣūfī and Shī'ī *riwāyāt* (oral traditions), theology, and myths. The Imām is endowed with the power to intervene in the order of things and to perform *mu'jizāt* (evidentiary miracles).[64] At one level he represents the visible side of the attributeless Allāh. On another level he represents the moral and spiritual side of the physical man. Physically, he is man, like any other man. Spiritually, he is the *nūr* (the light) of God "without which the universe cannot exist even for a *pal* (moment)".[65] The Imām is *Qur'ān-i-nāṭiq* (the speaking Qur'ān), and he is *asās al-ta'wīl* (literally it means basis or foundation of the interpretation of the Qur'ān. It also means the revealer of the hidden meaning of the Qur'ān).[66]

Nūr-i-Mūbīn, unlike some of the earlier polemical works, such as **sant panth nā sotāno mār** (the power of true path), published in 1928, emphasizes those aspects of history which do not exacerbate sectarian tensions nor encourage communalism. It was written "not with a view to criticize other faiths".[67] The Imāms are viewed as pious,[68] and as having always remained neutral in politics.[69] In some ways **Nūr-i-Mubīn** reflects the Āghā Khān's support for Hindu-Muslim unity and for a united Muslim political stand between 1910 and 1930.[70]

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64 Chunara, **Nūr-i-Mūbīn,** p. 6.

65 ibid. p. 3.

66 ibid. p. 5.

67 ibid. 7.

68 ibid. p. 36.

69 ibid.

70 The Āghā Khān issued a Firmān directing the Ismā'ilīs to live in peace with Hindus and Muslims; **Kalām** vol. II, p. 160. Between 1942 and 1946, the Aghā Khān had expressed his intentions of helping the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress to some sort of Political compromise. For details, see Stanley Jackson, **The Aga Khan,** London: Odham Press, 1952, p. 190.

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Another development which finds expression in the literature of the Khojah Ismā'īlīs during this period is the growing emphasis on viewing Ismā'īlism as a Ṣūfī *ṭarīqah* (path) and the Imām as the *Murshid-i-Kāmil* (the perfect teacher). For instance, in **mira'at-i-'ashikīn** (the mirror of love), the author M. Nūr Muḥammad, equated Ismā'īlism with Ṣūfīsm, the difference being only that in the Ismā'īlī *ṭarīqah* the Imām is the only *Murshid-i-Kāmil.*[71] In the article *"Hz. 'Alī nī Ḥaqīqat aurkhān"* (the True Recognition of Hz. 'Alī), the author, Hamīr Bhā'i Lākhā, quotes from Mawlānā Maqbūl Aḥmad's *ta'wīl* of *Sura al-nabī* to show that "the Imām and Allāh are the same in essence *(dhāt)*".[72]

> In the beginning, the essence of God had no corporeality, and then it passed on to the state of existence, manifesting Himself in 'Alī....who is Pāk nūr (the holy light) of Allāh and without whose command nothing can move.[73]

The dualism between God and the World is overcome by the doctrine of divine immanence, often expressed in a form amounting to pantheism. The 'Monotheism' of Islam is rather understood as 'Monism' by the Ismā'īlī writers, a doctrine in which the hard and fast barrier between the divine and the *'abd* (the human creature) is removed. "Since monism rules out any 'beyond' or crude supernaturalism, there is a tendency to conceive the practical benefits of religion in this worldly terms, as moral, social and even physical well-being".[74]

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71 Published by the author, Miyāji Nūr Muhammad, Sidhpūr, India, in the nineteen-twenties.

72 **Fīdā'ī**, vol. 5(1935), p. 161-162.

73 ibid.

74 John Macquarrie in **Twentieth Century Religious Thought**, New York: Harper and Row, 1963, argues that "perhaps the most important religious consequence of monism is the removal of a hard and fast barrier between the divine and the human - God and man are essentially one". p. 42-43.

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The religious world view of the Khojah Ismā'īlīs, until the middle of 20th century, can thus be characterized as:

1. Hierarchical - insofar as it re-inforced its belief system in the ascending spiritual order;
2. Heterodox - insofar as it deviated from the orthodox Sunnī view of the transcendent God. Moreover, it recognized the truth of the claims of other religious orders and utilized them syncretically to define the Ismā'īlī identity itself.

In a hierarchical spiritual order, the activities of each man are located, defined, and measured according to his spiritual and moral perfection. The worth of an individual is measured against the 'whole' - which alone is perfect.[75] This attitude is best illustrated in the story of a devotee named Ākhūd who was mistreated by a *Mukhī* (an individual in charge of *Jamā'at Khānah* activities). On being asked by some of his friends to challenge the *Mukhī*, he argued that "to oppose the *Mukhī* is in essence, a challenge to the Imām who has the knowledge *('ilm)* of everything".[76]

The Ismā'īlī belief in the Imām as the possesor of the divine *'ilm* (knowledge) had a tremendous impact on the functioning of the newly created social and economic institutions as these institutions came to be administered by the Khojah Ismā'īlīs on the basis of religious commitment. The Ismā'īlī attitude, as reflected in the case of Ākhūd (seen above), diminishes the possibilities of embezzlement and dissensions in the functioning of the Imāmate institutions. The correspondence of an hierarchical spiritual order with the organizational structure of the community seems to have thus offered a potential for relating religious faith to development in the case of Khojah Ismā'īlīs in the British India. How the Āghā Khān III adapted faith to his

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75 ibid. p. 43.

76 **Fidā'ī,** vol. 5 (1935), p. 292.

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modernization policies will be examined in the next section.

A heterodox or syncretic religious movement, while incorporating elements from diverse religious traditions, also seeks to express the religious truth at various levels within the same group. The diverse Gujrātī works on the Gināns, on Sūfīsm, history, Qur'ān (e.g. **Qur'ān-i-Majīd: Mūr Ayāto** - - a translation of selected verses from the Qur'ān published in 1922), and theology offer evidence of the Ismā'īlī tendency to interpret religious faith and practice at various levels. At one level, serious research work on Ismā'īlism was being sponsored by the Khojah Ismā'īlīs. At another level, religious symbolism became increasingly important in the expression of the Ismā'īlī faith.

Around 1930, the Ismā'īlīs began to employ the services of scholars such as W. Ivanow (a Russian), Asaf Fayzī (a Sulaymānī Bohra Ismā'īlī) and later, Jawād al-Masqatī (an Arab Ismā'īlī from Masqat), to examine documents on Ismā'īlī history and to produce publications on Ismā'īlī subjects.[77] This development lent the Ismā'īlīs significant theoretical leverage in breaking away from the pattern of a Hindu caste-like group - to whom history was insignificant- - to become a historically conscious group. In 1933, Ivanow translated **Risālah dar Ḥaqīqat-i-Dīn** (The true meaning of religion) by Shāb al-dīn Shāh into English. It was subsequently translated into Gujrātī and published as a series of articles in the monthly issues of **Nizārī**; and later, in 1946, it was published in its entirety.[78]

The **risālah** is a treatise on how to lead a good life and how to attain *ma'rifah* (the highest knowledge or wisdom about reality). It argues that since there are different levels of understanding God, He is understood differently by different people.[79] What

77 Hanna Papanek, **Leadership and Social Change,** p. 239. For the list of Ivanow's writings see Azim Nanji, **The Nizārī Ismā'īlī Tradition,** p. 191.

78 See the "Preface" to Shāb al-dīn Shāh, **Risālah dar Ḥaqiqat-i-Dīn,** tr. by Ivanow, Bombay: Ismaili Society, 1946.

79 ibid. p. 18.

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people know as the *sifāt* (attributes) of God are what they "imagine" to be the perfect forms of existence.[80] "They regard ignorance as a defect, and thus say that God is All-knowing".[81] God is like a lamp which can be perceived "(only) through the light".[82] In this sense, "the saints of God, are the manifest forms of God *(Sūrat-i-zāhir-i-Khudā)*"[83]

> Imām Ja'far Sādiq once replied to a man who asked him whether it is true that on the Day of Resurrection God will become visible to all? 'Yes' - said he, - 'He is visible even before that day. He is visible to his slaves from the day when He asked them: "Am I not your Lord?" True believers saw Him even in this world. Do you not see Him? The man who asked the question then replied: "O my Lord, I see thee! Give me the permission to tell this (to others) on thy authority". The Imām replied: "Do not tell this to anybody... because people shall disbelieve you, regarding this as impiety *(kufr)*.[84]

At the Ismā'īlī mission conference held in Dar-es-Salaam (then, Tanganyika, East Africa),[85] in 1946, the Āghā Khān expressed his regret that the Ismā'īlīs were not grounded in Ismā'īlī Studies. He said that:

> I am sorry to say, gentlemen, a person like Dr. Ivanow of Russia knows more about the Ismailia religion and its meaning than most of the *Bhagats* [pious ones] put together and many like Mr. Faisee, a Bohra gentleman...knows more about the Ismailia religion than most people of this faith.

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80 ibid. p. 19.

81 ibid.

82 ibid. p. 20.

83 ibid.

84 ibid. p. 23.

85 "Report", **Mission Conference,** 1946. The author conjectures that this document which has been reprinted many times annonymously and distributed to the Ismā'īlīs seems to have been interpolated by some Khojah Ismā'īlīs to sanction their own syncretic views about the Imām. The author's conjecture is based on the fact that the document has become available to the Khojahs only recently (after 1970) and contains no information on its publishers.

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Thus the Āghā Khān suggested that since the Ismā'īlīs were weak in understanding their religion, they "must never reason with people who have no religion" lest such discussions destroys their faith. He also argued that Islam and Ismā'īlism are based on *Imān* (faith) and not reason. "Momin who has true faith does not mean to be a philosopher".[86] He criticized those Ismā'īlīs who sought to purge the Ismā'īlī prayer of Hindu concepts, such as *Macch avatār* (fish incarnate), and also those who intended to replace such phrases as *'Alī Allāh* ('Alī is Allāh) with *'Alī-un Walīy-Allāh* ('Alī is the beloved of Allāh). He explained that such terms and phrases have symbolical significance and, as such, should not be tampered with. He interpreted the concept of *Macch Avatār* as signifying that "when there was nothing but fish on earth, God stood as a witness.".. With reference to the phrase *'Alī Allāh* ('Alī is Allāh) he explained to the Ismā'īlīs that they should retain it because it meant that, although 'Alī was a "prisoner of the material world" during his physical existence, he was actually "the eternal that came from God and returned to God direct"[sic] - as a river formed of streams *(mu'minīn)* flows continuously to the ocean (Allāh). The Āghā Khān, said that:

> Shariati people do not understand this. These are the things that must be understood," that according to the Ismaili religion Allāh is the Ocean. Ali during his life time - on earth - was separated from the ocean of the Almighty - separated from it and running towards it - overcoming all material resistances and running towards its origin. From the *Hakikati* point of view, this *Ayat* means more than all the rest of Koran.

These views of the Āghā Khān on 'Alī and Qur'ān are currently not espoused in Pakistan by the Āghā Khān IV. The change in the Guidance from one Imām to another causes problems for the community. These problems will be discussed in chapters three and five. The Āghā Khān III in 1946 had felt that there was a strong need to retain "some part of Hindu Mythology" which "has a great deal of allegorical value".

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86 ibid.

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Similarly the Mythology of Hazarat Hussein's and 'Alî's supernatural acts should be considered and purely interpreted as allegorical.[87]

Allegories are symbolical narrations or descriptions. They explain certain ideas relating to one thing by using the image of another. The Sūfîs have utilized this mode of 'allegorical exegesis' or *ta'wîl* to interpret the Qur'ān. According to Goldziher, "in order to secure legitimate and traditional Islamic points of depature for this esotericism, they borrowed from Shî'îsm the doctrine asserting that Muhammad entrusted to his mandatory 'Alî the secret meaning of the revelations".[88]

The Ismā'îlî response to the sectarian challenges in India in the first half of this century was essentially a religious response. This response finds expression in the Ismā'îlî emphasis on the Shî'î and Ginānic traditions. These traditions served to assert and locate the basis of religious authority in the Āghā Khān/Imām. This attitude strengthened the position of the Imām by integrating the loose elements of the group and by legitimizing the processes of change within the community. The divine institution of Imāmah, as an expression of the popular Ismā'îlî beliefs and practices, thus became the rationale for the transformation of the social and economic life of the community.

2.2 Transformation and Tradition

As the Imām of the Ismā'îlî community, the Āghā Khān III transformed the social and economic lives of the Khojah Ismā'îlîs along the lines of his modernist vision. The change in the material conditions of a group "would of necessity lead to the actual formulation of the type of belief-system that it suggests".[89] This section examines how

87 ibid.

88 Ignaz Goldziher, **Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law,** tr. by Andreas and Ruth Hamori, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981, p. 139.

89 According to Safran, "there is a connection between material realities and belief-systems to the extent that a drastic change in the former may make a particular belief-system obsolete, require its modification or replacement, and suggest the

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the traditional Khojah Ismā'īlī concept of religious authority justified social and economic changes within the community earlier in this century; in other words, how the concept of change and transformation itself became part of the definition of religious authority.

The Āghā Khān recalls in his Memoirs that his mother - who was the daughter of the Qajar Shāh, Fath 'Alī Shāh, of Persia was a "mystic in the Muslim tradition... who habitually spent a great deal of time in prayer for spiritual enlightenment and for union with God. In such a spirit there was no room for bigotry".[90] The Āghā Khān's early Firmāns reflect the influence of his mother.[91]

However, his later training in Arabic, Persian, Shī'ī theology and calligraphy, on the one hand, and in science, English literature, philosophy, and poetry, on the other, had a profound impact on the formation of his attitude toward Islam and the West.[92] Praising his English teachers as 'broadminded', 'wise', and 'impartial',[93] he condemned his Shī'ī Muslim theologian-teacher as being:

> extremely learned, a profound scholar, with a deep and extensive knowledge of Arabic literature and of Islamic History, but all his learning had not widened his mind or warmed his heart. He was a bigoted sectarian... If Islam had indeed been the thing he taught then surely God had sent Muhammad not to be a blessing for all mankind but a curse.[94]

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direction it should take. Such ideological orientation may take a long time to materialize, if it does at all; meanwhile, the community, deprived of a valid belief-system, may become the victim of disorder and confusion..." Nadav Safran, **Egypt in Search of Political Community**, London: Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 2.

90 Āghā Khān, **Memoirs**, p. 19.

91 **Rūhānī Rāz** (the Spiritual Happiness) is a collection of Firmāns on the subject of spiritual awareness. These Firmāns do not go beyond 1908.

92 **Memoirs**, p. 18.

93 ibid. p. 16.

94 ibid. p. 17.

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The Āghā Khān's exposure to the West convinced him of the urgent need for the Muslims to embrace the reforms which were being introduced by the British into India.[95] He felt that the Muslims were backward because a large number of them had continued to observe superstitious and out-dated religious customs, such as *purdah* (seclusion of women) and the "parrot-like method of teaching Qur'ān."[96] The Āghā Khān believed that Islam embodied the means to a better human life.[97] He also defended Islam against Western misconceptions based on conservative manifestations of Islam.[98] He maintained that Islam as preached and practiced by the Prophet and the Muslims in the first century, including the Umayyads, is the "world's finest religion and culture".[99]

In a foreward to Qasim 'Alī Jairozbhoy's **Muhammad: A Mercy to all the Nations,** published in 1937, the Āghā Khān described Muhammad as the incorporator of the universality of all the religions. Such a universal attitude, according to the Āghā Khān, was a derivation from the fundamental Islamic principle - *Allāhu Akbar* (God is greater) - that "everything is maintained and sustained by Divine Power".[100] With the intention of indicating where the cause of the failure to uphold this principle lay, the Āghā Khān argued that while the West had broken free from the authority of the "schoolmen of Europe" during the Renaissance through "intellectual revolutions", the

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95 In his speech to the Muhammedan Education Conference, the Āghā Khān, for the first time, addressed the Muslims at large urging them to support British-introduced social reforms and not to be led astray by conservative Muslims. The speech is reproduced by Sirdār Iqbāl 'Alī Shāh in the **The Prince Aga Khan,** London: John Long, 1933, p. 66-72.

96 ibid. p. 68.

97 ibid. p. 196.

98 See "Forward" in Al-Hajj Qāsim 'Alī Jairozbhoy, **Muhammad: A Mercy to All the Nations,** London: Unwin Brothers, 1937.

99 ibid. p. 12.

100 ibid.

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Muslims were still under the spell of the *'ulamā'*, clinging to the "non-essentials *(furū'āt* [sic])" among Muslim practices and, in doing so, they "had almost thrown out the *usūlāt* [sic] (essentials)".[101]

As an alternative to the authority of the *'ulamā'*, the Āghā Khān maintained that the institution of *'Ulū al-amr* (literally it means 'the possesors of command' and refers to the authority of Imām and Caliph) was established to ensure that "the faith would ever remain living, extending, developing with science, knowledge, art and industry".[102]

> If, rightly, the Muslims have kept till now the forms of prayer and fasting as practiced at the time of the Prophet, it should not be forgotten that it is not the form of prayer and fasting that have been commanded, but the facts, and we are entitled to adjust the forms to the facts of life as circumstances changed. It is the same Prophet who advises his followers ever to remain *Ibn 'l-waqt* (i.e. children of the time and period which they were on earth).[103]

This statement reflects the Āghā Khān's modernist attitude in that he fundamentally believes Islam to be ideally suited to embrace modern science, socio-economic institutions, and political ideas.

The Muslims are divided on the question of Islam's position in the modern world. The stand of the Modernist Muslims - that Islam is adaptable to modern conditions - is met with strong criticism from the traditionalists. The latter abhor any view which suggests that Islam needs to change in order to satisfy all the needs of modern times.

In the Ismā'īlī context, the Āghā Khān emphasized the concept of the *hādir* (present) Imām.[104] "The nūr (light) of Hazarat 'Alī was passed on to the Imām of the time - the *hādir* - - whose guidance has precedence over all other sources of guidance

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[101] ibid. p. 13.

[102] ibid. p. 14.

[103] ibid. p. 15.

[104] **Kalām-i-Imām-i-Mūbīn** (vol. I) "The Firmāns of Mowlānā Sultān Muhammad Shāh - the Aghā Khān", Bombay: Ismailia Association for India, 1950, p. 1-5.

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for the Ismā'īlīs".[105]

> and if Qur'ān was self sufficient (in guiding the *mu'minīns),* Hz. 'Ali would not have been appointed his 'successor...In view of new discoveries and many changes the Imām is always *hādir* (present) to guide the *mu'minīns* in the best possible way....and so, whoever is the Imām of the time, his Firmāns ought to be obeyed. As times change, so do the Firmāns. .[106]

The Imām's guidance, according to the Āghā Khān, occupies a pre-eminent position in the Ismā'īlī religious system. The Āghā Khān utilized his authority to justify changes in the prevailing religious customs of the Khojah Ismā'īlīs in accordance with his modernist reformist policies. There were some groups of Khojah Ismā'īlīs who seem to have resisted the reforms being introduced by the Āghā Khān in the areas of education, marriage, etc.. The Firmāns during this period reflect that the Khojahs were still clinging to the authority of the local *mawlawīs,* Sūfī shrines and even Ginans in making decisions about marriage, health, education, etc..

Through analogies and persuasion the Firmāns argued that it is not only contrary to the fundamental Ismā'īlī principle but also pointless to cling "to the Firmāns of the past Imāms," or "the Gināns (traditions) of the *pīrs* (such as *Pīr* Ṣadr al-Dīn)," and not to obey the Firmāns of the *hādir* (present) Imām.

> Whoever is the Imām, his Firmāns are to be obeyed. It is useless to obey the Firmāns of the Imāms of the past while disobeying the Firmāns of the Imām who is present amongst you...Thirteen hundred years back, the conditions of Arabs were very good. At the time, the Arab customs were also good. Now there have been many changes in the world. It is useless to continue to observe those customs at present. What *Pīr* Ṣadr-al-Dīn said five hundred years ago was significant. What is the use of clinging to the Firmāns of the *pīrs* and refuse to abide by my Firmāns.[107]

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105 ibid. p. 241.

106 ibid.

107 ibid. p. 190.

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The Āghā Khān's attempts to introduce reforms within the community necessitated repeated assertions of his authority. The majority of Firmāns between 1885 and 1920 reflect the prevalent tendency among some Khojahs to invoke mediation of forces other than the Imām and also to indulge in superstitious rituals. The latter, which included rituals such as visiting the tombs of the *pīrs*, the parading of effigies,[108] and accepting *ta'wīdh*[109] (written verses of Qur'ān to ward off evil spirits), etc., posed a challenge both to his authority and to his modernist vision. While asserting his authority he, therefore, also attempted to purify the Ismā'īlī faith from superstitious customs in a reformist fashion. The Firmān issued at Karachi in 1920 strictly forbade the Ismā'īlīs to indulge in such superstitious rituals as visiting the residences or tombs of the *pīrs* to seek *barakah* (blessings) and the mediation of the *pīrs*.

> Those who go to Hydershah's *Kothī* (residence) where rituals are performed, are doing harm. That is sinful. Neither the *pīr* nor his grave is there. Even if there was a grave of the *pīr*, it is not an Ismā'īlī practice. Even if there was once a (concept of) the grave in the Ismā'īlī faith, it is now impermissible. That is idol worship. Like that there are thousands of *Kothīs*. Of what use are they..?[110]

It is significant to mention here that the changes which the Āghā Khān attempted to introduce among the Ismā'īlīs by appealing to his religious authority most likely derived much of their weight from the Āghā Khān's role in the political life of India. This role earned him considerable respect among the modernist Muslims, the British, and some popular Hindu leaders, such as Gandhi, and in turn bestowed prestige on the Ismā'īlī community in India.[111]

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108 "Those who make *tā'būt* (effigies) are idol worshippers" (Karachi 1-5-1920) **Kalām** (vol. II), p. 56.

109 **Kalām** (vol. I) p. 289.

110 **Kalām** (vol. II), p. 59.

111 For details on the influence of the Āghā Khān, Qayyum Malik, **H.R.H. Prince Aga Khan**, Karachi: The Ismailia Association for Pakistan, 1954.

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Like other Muslims who supported the idea of Hindu-Muslim unity, such as Jinnāh (he withdrew from the Congress in 1920 and then abandoned his support for Hindu-Muslim unity) and Kalām Azād, the Āghā Khān supported the idea of Hindu-Muslim unity. But he felt that political independence should be sought through evolution - and not through radical opposition - until such time as the Indians were united and capable of self-rule.[112] Earlier, in 1906, he, along with Muhsin-ul-Mulk and others, had founded the Muslim League to represent the Muslims in demanding a fair share for themselves in the new social and political reforms brought about by the British.[113] His philanthropic contributions to various Muslim institutions, such as Aligarh, his active participation in the Khilafat Movement,[114] his defense against Western criticism of Islam[115] etc., earned him considerable respect among the modernist Muslims of India and, later, in Pakistan.[116] Thus, when Jawaharlāl Nehrū in 1935 attacked the Āghā Khān as a heretic for pretending to be God while living in the West and serving British interests, and, yet ironically, being looked upon to lead the Muslims of India,[117] the

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112 See Āghā Khān, Sir Sultān Muhammad Shāh, **India in Transition, A Study in Political Evolution,** New York: Bennett, Coleman & Co., Ltd. The Times of India Office, 1918.

113 Aziz Ahmad, **Islamic Modernism,** p. 66.

114 His concern for obtaining the status of a 'Recognized University' for Aligarh led him to raise huge funds to finance it. See Dumasia, **Aga Khan,** p. 183.

115 For instance, in defense against the criticism that Islam renders women non-entities, the Aghā Khān maintained that "their spiritual equality with men is absolute". Stanley Jackson, **Aga Khan,** p. 101. He accused the West of having, instead, denied the rights of inheritance for married women until 1882; but "the Muslim Women got full and equal rights to property one thousand and three hundred years ago, when the Muslim religion was founded". p. 101. The Aghā Khān occasionally expressed his distaste for British "snobbery" and racial policies which, according to him, probably caused his fourth wife, Yvette Labrousse, to convert to Islam. Willi Frischauer, **The Aga Khans,** London: The Bodley Head 1970, p. 145.

116 In Pakistan, the Āghā Khān came to be regarded as one of the Founders of Pakistan, See **Dawn,** 12th July, 1957, p. 5.

117 Jawahar Lāl Nehrū, "His Highness the Aga Khan", **Modern Review,** vol. 58(1935) No. 5, p. 505-507.

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Modernist Muslims, such as Iqbāl, defended him by pointing out that he was a good Muslim by virtue of his adherence to the *Kalimah* (the Islamic witnessing formula).[118]

Izhār-i-Ḥaqīqat, written in 1921, by a Sunnī *'ālim*, Fayzūl Ḥasan Salīm, had defended the beliefs and practices of the Khojah Ismā'īlī community. It was translated by Lāljī Devrāj into Gujrātī from Urdū in the same year. Salīm, a graduate from al-Azhar, claimed in this book that his study of Ismā'īlī history did not reveal that the Khojah beliefs amounted to heresy *(shirk)*. He described the Khojahs as "peace loving, respectful of other *tarīqahs*, and devoted to the experiencing of *ma'rifah* in a Sūfī style".[119] Concerning Khojah syncretic practices, the author argued that such practices signified points of contact and unity between the Muslims and Hindus. "The Hindus were not idolators". In fact, he claimed,

> the Sharī'ah laws, established by the Prophet and the Imāms, over a period of time, begin to be employed idolatrously by the Sunnīs in the same way as idols are worshipped among the Hindus, *tabūt* (parading the effigies) is practiced among the Shī'ah, and tombs are worshipped among some Sūfī *tarīqahs*.[120]

He condemned the Muslim revivalist and anti-Sūfī tendencies for blunting the spiritual aspects of Islam. It was due partly to ignorance on the part of some Khojahs who indulged in idolatry, he argued, that the Ismā'īlī concept of religious authority has been so misunderstood.[121]

In the light of the growing Muslim political consciousness in India, prior to its partition in 1947, the Āghā Khān encouraged the Isma'ilīs to align themselves with the Muslims, and to project an Islamic identity for the sake of Muslim unity. Accordingly, the Ismā'īlīs were asked to visit Sunnī Mosques and to mingle with other Muslims without articulating any Shī'ah-Sunnī differences.

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118 Smith, **Modern Islam,** p. 135.

119 **Izhār-i-Ḥaqīqat,** Bombay: Sindhi printing Press, 1921, p. 5.

120 ibid. p. 4.

121 ibid.

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> I am very happy to learn that you go to the Mosques. You must go on every Friday and mingle with other Muslims... To encourage Shī'ī-Sunnī enmity is to weaken Islam. Forget who Yazīd was. It is not our problem. We are all brothers who witness *Kalimah - La Illaha Illa Allāh* (there is no God but Allāh).[122]

The Āghā Khān not only issued Firmāns to the Khojah Ismā'īlīs to help foster Muslim unity but adapted Islamic values to the processes of modernization. For instance, in marriage practices, education and economics he made several changes.

2.2.1 Marriage:

Marriage customs prevalent among some sectors of the Khojah Ismā'īlīs such as, infant marriages, disallowing widows and divorcees from remarrying, forcing brides to live in their parents' home for a long period before allowing them to join their husbands;[123] and setting high dowry prices for the brides[124] were abolished by the Āghā Khān. He introduced the *Nikāh* (the Muslim marriage ceremony, which also connoted 'social contract') to replace all other marriage ceremonies.[125] In 1923, he argued that "if the rich will spend less (in the marriage ceremonies), then the poor people too will spend less".[126] Presently, in Pakistan, all Ismā'īlī marriages are performed through the *nikāh* ceremony or in the presence of the Āghā Khān where the couples exchange rings and are given the Imām's blessings. These simple marriage ceremonies were meant to reduce expenses incurred as a result of holding elaborate marriage parties and also to avoid dowries. It was hoped, thus, to encourage the poor to get married. Presently, however, the affluent continue to indulge in extravagant and

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122 The Firmāns was issued in Bombay in 1934 and in Karachi in 1938. **Kalām** vol. II, p. 160 and p. 246.

123 ibid. p. 14.

124 ibid. p. 12.

125 "In our *madhab* (faith) no customs or practices, except the *nikāh*, is *wājib* (obligatory), ban all other ceremonies". **Kalām,** vol. II, p. 44.

126 **Kalām,** vol. II, p. 44.

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elaborate parties. These parties often become the target of sharp criticisms from the community.[127] The Āghā Khān III had, around 1910, taken steps to simplify and, at the same time, to dignify the concept of marriage by declaring that marriages could be performed in his presence.[128] Thus, the custom of performing marriages in the presence of the Imām became a very prominent practice among the Ismā'īlīs. Marrying a widow, the Āghā Khān maintained, would earn one a *sawāb* (spiritual benefit). "Even the Prophet himself married nine widows".[129] Marriage with more than one wife just "for the sake of pleasure alone"[130] was condemned. He argued that only under certain circumstances "marry a second wife; but treat both your wives as equal as your two eyes". The Ismā'īlīs, therefore do not encourage or practice polygamy.[131]

The institution of marriage served also to foster unity among the Khojahs of different backgrounds in India. He advised the Ismā'īlīs not to think of themselves in ethnic terms (i.e. Kucchī, Kāthiawārī, Sindhī, etc.), but as *murīds* and brothers in the Ismā'īlī faith. "Give your daughters to each other ... you are all the children of the same parents".[132]

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127 **Payghām,** 15th August 1968, p. 1.

128 ibid. p. 27.

129 ibid. p. 83.

130 **Kalām,** vol. I, p. 284.

131 ibid.

132 **Kalām** vol. II, p. 42-43.

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2.2.2 Education:

The Āghā Khān's main objective in the educational field was to eradicate illiteracy among the Jamā'at through the acquisition of *dunyawī ta'līm* (worldly education) in addition to *dīnī ta'līm* (religious education).[133] To realize this objective, he asked the Ismā'īlī schools to collect higher fees from the rich in order to fund the education of the poor.[134] We have no detailed records available to us on the number of Ismā'īlī schools and the extent to which they benefited the poor during the period under discussion. However, in 1935, an issue of a Gujrātī magazine called **Fidā'ī** reports that:

> Now in Kāthiawār the Ismā'īlī community can benefit from four boarding schools... The new boarding schools will be run by Sūlaymān Zawer of Bombay who has previously worked for the 'The Fidā'ī Boarding and Orphange Committee' ...which administers 'The Kandi Mahollah Ismaili Students Library', 'Fidā'ī Printing Press', and the boarding school.[135]

The same issue of **Fidā'ī** magazine reports that "in accordance with the Imām's wishes, a large part of the Golden Jubilee Funds were directed towards child care and scholarships for the improvement of the quality of life ...of the poor and needy".[136] In the same year (1935), an educated Ismā'īlī (with an M.A. degree), Ismā'īl Thāwar Virānī, while praising the efforts of 'His Highness Central Board of Education', stated:

> But as regards secondary and High school education the existing state of things is not at all satisfactory. The Central Free School managed by His Highness Central Board of Education does not teach the students higher than the third standard in English, and although scholarships are awarded to some of the more promising students to enable them to pursue higher studies, the majority of students find it difficult to join the other schools in the city where the fees are often more than the parents can afford to pay. In the circumstances it would be a great asset to our community if we possess a Central Free School which teaches the

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133 ibid. p. 51.

134 ibid. p. 18.

135 **Fidā'ī** vol. 9 (1935), No. 4, p. 268.

136 ibid. p. 266.

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students upto the matriculation examination.[137]

Thāwar Virānî reports that although there existed an Ismā'îlî Orphanage for female orphans and poor girls, it did not function as efficiently as that for the male orphans. He, however, praised the Fidā'î Boarding school and Orphanage for teaching handicraft and home industry to the orphans and the poor.[138]

The Āghā Khān paid great attention to the education of women. He exhorted parents to send their daughters to schools. If financial strain posed a situation where a choice had to be made between "sending your daughter or your son to school, then first send your daughter to school".[139] While more emphasis was laid on girls' education, the Firmāns also reflect a policy of helping more Ismā'îlî children to acquire elementary and secondary education rather than helping a minority to acquire university degrees.[140] The justification for adopting such a policy was given in the Firmāns which encouraged the Ismā'îlîs to go into trade and commerce and not to become subservient through the excercise of professions such as Law.[141]

> If three or four students can be helped to study up to the matric (approximately tenth grade) with the same amount needed to get one student through a B.A. program, then why not educate more children. Otherwise it is like making one person rich and ten persons poor. If a student intends to do a B.A. in order to do a job...then how will you be rich? It is not by studying only that you will become rich, but by going into trade one becomes rich...[142]

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137 ibid. p. 268.

138 ibid.

139 **Kalām** vol. II, p. 4.

140 ibid. p. 290.

141 **Mubārak Tālikā and Messages**, Mombasa: Ismailia Association for Africa, 1955, p. 18.

142 **Kalām**, vol. II, p. 29.

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This advice from the Imām at least provided justification and legitimacy for the involvement of a large number of Khojah Ismā'īlīs in trade and commerce. Generally, many young men in India sought employment with the Government - it being the principal employer. The Ismā'īlīs, on the contrary, sought independence through trade and commerce. This trait of seeking financial independence continues to prevail among the Khojah Ismā'īlīs in Pakistan. There may have been other reasons besides the Āghā Khān's advice as well for this trait of the Khojahs. However, the resulting material prosperity, while strengthening the belief structure of the community, may have perhaps contributed toward the community's diversion from intellectual involvement in stating the Ismā'īlī position on Islamic modernism, Sūfism, Ismā'īlī theology, etc.. Until recently, no substantial works on these subjects have been produced by the Khojah Ismā'īlīs. We will see in the following chapters how this vacuum in Modern Ismā'īlī religious thought has caused religious tensions within the Ismā'īlī community in Pakistan under the impact of the Islamization process.

2.2.3 Economics

The economic success of the Khojah Ismā'īlīs is largely attributable to the immigration policies of the Āghā Khān. A large number of Khojahs were assisted in migrating from the desert-like areas of Kucch and Kāthiawār, and from crowded cities like Bombay, to Burma, Africa, etc.. The Āghā Khān advised the Ismā'īlīs to keep abreast of modern developments in order to avoid destabilization (for example, he advised those involved in the horse-carriage transport business to switch to automobiles).[143] He attributed religious significance to the trickling down of the wealth accumulated at the upper level. To help a poor Ismā'īlī to establish himself economically was equated with "more than 1,000 years of *ibādah* (worship)".[144] The

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[143] ibid. p. 81.

[144] ibid. p. 72.

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Khojah Ismā'īlīs responded to the social and economic directives of the Āghā Khān by enthusiastically translating them into principles governing their lives. For instance, migration in search of economic opportunities became a widely held Ismā'īlī trait; and the Ismā'īlī co-operative banks and schools mushroomed wherever the Khojah Ismā'īlīs constituted a numerically viable group to carry out such activities. These activities are recorded, for instance, in the magazine **Fidā'ī** published between 1920 and 1940.[145]

The Ismā'īlīs' response to the changes introduced by the Āghā Khān during this period is determined by their perception of the Imām. The Imām was the locus of religious authority. His authority consisted precisely in his having been divinely appointed in the line of *nass*, and in his being the *nūr* of Allāh. By virtue of his religious authority, the Imām was able to command the means to transform the lives of the Khojah Ismā'īlīs.

The Ismā'īlī concept of the Imām during this period, is characterized by the transcendental and divine aspects it derived from both Shī'ī and Hindu syncretic borrowings made by the community in the Indian sub-continent. This development was partly triggered by sectarian challenges to the loose identity of the Khojahs and also to the authority of the Imām. The official British recognition of the Imām's absolute authority and the Āghā Khān III's public involvement both at the Indian and international levels added the needed prestige and significance to the role of the Imām and, thus, to the image of the Ismā'īlīs.

The Āghā Khān utilized this acquired religious authority to facilitate secular developments within the community "without being impeded by the historical limits of the role definition".[146] The improvement in the material life of the community in turn

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[145] For instance Kandi Mahol library was established in 1918 and the Ismaili Co-operative Bank in 1930 under the directives of the Aghā Khān. **Fidā'ī**, 1931-35.

[146] Hanna Papanek, **Leadership and Social Change**, p. 108.

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further strengthened the Khojah identity defined by the syncretic and hierarchical spiritual order of which the Imām is the apex.

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Chapter III

ISLAM IN PAKISTAN: 1947-1977

This chapter examines the problems that have confronted the Muslims of Pakistan in their attempt at defining the role of Islam in Pakistan, from 1947, when the country gained independence to 1977, when the last of the Modernist Governments under Zulfiqar 'Ali Bhutto fell. The following chapters on 'The Development of the Ismā'īlī Concept of Religious Authority' and on 'Islamization' will be seen against this background.

Under Jinnāh, the Muslim nationalist movement (in the sense of the Pakistan movement) in British India acquired a religious and, therefore, a communal undertone, in the second quarter of the 20th century. Communalism had already set Muslims and Hindus against each other especially after the failure of the Khilafat Movement.[147] Communalism, in the sense of loyalty to the membership of a group became the rationale for the Muslim League's Pakistan Movement after 1936.[148]

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147 Wilfred Cantwell Smith defines Communalism in India as "that ideology which has emphasized as the social, political, and economic unit the group of adherents of each religion, and has emphasized the distinction, even the antagonism, between such groups; the word 'adherent' and 'religion' being taken in the most nominal sense. Muslim communalists, for instance, have been highly conscious of the Muslims within India as a supposedly single, cohesive community, to which they devote their loyalty..." For an excellent analysis, see his **Modern Islam in India;** London: Victor Golancz Ltd., 1946. Communalism as an ingredient of Muslim Nationalism had never been intensely manifested before 1936, because the Muslim League was, unlike the Indian National Congress, not a nationalist organization. See Peter Hardy, **The Muslims of British India;** Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972, p. 227.

148 Smith, **Modern Islam,** p. 248.

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Muslim Communalism, in the form of seeking separate Muslim representation for Muslims, as espoused earlier by Modernist Muslims such as Sayyid Ahmad Khān, the Āghā Khān, Muhsin-al-Mulk, and later by Muḥammad 'Alī Jinnāh (a Shī'ah),[149] was initially aimed at safeguarding the political and social interests of Muslims against the Hindu majority in the democratic framework being introduced into India by the British.[150] The Āghā Khān, in 1929, stated that the aims of the Muslim League were "purely political. The religious differences separating various sects of Muhammadans exist for all time as far as we can foresee."[151]

After the failure of the Khilafat Movement (1919-1924) Muslim Communalism was characterized by increased antagonism towards Hindus. The Muslims felt that the Hindus had betrayed them when Gandhi called off the non-co-operation movement, which was a joint Hindu-Muslim pressure tactic against the British to demand *swarāj* (home rule) and the restoration of the Khilafat in Turkey.[152] Until the Khilafat

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149 Much has been written on determining exactly to what branch of the Shī'ah Jinnāh belonged. See Hector Bolitho, **Jinnāh, Creator of Pakistan,** New York: Macmillan and Co., 1954. See also Sheila McDonough, ed. **Mohammad Ali Jinnah,** Massachusetts: Heath and Co., 1970. Stanley Wolpert writes in **Jinnah of Pakistan,** New York: Oxford University Press, 1984, that Jinnāh was a Khojah Ismā'īlī, p. 4.

150 Sayyid Ahmad Khān expressed the fear in the following words: "The system of representation of the views and the interests of the population, and in countries where the population is composed of one race and one creed it is no doubt the best system that can be adopted. But, My Lord, in a country like India, where caste distinctions still flourish, where there is not fusion of the various races, where religious distinctions are still violent,... the principle of election, pure and simple... would attend with the evils of greater significance than purely economic considerations." R. Symonds, **The Making of Pakistan,** London: Faber and Faber, 1950, p. 30-31.

151 Harry Greenwall, **H.H. The Aga Khan Imam of the Ismailis,** London: The Cresent Press, 1952, p. 136.

152 Similar to political development in Turkey - where the position of the Caliph, 'Abd al-Ḥamīd, was being threatened by rising Turkish nationalism - the Muslims of India felt that their Islamic culture was being threatened by the British. They joined the Congress to demand two things. 1. *Swarāj*, i.e. home-rule for India, and 2. to revive the concept of Khilāfat in Turkey for the Muslims of India to draw inspiration from. In February, 1922, Gandhi called off the non-co-operation movement. See Smith, **Modern Islam,** p. 195-204. For an important work on

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Movement, Hardy maintains, there was no unity among the Muslims in India. The consciousness of the India-wide Muslim Community began to evolve slowly, and communalism became an element in its evolution.[153] Muslim Communalism contributed towards articulating a common Islamic identity among the Muslims in response to the external threat - Hinduism. This external threat temporarily camouflaged the existing theological and sectarian fissures in the Muslim community itself.[154]

Jinnāh exploited the situation[155] and set out to broaden the League platform by accomodating an emotionally based Muslim Communalism to the political and legal categories of Western democracy in an effort to gain power for the Muslim League after 1936.[156]

In spite of Jinnāh's efforts to underpin the League with Communalism, the Muslim League was heavily defeated in the elections of 1937 even within the Muslim majority provinces of Punjab, N.W.F.P. and Sindh. M. J. Akbar argues that these elections were "indicative of the popular mood" which was supportive of democratic, socialist and secularist views, rather than communalist ones.[157] I. A. Talbot, however, argues that while the Muslim League was essentially an urban and elite party, prior to 1936, the power to mobilize the masses in the rural areas lay with the Sūfī *pīrs*. The traditional religious pattern of authority integrated with the economics of the rural

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Khilafat Movement see Gail Minault, **Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India.** New York: Colombia University Press, 1982.

153 Peter Hardy, **The Muslims of British India,** p. 198-210.

154 ibid. p. 207.

155 Khalid Bin Sayeed, **Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change,** New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980, p. 37.

156 Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Political Leadership and Institution Building Under Jinnāh, Ayub, and Bhutto", in **Pakistan: The Long View,** ed. by Ziring, Braibanti, and Wriggins, Durham: Duke University Press, 1977, p. 24.

157 M.J. Akbar, **India: The Siege Within,** New York: Penguin Books, 1985, p. 29.

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population appears to have been more crucial in determining the moods of the people.[158] In Punjab, for instance, the support for the Unionist Party was the decisive factor in the defeat of the Muslim League.[159]

After 1937, Jinnāh began to broaden the League's support base by enlisting the allegiance of the *pīrs* and also by continuing to fuel communalism. In 1939, the League fueled Hindu-Muslim antagonism through the circulation of the 'Pirpur Report' accusing the Hindu-dominated Congress of atrocities committed against the Muslims.[160] In 1940 the Muslim League resolved to demand 'Independent States' made up of Muslim majority provinces.[161] Muslim Communalism then began to be identified with "Muslim Nationalism" or "Islamic Nationalism."[162] Thus, the Pakistan Movement, in the sense of Muslim Nationalism, gave little attention to what the Pakistan sought by the Muslim League would be like in terms of the government, the principal institutions, etc.. Its foremost objective was independence on a basis that would ensure Muslim interests. The League was not concerned with the detailed formulation of its political framework, but with the broad and emotionally based religious frame of reference to "foster in the Muslim people of India a sense of community, a feeling of belonging together which ... had never before so intensely characterized the Muslims of that subcontinent at any time in their history".[163]

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158 A. Talbot, "The Growth of the Muslim League in Punjab; 1937-46", **The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics,** vol. 20(1982). Also see his "The 1946 Punjab Elections", **Modern Asian Studies,** 14(1980).

159 Talbot, "Punjab Elections", p. 81.

160 W. Cantwell Smith maintains that the report was exaggerated, see **Modern Islam,** p. 261.

161 Symonds, **The Making of Pakistan,** p. 41.

162 Charles J. Adams, **Islam in Pakistan,** Lassale: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1959, p 37.

163 ibid. p. 34.

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The Muslim League proved victorious in the 1946 elections. Muhammad Munîr, the retired Chief Justice of Pakistan, repeatedly emphasizes in his book **From Jinnah to Zia** that Jinnāh was against the creation of "theocracy" in Pakistan.[164] Jinnāh envisaged a secular democratic Government "embodying the essential principles of Islam" which were also the modernist principles of democracy, viz. "equality, justice and fairplay to everybody".[165] These views of Jinnāh which he expressed in his speech to the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly were vague in that they implied no particular structure of Government and State.

> You may belong to any religion or caste or creed - that has nothing to do with the business of the State... We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State..., and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense; because that is the personal faith of each individual but in the political sense as citizens of the State.[166]

Munîr claims that those who had in fact opposed the Pakistan movement became the forerunners in making Pakistan a theocracy.[167]

Many *'ulamā'* and Mawlānā Mawdūdî - the leader of Jamā'at-i-Islāmî - had vehemently opposed the Pakistan Movement. Mawdūdî argued that the Pakistan idea implied Muslim loyalty to a "Western Phenomenon of Nationalism" and not to the Muslim Society governed by the Divine Will - Allāh's Will.[168] His objection was directed at the leadership of the Pakistan Movement - particularly Jinnāh. According to Mawdūdî, Jinnāh and other Modernist Muslims were more dangerous than atheists because the former corrupted Islam from within by sapping "the very foundation of

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164 M. Munir, **From Jinnah to Zia,** Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1980, p. 30.

165 ibid. p. 31.

166 ibid. p. 30.

167 ibid. p. 53-71.

168 For an excellent analysis of Mawdūdi's thought see Charles Adams, "The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi" in **South Asian Politics and Religion.** ed. by D.E. Smith, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.

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Islamic commitment"[169] and replacing it with material interests.

Some *'ulamā'* such as Shabbîr Aḥmad Uṣmāni, Muftî Muḥammad Shafî'î and Ihtishām al-Ḥaqq, who supported the Pakistan Movement, envisaged a state governed by the Sharî'ah[170] where they would acquire a renewed and important role as overseers of the implementation of Islamic ideals.[171] Binder reports that soon after Pakistan came into existence, "several *'ulamā'* met at the residence of Mawlānā Shabbîr Aḥmad Uṣmānî and worked out a plan for a semi-independent ministry of religious affairs".[172] He adds that such a ministry was not only to be immune to voting but "it would act as general censor of all government activities, and excercise general supervision over the behaviour of all government servants. The aim of these *'ulamā'* was to preserve not to change; their method was through political recognition of their institution".[173] This group of conservative *'ulamā'* differed from the revivalist group under Mawdūdî on the question of the role of religious authority. The former's role was more that of preservers and transmitters of a divine law already interpreted by the legal schools (mainly Ḥanafî in Pakistan) and not that of reformers. *Ijtihād* or individual judgement was the prerogative of the founders of the legal schools alone. "To alter the decisions that have been accepted for ages would be to deny the eternal immutability for God's law, and to admit that earlier jurists erred, would be to destroy the idea of the continuity of the divine guidance of the Muslim community".[174] The latter (revivalists) rely on reason and personal judgment for the interpretation of what

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169 ibid. p. 374.

170 Peter Hardy, **The Muslims of British India,** p. 242.

171 Sheila McDonough, "The Religious Legitimization of Change Among Modernists in Indo-Pakistani Islam" in **Religion and the Legitimation of Power in South Asia,** ed. by Bardwell L.Smith, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978, p. 43.

172 Binder, **Religion and Politics,** p. 33.

173 ibid.

174 Binder, **Religion and Politics,** p. 26.

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they consider clear and simple Qur'ānic injunctions and prophetic traditions[175] which alone constitute the Islamic ideals by which a Muslim Society ought to be governed.[176] Both groups, however, are decidedly anti-Western, anti-Hindu and puritanical. An ideal Islamic Society, accordingly, must be monolithic and free from internal diversity which is generally due to foreign influences. Peter Hardy quotes a Punjabi Muslim's vision of a Muslim State.

> A Muslim State may not mean a State in the Western sense of the word which the Indian Muslim have been accustomed to. It may mean a State governed by the Islamic Law as contained in the Holy Qur'ān. It may mean the purging of the Indian Muslims of all un-Islamic influences which they have contracted on account of their close contact with the non-Muslim communities in India.[177]

When Pakistan emerged in 1947, a number of *'ulamā'* - - and Mawdūdī who had opposed the creation of Pakistan - migrated to Pakistan where they undertook to build a definition of an Islamic State on which the country could be patterned. The *'ulamā'* did not consider Mawdūdī to be an *'ālim*. The *'ulamā'* and Mawdūdī differed from one another sharply, especially as evidenced during the debates about the constitution. Mawdūdī denied the *'ulamā'* the veto power over legislation, something which they very much wanted. Also, Mawdūdī rejected *taqlīd* and blamed the *'ulamā'* for the corruption of Islam.[178] The enthusiasm of both the *'ulamā'* and Mawdudī not only clashed with the Government of Pakistan, administered mainly by Western educated Muslims, but reflected a Sunnī Sectarian bias.[179] Their vision of Islam and Islamic

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175 Charles Adams argues that the two sources of Islamic authority are (i) silent on many matters of concern to the Muslims and must be supplemented by some other principle of authority; (ii) the fact that in addition to their clear commands the basic sources have a number of others, the exact meaning of which is doubtful and require interpretation; (iii) the fact that even clear commands must be understood in the light of whatever historical circumstances may prevail." See "The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi", p. 386.

176 ibid.

177 Hardy, **The Muslims of British India**, p. 241.

178 Binder, **Religion and Politics**, p. 75

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Society was, in principle, the equivalent of the Sunnî Islamic Society based on either the Qur'ān and the traditions of the Prophet as interpreted by individual Muslims (pious like Mawdūdī)[180] or as interpreted by one of the four legal schools; Hanafî, in the case of Pakistan.[181] Such a position undercut the cardinal Shî'î principle of *Imāmah* which, according to *Shî'î* Muslims, is the sole divinely authorized institution for interpreting the Qur'ān and, accordingly, for upholding the law.[182]

The Modernist Muslims who believed that Islam is rational, humanitarian, liberal, and everything that a modern democratic state espouses, did not feel the need to formulate a criterion to determine who was a Muslim or what makes a society Islamic. Theirs was essentially a secularist vision, though they talked about the relationship between Islam and Pakistan. If the vision was not secularist, it was at-least individualistic in the sense that they saw religion as each man's relation with God. (Jinnāh, as seen above, represented this view in particular). In a modern democratic state, the modernists believed that the Muslims would be free to practice their faith.[183] This implied not only security and freedom for Muslim minority groups, such as the Shî'ah and the Ahmadîyah, but also for minority non-Muslim groups such as Christians and Hindus, in shaping their own religious orientations.[184]

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179 ibid. p. 242.

180 Azız Ahmad, "Islam and Democracy in Pakistan", in **Religion and Change in Contemporary Asia,** ed. by Robert F. Spencer, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971, p. 126.

181 M.Geijbels, "The Process of Islamization in Pakistan" **al-Mushir,** Rawalpindi: vol. XXI, (1979) p. 31-51.

182 For a Shî'î concept of Imāmah see Vaglieri, "Ali bin Abi Talib", **EI2** p. 381 and also A.A. Fyzee, **The Book of Faith** translated from **Da'ā'im al-Islam of al Qādî al-Nu'mān,** Bombay: 1974, p. 26.

183 Freeland Abbot, "Pakistan and the Secular State" in **South Asian Politics and Religion,** p. 360.

184 Keith Callard, **Pakistan: A Political Study,** London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1957, p. 233.

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Amongst the Muslims who opposed the Modernist vision of Islam, the revivalist group - Jamā'at-i-Islāmī - has been the most organized, effective and appealing religio-political group in Pakistan.[185] According to Mawdūdī, the creation of Pakistan was sought in order to found an Islamic State based on the Sharī'ah - the Islamic ideals as revealed through the Qur'ān and exemplified by the Prophet of Islām. Obedience to any authority other than God means "idolatory or associating partners with God *(shirk)*..."[186] Thus, a modern democratic state is antithetical to Islam, and the architects of such a State are *Kāfirs* (unbelievers).[187] His position implied that Jinnāh and the supporters of the Muslim League were *Kāfirs*. They had followed the alien ideals of nationalism and democracy which bestow sovereignty on man or a nation instead of Allāh.

The contradiction between the two visions - one Democratic and one Islamic (i.e. a view of what a proper Islamic order is) - - of governing Pakistan became evident in the Objectives Resolution[188] passed by the Constituent Assembly in 1949, and later incorporated in the 1956 Constitution of the "Islamic Republic of Pakistan", as a preamble. The Resolution stated that Pakistan is a Nation,

> Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam should be fully observed: Wherein the Muslims of Pakistan should be enabled individually and collectively to order their lives in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam, as set out in the Holy Qur'ān and Sunnah.[189]

The constitutional development in Pakistan thus reflected the attempts of the modernist administrators of Pakistan to deal with Islam in an ambiguous way and to avoid offending the *'ulamā'* while at the same time carrying on their activities. The

185 Adams, **Islam in Pakistan,** p. 52-53.

186 Adams, "The Ideology of Mawdudi", p. 382.

187 ibid. p. 389.

188 Adams, **Islam in Pakistan,** p. 39.

189 ibid.

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ambiguity lay in the modernist attempt at synthesizing two contrasting political philosophies - the Democratic, and the Islamic - in a self contradictory category of Islamic Democracy. While Democracy delegates authority to people by people in order to evolve and formulate laws to govern the society for the benefit of each and every individual, the Islamic Political Philosophy according to Mawdūdī depends upon laws already formulated by God according to which Muslims must govern themselves at all times.[190]

> In the one there is the concept of a law made by men through the excercise of reason for the benefit of man, and in the other there is the divine fiat rising beyond human understanding and calling only for obedience.[191]

The traditionalists ironically supported the idea of 'Islamic Democracy' because, according to Fazlur Rahman, the 'Islamic' side of the coin would lend them the authority to interpret the doctrine of the sovereignty of God and enable them to exercize His rights and powers. The 'Democracy' side of the coin, on the other hand, would put the majority Sunnī Muslims of Hanafī persuasion in a position to define the course of establishing the true Muslim society.

> This explains largely why the acceptance of democracy - at least as a strategy - was facilitated by Mawdūdī since Pakistanis are Muslims, democracy would be commensurate with Islam, not in the sense that people are, in fact, Muslims but that they 'ought to become real Muslims'.[192]

The strength of the *'ulamā'* was violently expressed when, in 1953, the Ahrār party, later joined and supported by Jamā'at-i-Islāmī, launched an anti-Ahmadīyah movement demanding that the Ahmadīyah be declared non-Muslims.[193] The Ahrār,

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190 For an analysis on the distinction between Democratic and Islamic political philosophies, see C. J. Adams, "Islam and the Public Philosophy in Pakistan", in **Political Forces in Pakistan,** (Papers presented at a Seminar held at the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, 1958).

191 ibid. p. 14.

192 Fazlur Rahman,"Islam in Pakistan", **Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies,** vol. 8 (4) 1985, p. 38.

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who emerged as a militant group in 1930, were anti-British and had supported the Congress. They were bitter enemies of the Ahmadīyahs even before the partition. In Pakistan, they were trying to regain prestige which they had lost because of their opposition to the Pakistan movement. They demanded that members of the Ahmadīyah group as such and in particular, Sir Muhammad Zafrullāh Khān, (d. 1985) who was at the time, in 1953, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, be removed from important government posts.[194] The anti-Ahmadīyah Movement assumed a violent form:

> Several Ahmadis were attacked and killed and their masjids and property burnt, destroyed or looted. One of the persons killed was Major Mahmood, an Ahmadi, whose car had failed near a crowd which was being addressed by a Maulvi at Quetta on the subject of Ahmadis being Kafirs. Major Mahmood was trying to start his car when he was attacked by a furious mob.[195]

Following the anti-Ahmadīyah disturbances, a Court of Inquiry was constituted to examine the causes which led to this movement. The Inquiry Commission, under the Presidentship of Muhammad Munīr, submitted its report (known as **The Munīr Report**) in 1954.[196] **The Munīr Report** concluded that "if the Ahmadis were *Kafirs*, any one becoming an Ahmadi became liable to death penalty because apostasy in an Islamic State is punishable with death."[197] All the *'ulamā'* were found by the Inquiry Commission headed by Munīr to agree on this point. What they could not agree upon was how to define "who is a Muslim."[198]

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193 For an extended treatment on the history of Ahmadīyah movement and its inter-relationship with the religious and political life of late nineteenth and early twentieth century India, see Spencer Lavan, "The Ahmadiya Movement: Its Nature and Its Role in Ninteenth and Twentieth Century India", Ph.D Dissertation, McGill University, Montreal, 1970. The thesis was later revised and published in New Delhi: Manohar Book Service, 1974. See also Adams, "The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi", p. 376-377.

194 Callard, **Pakistan**, p. 204.

195 M. Munir, **From Jinnah to Zia**, p. 38.

196 **Report of The Court of Inquiry**, Lahore: Punjab Government, 1954.

197 M. Munir, **From Jinnah to Zia**, p. 38.

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The basis of the anti-Ahmadîyah movement was the allegation that the Ahmadîyah believed Mirzā Ghulām Ahmad - who founded the sect in 1890 - to be a *Masīh* (savior) after the Prophet Muhammad.[199] He also claimed to be the "reincarnation of Jesus and Lord Krishna."[200] His claim, the *'ulamā'* maintained, violated the belief of the Muslims in *Khatm-i-Nubuwwat* (finality or the Seal of Prophecy). The Ahmadîyah, found mainly in Punjab, are a well-knit proselytizing group which has recently spread to other parts of the world, including Nigeria, Canada, etc.. The significance of the anti-Ahmadîyah movement, however, lay in the power which the Sunnî *'ulamā'* showed themselves able to wield.[201]

The court inquiry into the incident declared that "in the eyes of certain Sunni leaders all Shiahs were Kafirs (unbelievers) and some of the Shiah leaders were inclined to pay the same compliment to the Sunnis."[202] Consequently, the report argued:

> The net result of all this is that neither Shias nor Sunnis nor Deobandis nor Ahl-i-Hadith nor Barelvis are Muslims and any change from one view to the other must be accompanied in an Islamic State with the penalty of death if the Government of the State is in the hands of the party which considers the other party to be Kafirs.[203]

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198 Munîr interviewed the *'ulamā'* and the leaders of the Jamā'at-i-Islāmî, including Mawdūdî. See **Munîr Report,** p. 215-218.

199 Binder, **Religion and Politics in Pakistan,** p. 260.

200 For a brief discussion on the history of Ahmadîyah, see W.Cantwell Smith's **Modern Islam,** p. 298. For the anthropological analysis of the anti-Ahmadîyah Movement in Pakistan, in 1953, see John Honigmann, "Intensional Orientation and National Unity (A case study from Pakistan)" **A Review of General Semantics,** 13:2 (Winter 1955-56), p. 108-115; and "Radical Opposition in National Culture", **Davidson Journal of Anthropology** vol. 1, No. 2, (1955), p. 169-180.

201 Leonard Binder, **Religion and Politics in Pakistan,** Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961, p. 259-296.

202 Khalid Bin Sayeed, **Politics in Pakistan,** p. 37. For details see **Munîr Report,** p. 219.

203 **Munîr Report,** p. 219.

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Islam in Pakistan[204] continued to be emotionally powerful in unifying one group against the other, frequently serving to disguise social, political or economic issues.[205] While Muslims in India prior to partition were united against a real or an imagined Hindu threat, the Muslims in Pakistan directed their fears against each other, fears based on sectarian differences, regional centrifugal forces, political disagreements and economic disparity. The political machinery first collapsed in 1953, following the anti-Ahmadîyah agitation, when the Governor General, Ghulām Muhammad, dismissed the Prime Minister, Khwājā Nāzimuddîn, and his cabinet. Ghulām Muhammad justified his decision by revealing that the "cabinet of Khwaja Nazimuddin has proved entirely inadequate to grapple with difficulties facing the country."[206] In 1958, the military, under General Ayūb Khān, finally took control of Pakistan and banned all political parties. Ayūb Khān lifted Martial Law only in 1962. In the same year he lifted the ban on political parties such as Jamā'at-i-Islāmî. Although Azîz Ahmad views Ayūb Khān's system of democracy from 1962-1969 as a purely secular development,[207] Ziring notes that Ayūb Khān was caught up in an ironical situation wherein he condemned the conservative Muslims and yet upheld Islam to unify the country.[208] This has been the paradox of every Government of Pakistan and of governments in other countries such as Egypt. The government has to uphold Islam, but it is

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204 The phrase indicates the uniqueness of the nature of Muslim response in Pakistan and its attempt at defining the position of Islam in the modern world. The unique response, according to Adams, is due to "the connection between Islam and the Pakistan Movement... Pakistanis are self-conciously Muslims and are determined to impart a Muslim flavour to their state. It is not enough to have achieved a state of their own; the state must in addition be an Islamic State." See **Islam in Pakistan**, p. 37-38.

205 D.E. Smith, "Patterns of Religion and Politics", **South Asian Politics and Religion**, p. 22.

206 Callard, **Pakistan**, p. 22.

207 Aziz Ahmad, **Islam and Democracy**, p. 35.

208 Ziring, **Ayub Khan Era**, p. 28.

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confronted by opposition in the name of Islam on the part of people who claim to be more truly Muslim.

By focusing his attention on Islam as a cementing force and using it to quell regional and ethnic differences, Ayūb Khān strengthened the influence of the *'ulamā'* in the realm of secular politics.[209] Ayūb was thus torn between a hard and fast nationalist ideology - which sounded too feeble to transcend Muslim consciousness and regional interests - and Islam, which was guarded by the *'ulamā'* and which, according to Ayūb, was synonymous with "bigotry and theocracy."[210]

As a secularist, Ayūb, like Jinnāh, operated from the premise that "Islam had not prescribed any particular pattern of Government but left it to the community to evolve its own pattern to suit its circumstances."[211] Ayūb thus introduced a political system to bypass the old politicians, who, Ayūb believed, were the cause of instability in Pakistan. He introduced the system of "Basic Democracies" to govern the people through locally elected representatives. The Basic Democracies were Union Councils, each constituting a few (ten or twelve) elected members (Basic Democrats) "exercising local government functions in a jusrisdiction comprising about 10,000-12,000 people."[212] The Union councils, in turn, formed Councils at the district and provincial levels thus helping to forge a link between the people and the government without the mediation of the older politicians.[213]

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209 Khalid Bin Sayeed, **Politics in Pakistan,** p. 27-37.

210 D.E. Smith, "Patterns of Religion and Politics", **South Asian Politics and Religion,** p. 45.

211 Ayub Khan, **Friends not Masters,** p. 198.

212 Wheeler, **The Politics of Pakistan,** p. 149.

213 Ziring, **The Ayub Era,** p. 16.

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As a Muslim, Ayūb Khān espoused a Modernist Reformist trend in which Islam was essentially "a code of life and governed its moral aspects."[214] He argued that any "government, constitution or democracy would be Islamic if it worked in an Islamic spirit, for that spirit was essentially progressive."[215] Ayūb declared that Islam was "the only force which can create and sustain a sense of Pakistani Nationality."[216] In order to spread his convictions that the Islamic Spirit was essentially progressive, liberal, etc., Ayūb introduced various measures such as setting up State institutions to train *'ulamā'*; expressing his intentions to establish an Islamic University;[217] and even modifying the 1962 constitution to accommodate phrases such as "The Islamic Republic."[218] The Constitution of 1962 - in response to the *'ulamā'* reaction to the government's attempt at reforming the Muslim Family Laws, by such steps as imposing restrictions on polygamy - incorporated a provision for the establishment of an Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology.[219] The Advisory Council was to be linked with the Central Institute of Islamic Research which was established earlier, in 1960, with the following objectives:[220]

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214 Saleem M.M. Qureshi, "Religion and Party Politics in Pakistan", **Pakistan Since 1958,** seminar held at the Institute of Islamic Studies of McGill University, 1964, p. 50.

215 ibid.

216 D.E. Smith, "Pattern of Religion and Politics", **South Asian Politics and Religion,** p. 45.

217 S.M. Qureshi, **Religion and Party Politics,** p. 56-57.

218 ibid. p. 57. The word "Islamic" had been left out from the original version of the Constitution.

219 S.M. Ikram, "Religion in Pakistan", **Pakistan Since 1958,** seminar held the Institute of Islamic Studies of McGill University, 1964, p. 5.

220 D.E. Smith, "Patterns of Religion and Politics", **South Asian Politics and Religion,** p. 32-33.

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1. "To define Islam in terms of its fundamentals in a rational and liberal manner and to emphasize, among others, the basic Islamic ideals of universal brotherhood, tolerance and social justice."

2. "To interpret the teachings of Islam in such a way as to bring out its dynamic character in the context of the intellectual and scientific progress of the modern world."

3. "To establish Islamic validity for legitimizing Government Reforms in the laws governing Muslim Families, the Banking System, etc."

With his ambivalent secularist-religious political philosophy and his acquired concentrated political power, Ayūb Khān forged ahead with promoting the country's economy based on State Capitalism.[221] Capitalism - characterized mainly by the role of private initiative (or ownership) in the production, sales, and other factors relating to the business enterprise - has been, according to Hafiz Malik, provided with "A fertile seed-bed" by Islam in Pakistan.[222] Ayūb Khān was convinced that under the planned state captalist system inequalities of income would not only contribute to the growth of the economy through individual and private efforts but would help the strong economy at the upper level "spill" down and improve the economy of the lower-income groups.[223] Ayūb's policies attracted business communities such as the Memons, Bohras, Khojahs, etc., to channel their investments into industries, trade and commerce. While these minority Muslim groups (forming less than one percent of the total population) managed to control over half of industrial assets by 1959, they passed on most of the benefits to the members of their respective groups.[224] Ayūb

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221 Khalid B. Sayeed, **Politics in Pakistan,** p. 62.

222 For an interesting and detailed analysis of the relationship between Islam and Capitalism in Pakistan, see Hafiz Malik, "The Spirit of Capitalism and Pakistani Islam", **Contributions to Asian Studies: Religion and Society in Pakistan,** vol. 2. ed. by Aziz Ahmad, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1971, p. 59-78.

223 Khalid B. Sayeed, **Politics in Pakistan,** p. 57.

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anticipated that Islam with its emphasis on the moral values would help minimize the self-seeking tendencies generally associated with a capitalist economy. Khalid bin Sayeed maintains that Ayūb's economic policy not only "resulted in the concentration of the economic and industrial power in the hands of a small section of private sector",[225] but also antagonized the regions against the Government.

> The result of this policy of encouraging industrial concentration were two fold. First, by 1968, the 22 largest families controlled 66 percent of industrial assets, 70 percent of insurance funds, and 80 percent of banks assets. In regional terms, this policy implied that in order to maximize growth, resources should first be invested in West Pakistan where the return was much higher than in East Pakistan where, because of relatively less developed economic infrastructure and relatively uncertain political conditions, returns were expected to be lower.[226]

In the agricultural sector Ayūb tried to introduce land reforms under which ceilings of 500 acres for irrigated land and 1,000 acres for non-irrigated lands were fixed. This land reform resulted not only in the emergence of a new large middle scale farmers or landlords class but, according to Sayeed, also resulted in some big landlords channelling their savings into industries.[227] The land reforms could be carried out only in the areas where Hindu landlords had left Pakistan and emigrated to India leaving their lands behind. The land reforms were thus not aimed at restricting the influence of landlords who exercized considerable influence among the peasants but at the management of agricultural resources with greater efficiency.

> In West Pakistan, considerable concentration of land ownership exists in some areas... about one-half of one percent of the owners held about 21 percent of land, that in Sindh 3 percent of the owners held nearly one-half of all land.[228]

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224 Stephen Lewis, **Pakistan: Industrialization and Trade Policies.** New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 46.

225 ibid. p. 62.

226 ibid. p. 57.

227 Khalid B. Sayeed, **Politics in Pakistan,** p. 56.

228 G. Papanek, "The Location of Economic Policy", p. 16.

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Thus, under Ayūb the rural social and economic structure, with the landlords at the top, became further strengthened and in turn, became impenetrable by the urban-based revivalist movements. This development considerably influenced the subsequent political events.[229] Bhutto, who appealed to the peasants and rural population mainly of Sindh and Punjab was swept to power in the elections of 1970 and was re-elected in 1977. It is significant to add that although the Islamic slogans of the urban based Jamā'at-i-Islāmî were crucial in overthrowing Bhutto, it could manage to get only nine of sixty one candidates elected to the General Assembly in 1985. The rest of the seats went to candidates associated with the mainly rural supported Pakistan Muslim League and the Pakistan Peoples Party.[230] Like the influence of some *'ulamā'* in the urban centres, the landlords' influence in the rural areas had not yet been undermined by any government in Pakistan.[231] The urban based *'ulamā'* and the Jamā'at-i-Islāmî, whose influence was restricted mainly to the lower middle and professional classes in the urban centres,[232] began to achieve widespread credibility[233] during Ayūb's régime. Their oppositional role was mainly politically oriented. For example, the Jamā'at-i-Islāmî directed its criticism at the Government by pointing out that:

1. The Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology was established to subvert the principles of Islam.

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229 For an interesting essay on the relationship between the rural groups and the Pakistan Government, see Charles Kennedy, "Rural Groups and the Stability of the Zia Regime", in **Zia's Pakistan,** p. 23-46.

230 **Al-Mushir,** "Introduction" 27(1985), p. 110.

231 Aziz Ahmad, "Introduction", **Contributions to Asian Studies,** vol. 2(1971), p. 3-4.

232 Leonard Binder, **Prospects for Pakistan,** Chicago: University of Chicago, 1971, p. 11.

233 Qureshi, **Religion and Party Politics in Pakistan,** p. 53-54.

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2. Jinnāh's picture had appeared on Pakistānī currency, and that this was un-Islamic

3. The government was negligent in implementing the system of *Zakāt* (annual tax of 2 1/2 percent) and other Muslim practices such as *Waqfs* (endowments) as means of overcoming the widespread economic and social disparity.[234]

Earlier, during the elections in 1965, the Jamā'at-i-Islāmī's motives had become evident when Mawdūdī supported Miss Fātimah Jinnāh against Ayūb, although he had strongly advocated "that Muslim women must be veiled, their domain is the home and the mixing of sexes socially is highly immoral and a sin."[235] He defended his stand in the election as "acceptance of a lesser evil."[236] Ayūb, on the other hand, was able to obtain a *fatwa* from the *'ulamā'* "that a woman could not be the Head of State under Islamic Law."[237]

The final blow to Ayūb's régime came from Zulfiqar 'Alī Bhutto's Peoples Party. Bhutto, the son of an influential Sindhī landlord, received his education in Political Science and Jurisprudence from the University of California and from Oxford. Until 1965 he served Ayūb as a foreign minister. Bhutto claims to have dissociated himself from Ayūb at the time of the cease-fire agreement reached in Tashkent after the 1965 war between India and Pakistan. Bhutto subsequently claimed that Ayūb acted as a traitor to Pakistan during the Tashkent talks.[238]

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234 ibid. p. 5.

235 ibid. p. 54.

236 ibid.

237 Edward Mortimer, **Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam,** London: Fáber and Faber Ltd. 1982, p. 212.

238 Since India's partition, the issue of Kashmir - where the Muslims are in a majority and yet form an Indian State has been the cause of conflict between India and Pakistan. During the 1965 war, the Muslims of Pakistan believed that they were winning the war and that the Kashmir issue would be resolved in their favour. The war, however, ended with a ceasefire agreement - called the Tashkent Declaration drafted by the Soviet Union - between India and Pakistan. Ziring maintains that

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Thus, all the opposition parties, including the Jamā'at-i-Islāmî and Bhutto's Peoples Party united in bringing about the downfall of Ayūb whose reign has since been referred to by some writers, as one of the most accomplished "eras" for Pakistan.[239] Islam was again used as the emotional base for the opposition to legitimize their charges against the Government.

The Jamā'at-i-Islāmî, whose influence had not yet penetrated to the peasants who formed 80% of the population,[240] advocated the revival of Islamic values which, it claimed, the Muslims had foresaken, thereby causing their own decay.[241] Bhutto, on the other hand, coupled socialism with Islam and called it *Mussawat-i-Muhammad* (the socialism practiced by Muhammad; lit. *'musawwah'* means to be 'equal'). The Peoples Party came up with a slogan, "Islam is Our Faith. Democracy is our Polity. Socialism is our Economy. All power to the People."[242] During the election campaign in 1970, Bhutto promised *"Rotī, Kapra aur Makān"* (food, clothing and shelter) to every Muslim.[243] Thus, he captured the majority of votes in West Pakistan. In 1971, during the civil war in Pakistan, East Pakistan separated itself from West Pakistan, which, it claimed, had exploited the Bengalis economically and politically.[244] The Jamā'at-i-Islāmî and the *'ulamā'* blamed the successive Pakistānî governments, led by Modernists, for having diluted the ability of Islam to cement East and West Pakistan

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Ayūb signed the Tashkent Declaration against Bhutto's advice. See Ziring, **The Ayub Era,** p. 66.

239 ibid. p. 189.

240 Saghir Ahmad, "Islam and Pakistani Peasants", **Contributions to Asian Studies,** vol. 2(1971), **Religion and Society in Pakistan,** p. 93-104.

241 Ziring, **The Ayub Era,** p. 47.

242 Sayeed, **Politics in Pakistan,** p. 86.

243 ibid. p. 88.

244 ibid. p. 81.

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together.[245] Mawdūdī also blamed Mujīb al-Rahmān for having incited the rebellion, and in this he supported the government of Pakistan.

The Jamā'at-i-Islāmī was, however, quick to point out that socialism was antithetical to Islam and continued to muster support on the basis of Islam. Aziz Ahmad, thus, noted that Islam was being used for political purposes by all the political parties in Pakistan.

> In the meantime all sections of society in Pakistan are responsive in various degrees to the pull of religion. All political parties pay at least lip service to Islam. There is not a single party which dare call itself secular; though the programmes of most parties is by far and large secular and Socialism in Pakistan is labelled 'Islamic'.[246]

This fact complicates the matter and makes it hard to distinguish what is Islamic and what is not Islamic in Pakistānī politics. Everyone talks about Islam and tries to muster the loyalty of others on the basis of religion. Some claim that Islam is democratic and others, without acknowledging that they do it, call a fascist type of government Islamic.

Bhutto set about to carry out land reforms and the nationalization of industrial concerns in order to implement his socialist policies.[247] Through the curtailment of the influence of the landlords, businessmen, and industrialists, he hoped to enjoy continuing mass support. Through the introduction of various religious measures he hoped to outsmart the *'ulamā'* and the Jamā'at-i-Islāmī. He enrolled Mowlānā Kawthar Nīyāzī, formerly a member of the Jamā'at-i-Islāmī, in his cabinet to administer religious affairs in Pakistan such as providing facilities for Muslims to perform the *Hajj* (pilgrimage), or administering *Awqāf* (religious endowments), etc..[248]

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245 See Rounaq Jahan, **Pakistan: Failure of National Integration,** New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1972.

246 Aziz Ahmad, "Introduction" **Contributions to Asian Studies,** vol. 2(1971), p. 4.

247 For an excellent analysis of the Economic Development in Pakistan see Gilbert Brown, "Pakistan's Economic Development after 1971", **Pakistan: The Long View,** eds., Ziring, Braibanti, and Wriggins, Durham: Duke University Press, 1971, p. 172-216.

248 Sayeed, **Politics in Pakistan,** p. 155.

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Various developments, during Bhutto's rule, however, swelled the influence of the Jamā'at-i-Islāmī and the *'ulamā'* beyond the expectation of the Peoples government, and in 1977 the military under Zia al-Haqq took over the country.

In 1972, Bhutto was forced to give in to the Jamā'at-i-Islāmī on the language issue. The Sindh Assembly in the same year had passed a language bill declaring Sindhī to be the sole official language in the province. The *Muhājirīn* (immigrants), who spoke Urdū and who comprised at the time 50% of Sindh's population, feared that this would put them at a disadvantage. The Jamā'at-ı-Islāmī spearheaded the *Muhājir* (immigrant) agitation in support of Urdū language rights. It argued that making Sindhī the official language would mean the encouragement of provincialism in Sindh where Sindhī Hindus and Sindhī Muslims would unite against the very foundation of Islamic Pakistan.[249] Bhutto was finally forced to announce that "For a period of 12 years, there would be no discrimination in hiring, promotion, or continuation of service in Sind on the grounds that one did not know Sindhi or Urdū".[250] In 1974, Bhutto, in response to the growing anti-Ahmadīyah agitation, declared the Ahmadīyah to be a non-Muslim sect. Thus, for the first time in the history of Pakistan, a sect claiming to be Muslim was declared non-Muslım on the basis of dogmatic differences.[251]

To the influence of the Jamā'at-i-Islāmī was added an economic dimension. Bhutto's intervention in the business world, through his program of nationalization, resulted in a growing support for the conservatives and the revivalists by shopkeepers, businessmen, and industrialists.[252]

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249 ibid. p. 154.

250 Louis Hayes, **Politics in Pakistan: The Struggle for Legitimacy,** Colorado: Westview Press, 1984, p. 177.

251 The Ahmadīyah, Sayeed maintains, had supported Bhutto's Peoples Party in the 1970 elections. Inspite of that, Bhutto could not but give in to the demands of the *'ulamā'*. **Politics in Pakistan,** p. 155.

252 ibid. p 159.

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The *'ulamā'* and the Jamā'at-i-Islāmī joined hands with the National Awami Party and Jam'īyat-i-'ulamā'-i-Hind, in 1977, on the platform of the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) and even used the mosques and Madrasahs to vent their discontent. Bhutto's personal conduct, such as his drinking liquor, was exploited in a call to the Muslims to wage war "as a religious duty" against the un-Islamic régime:

> The slogan that inspired the processionists to face the police lathis or even bullets was the establishment of Nizam-i-Mustafa. This was a powerful symbol because it combined the religion of Islam and the personality of the Prophet Muhammad.[253]

Bhutto's Islamic measures to pacify the *'ulamā'* and the revivalists, in fact strengthened the latter's position as the true spokesmen of Islam. Opposition to Bhutto sprang mainly from the urban centres and not from the rural areas where the peasants experienced significant changes in their life patterns. The peasants had benefitted economically and socially from the land reforms introduced by Bhutto. Their income not only doubled, but, Sayeed maintains, there grew in people a sense of hope and of ability to change things.[254] According to Kevin Rafferty, Bhutto "was the first politician who had tried to take politics out of its normal middle class confines... he was the first politician of note who had bothered to stomp the villages and had the knack of being able to talk to the ordinary people in their own language".[255]

Bhutto's Government, like that of Ayūb, faced the charge that it was insufficiently Islamic. Islam has been held to be the ideology for the Pakistānī State by all parties in Pakistan. No party, except perhaps the communists, dared claim to be secularist. Everyone talks about Islam and tries to attract the loyalty of others on the basis of Islam. The failure to realize the Islamic ideology and its implications have been a recurring basis for opposition to the successive governments of the country . Islam has

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253 ibid.

254 Sayeed, **Politics in Pakistan,** p. 62.

255 Kevin Rafferty, "Pakistan", **Middle East and North Africa,** 1979, p. 299.

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been used more as an emotional base to mobilize opposition than as a framework for working out concrete social and economic programs to solve the problems of the common man. In this sense the use of Islam is negative, and not positive.

Those who advocate the concept of an Islamic State exhibit a manifestly Sunnî character. They are, however, not in agreement with each other when it comes to defining what an Islamic State is. They are perhaps in agreement only when they are in opposition and when nothing positive is demanded. Also they are not only decidedly anti-Western, and anti-Hindu but puritanical and rigid in their views, and for this reason they have encouraged or incited movements against groups, such as the Ahmadîyah, who have interpreted Islam differently. What seems to be significant, however, is that the whole concept of the 'Islamic State', in whose name the process of political and social growth in Pakistan has been stunted, was not anticipated by the creators of the country. Moreover, because no accepted model for an Islamic State existed, the various experimental forms of Government tried in Pakistan were viewed by the opposition as un-Islamic. They were therefore, dismantled. No political institution, therefore, was given a chance to live beyond its creators in Pakistan.[256]

256 For changes in the Political Paterns in Pakistan, see Shahid Javed Burki, **Pakistan: A Nation in the Making,** Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 37-101.

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Chapter IV

THE ISMĀʿĪLĪ CONCEPT OF RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY IN PAKISTAN: 1947-1970

The Ismāʿīlī response to developments in Pakistan is characterized mainly by the attempt to contain the process of change within the established religious framework. This Ismāʿīlī response, however, involved a continuous and renewed search for the Ismāʿīlī identity in the context of the changing social and political definitions of itself that Pakistan was engaged in forging amidst conflicting modernist and conservative-revivalist appeals. Pakistan's identity and the struggle with respect to it was not confined to religion and the conflict of religious views. There was also a large element of ordinary nationalism. This chapter deals with the changes in the Khojah Ismāʿīlī perception of religious authority in two phases:

1. From 1947, when Pakistan emerged, until 1957, when the Āghā Khān IV, Shāh Karīm al-Husaynī (1936-), ascended the throne of the Imāmat;
2. From 1957 to 1970, when Bhutto's Peoples Party and Mujīb al-Rahmān's 'Awāmī League party won the elections in the Western and the Eastern Wings of Pakistan respectively, followed by the civil war causing the partition of Pakistan in 1971.

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4.1 The Ismā'īlī Identity amidst Traditionalist versus Modernist Appeals: 1947-57

When Pakistan emerged in 1947, a large number of Ismā'īlīs migrated to Karachi in Sindh and to East Pakistan.[257] The figures on the influx of immigrants to Pakistan have not been accurately established.[258] Hanna Papanek reports that in Karachi alone the Ismā'īlī population more than doubled to about 25,000 by 1957 and continued to grow rapidly. The entire Ismā'īlī population in East Pakistan, about ten thousand, was comprised of immigrants only.[259]

The immigration of the Ismā'īlīs to Pakistan was probably motivated by economic prospects. Hanna Papanek maintains that immigration for economic reasons had already become an Ismā'īlī trait, introduced in the early twentieth century by the Āghā Khān to rehabilitate the Ismā'īlīs of the drought-stricken areas of Kacch and Kāthiawār in Gujrāt.[260] The inherited religious framework, she adds, provided the immigrant Khojah community with "social anchorage" in the process of rehabilitating themselves in Pakistan.[261] In the early phase (between 1950 and 1953) of migration, the Imām gave specific directives for the establishment of teaching projects ("to teach trade and commerce"),[262] industrial homes, health centres, and housing facilities.[263]

Under the guidance of the Āghā Khān, who kept in touch with world economic trends, the Khojah Ismā'īlīs improved their economic situation by plunging into industry and the import and export of goods, and by taking advantage of the price

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257 See G.F. Papanek, **Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Initiatives,** Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967.

258 Frischauer, **The Aga Khans,** p. 160.

259 Hanna Papanek, **Leadership and Social Change,** p. 14.

260 ibid. p. 13.

261 ibid. p. 11.

262 **Firmān Mubārak,** 1952, p. 23.

263 ibid.

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fluctuations of various commodities.[264] During the "Platinum Jubilee" celebrations, (commemorating 70 years of the Imāmat of Āghā Khān III) in 1954, the Ismā'īlīs collected 3 million rupees. The Āghā Khān used this fund to establish a "Platinum Finance Corporation", which would channel the funds to individual Ismā'īlīs through co-operative credit societies and "Housing" societies (numbering forty-seven by 1956), in the form of loans with low interest. The Corporation would encourage the Ismā'īlīs to be self-reliant, to own a housing unit, and to enter industry related businesses.[265] Hanna Papanek compares the income distribution over a period of one month in 1959 between Muslims in general and Khojah Ismā'īlīs in Karachi. She concludes that, while the income of 75 percent of the Muslims was less than 200 rupees and the income of another 17 percent between 200 and 400 rupees, the income of only 25 percent of Khojah Ismā'īlīs was less than 200 rupees; of 45 percent between of 200 and 400 rupees and of 30 percent above 400 rupees.[266]

The Khojah Ismā'īlīs attributed this improvement in their social and economic life to the guidance of the Imām.[267] These changes paralleled significant changes in their religious out-look. The following two sections will examine how the Khojah Ismā'īlīs viewed the Imām and responded to his ideas. The changes in the religious out-look of the Ismā'īlīs will be seen against their:

1. attempt at projecting an Islamic Modernist identity and supporting the cause of Muslim unity; and
2. statement on the spiritual dimensions of Islam.

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264 Hanna Papanek, **Leadership and Social Change,** p. 184-189.

265 ibid. p. 267-268.

266 ibid. p. 16.

267 ibid. p. 5.

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4.2 Unity in Diversity - A Modernist Appeal

When Pakistan was born in 1947, the Āghā Khān described it as "the greatest child of Islam". Pakistan's emergence seems to have given the Muslims a sense of being on the verge of recapturing their lost glory. The linking of Pakistan with Islam not only gave Pakistan a charismatic image but a messianic character. Apart from that in the statement quoted, there is no indication in the writings of Āghā Khān that he saw Pakistan as an Islamic State. He attacked the romanticism of the modernists about the past but he accepted other aspects of modernist views. He stated that "with faith in Islam and trust in God...we must work for a better world, and be no more hypnotized by the dead glories of the distant past".[268] He became aware of the developing rift between the conservatives and progressives, and of a compelling need to find a "middle path".[269] However, he aligned himself with the Western educated politicians and expressed his modernist reformist views. He attacked modernist apologetic tendencies and yet he cited both Sayyid Ahmad Khān and Sayyid Amîr 'Alî as sources of Muslim inspiration in India.[270] The latter was a thorough apologist and not a reformist in the category of Sayyid Ahmad Khān. On the other hand, he condemned the *'ulamā'* as the cause of Muslim backwardness. According to the Āghā Khān, they had imported formalism into Islam under the Abbasids.[271] He advocated that the Muslims focus their attention instead on the Umayyads for direction. In an address to the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, in 1950, the Āghā Khān said:

> Islam was and is dynamic. It was dynamic, simple, clear during the glorious Ommaid [sic] period when the foundations of Islam were laid wide and deep...ask your historians, ask your thinkers and concentrate

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268 **Message of H.R.H. Prince Aga Khan III to the Nation of Pakistan and World of Islam,** Karachi: Ismailia Association for Pakistan, 1968, p. 1.

269 ibid. p. 8-14.

270 The Āghā Khān had recommended that Sayyid Amîr 'Alî's **The Spirit of Islam** should be introduced into all educational institutions. **Message,** p. 10.

271 ibid. p. 19.

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> on that glorious 100 years of Ommaid [sic] rule and take that for example with its simple faith and open mind, with its dynamic qualities without scholasticism and its legal servitudes.[272]

It was ironical that the Āghā Khān turned to the Umayyads since they were the implacable enemies of 'Alī and the Shī'ī Muslims. The Āghā Khān probably associated the growth of conservative and revivalist tendencies with the Muslims turning to the Abbasids for inspiration. He appears to have been alarmed at the political manifestation of Islamic revivalism in Egypt where the revivalist party (Ikhwān al-Muslimîn) clashed with the modernist government. The former, like the Jamā'at-i-Islāmî in Pakistan, demanded that Egypt be governed on the basis of Sharî'ah and not on the basis of Western ideologies. The Āghā Khān did not wish to see a gap, similar to that which existed in Egypt between the traditionalists and modernists, developing in Pakistan.[273] He believed that the Pakistānîs would save themselves from a crisis similar to that of Egypt by focusing on the Umayyad State model instead of the Abbasid one. At the time, the Āghā Khān did not seem to have been even remotely concerned with the idea of the Islamic State or its implications. The Āghā Khān's concern seems to have been rather to suggest ways to help forge political unity among the Muslims of Pakistan. It must be mentioned here that the Ismā'îlîs, who until the end of the nineteenth century had joined the other Shī'ī groups in observing *Muharram* and condemning the Umayyads, discontinued such practices at the insistence of the Āghā Khān. At present they do not condemn the Umayyads, including Yazîd, as is the case with the Ithnā 'asharî Shī'ah.

Until 1953, when the anti-Ahmadîyah disturbances occurred, the Āghā Khān's foremost religious concern was to define the Ismā'îlî stand in relation to the traditionalist-modernist controversy over the role of Islam in Pakistan rather than anything else. Following the anti-Ahmadîyah riots, the Ismā'îlî attitude evidenced a

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272 ibid.

273 ibid. p. 11.

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significant new orientation. Not only were Hindu elements eliminated from the community's religious practices, but the Shī'ī sectarian and modernist anti-'ulamā' emphasis underwent significant dilution as well.[274]

In 1954, the Āghā Khān stated that although the Ismā'īlīs are Shī'ah, they do not question the authority of the first three *Khulafā'* (plural of *Khalīfah)* since Hz. 'Alī himself "co-operated" with them without any objection.[275] In 1955, the Āghā Khān issued a statement from Cairo re-emphasizing that "although Ismailis firmly adhere to their faith, they do not - like some other sects - condemn ...brother Muslims who have other interpretations of the Divine Message of our Holy Prophet (s.a.s.)".

> I hope and believe and pray that Ismā'īlīs may show their true Islamic charity in thought and prayer for the benefit and happiness of all Muslims, men, women and children.[276]

In the same year, a very significant book was published, entitled **Everliving Guide** written by Qāsim 'Alī Ja'far, who later became the president of the Ismailia Association for Pakistan.[277] It is one of the most widely-read books among the Ismā'īlīs in Pakistan. The author attempts to establish the necessity of divine guidance (Imāmat), of which mankind, since Adam (the first Prophet) has never been deprived by God. He cites the Qur'ān and the traditions of the Prophet to argue that the last of the Prophets, Muhammad, appointed 'Alī, whose descendant is the Āghā Khān, the Imām of the Ismā'īlīs, to perpetuate the divine message for the benefit of mankind.[278] The Prophet and the Imāms are the proofs of God on earth.[279] "Obedience to God,"

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274 The pre-1953 and post-1953 period evidence this statement.

275 Muhammad A. Harris, **The Great Umayyads,** Karachi, G.N. Zakria, 1954, p. 25.

276 ibid.

277 Qāsim 'Alī, M. J. **Ever Living Guide,** Karachi: Ismailia Association for Pakistan, 1955.

278 ibid. p. 44-52.

279 ibid.

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His apostle and the Divine Authority (Imām) is not the belief in three but one and one [sic] authority".[280]

> Though in the same material body as ordinary human beings, Prophet and Imām carry divine light (Noor) and are exalted. Imām Ja'far-us-Sadiq once said, "We have certain positions with God in some of which we are He and He is He". Therefore, only those who are *surat parast* (form worshippers) deny this and consider Prophet and Imam like themselves.[281]

Therefore, the author argues, quoting a verse from the Qur'ān, obedience to the Imām is equivalent to obedience to God.[282] Recognition of the Imām and following his guidance ensures *najāt* (salvation) for the *mu'min* and unity for the community.[283] According to Ja'far, while the Prophet was physically present, the Muslims were not divided. They became divided only as they differed in their interpretation of the Holy Qur'ān. The unity of the Muslims could be possible if they referred "to Living Imam and not the book itself".[284] He further emphasized that the "Imāms are super-human".[285]

> Jalaluddin Rumi correctly says... 'Do not measure the actions of holy men by (the analogy of) yourself'...the Prophets and Imams should be considered as super-human and as *Abdal-i-Haq* [sic] i.e. substitutes of God carrying Divine Light in them.[286]

At the time, the Ismā'īlīs do not seem to have felt the need to reconcile their traditional concept of the Imām's authority with the idea of religious authority held by the Sunnī Muslim majority.

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280 ibid. p. 8. The phrase 'one and one' is a literal translation of the Urdū idiom meaning 'one and only'.

281 ibid. p. 9.

282 ibid. p. 8.

283 ibid. p. 28.

284 ibid. p. 35.

285 ibid. p. 9-11.

286 ibid.

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Throughout the book, the author has extensively quoted verses and passages from the Qur'ān, Mawlānā Rūmī, Qāḍī al-Nu'mān, and the Āghā Khān's writings to show the divine necessity of the Imām. For the first time, the Imām's role was not derived from the Hindu belief in the *avatārs* as we saw it to be in the previous chapter. This development reflects that some Ismā'īlīs felt the need to remove Hindu elements from their religious beliefs about the Imām rather than radically to re-assess their beliefs about the Imām himself. In view of the fact that Hinduism was seen by the Muslims of Pakistan as the religion of the enemy, the retention of Hindu practices by the Ismā'īlīs would have raised suspicion about their Muslim identity and loyalty to Pakistan. The pressure on the community, therefore, apparently did not arise around its understanding of the Imām, but in connection with those things that visibly set them off from other Muslims. This suggests that the basis of religious authority was not an important question in their relations with other Muslims in Pakistan at that time so much as was the need to de-emphasize the role of Hindu elements in characterizing the transcendent nature of the Imām's authority.

In 1950, the Āghā Khān introduced into the Ismā'īlī *du'ā'* (prayer), some verses from the Qur'ān,[287] replacing those verses which dealt with "the Hindu concepts of reincarnation of various forms of divinty".[288] The *du'ā'* (see Appendix B), which was being recited in the Gujrātī dialect, was in its entirety translated into Arabic in 1956, and more verses from the Qur'ān were added. To prepare the Ismā'īlīs to accept the new *du'ā'* , a Farmān was issued in the same year, stating that:

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287 **Kalām,** vol. II, p. 471.

288 The du'ā' is divided into six parts, begining with *Surāh al-Fātiha* (the opening verse) and ending with the complete genealogy of the Imāms from Hz. 'Alī to the present Imām - the Aghā Khān. The genealogy evokes a sense of kinship with the Holy family through Hz. 'Alī, Hasan and Hussein, and also helps to draw a boundary limiting the claimants to authority to those who have inherited the divine knowledge *('ilm)* and not acquired it as in the case of Sunnī *'ulamā'*. For instance the term *naklankī avatār* is used for the Imām in the old *du'ā'* See Hanna Papanek, **Leadership and Social Change,** p. 77.

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> The *du'ā'* will soon be translated into Arabic. Since the 8th century, that is to say the birth of our great religion, Arabic has been the language of Islam. It is probably the most beautiful and most complete of all languages spoken to-day. For this reason...you should learn *du'ā'* in Arabic when it is ready.[289]

Before the *du'ā'* was introduced in Arabic, the Khojah Ismā'īlīs conducted most of their religious practices in the local Indian vernaculars. The Gināns as well as the literature on the Ismā'īlī faith were, as we saw in chapter one, made available to the Khojah Ismā'īlīs in Gujrātī. The learning of Arabic was not considered essential. The Āghā Khān, in 1899, stated:

> If some among you learn little Arabic, they feel elated and proud. They think they are smart. They try to speak Arabic and produce certain sounds from the throat. Is it the only language that God understands? It is not that He does not understand Sindhī. God has created the earth and the sky (heaven) and He naturally understands all languages.[290]

Later, in 1951, the Āghā Khān had appealed to the Muslims of Pakistan to make Arabic the national language rather than Urdū. He argued that Urdū would hinder the efforts of Pakistānīs to forge unity not only from within but also with the other Muslim countries. Urdū, he argued, "is a language associated with the downfall". Arabic on the other hand is

> the language of Islam. The Quran was in Arabic. The Prophet's Hadiths are in Arabic. The highest form of Islamic culture in Spain was in Arabic. Your children must learn Arabic to certain extent.[291]

G. Allana, in his book **His Highness Aga Khan III: A Brief Survey of His Life and Work,**[292] reports that the Āghā Khān's suggestion to make Arabic the national language of Pakistan was met with strong opposition mainly from the Government

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289 Quoted from the Fırmān found at the Ismaili Library in Montreal.

290 **Kalām,** vol. I, p. 86-87.

291 Aga Khan, **Message,** p. 17.

292 Published by Hamdard National Foundation in 1973, Karachi: p. 36. G. Allana (d. 1985) was a famous Sindhī Poet, and industrialist, and served as the President of H.H. The Aga Khan Shia Imami Supreme Council for Pakistan from 1955 to 1962.

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officials, such as Fazl al-Rahmān.[293] Fazl al-Rahmān in 1951 was the President of Mu'tamar-i-'ālam-i-Islāmī and also the Minister of Education. The Āghā Khān, on being informed by G. Allana of the strong opposition from some influential Pakistānīs, did not personally present his views in the gathering of Mu'tamar-i-'ālam-i-Islāmī. Instead, he had his speech circulated among the dignitaries.[294]

This change in the structure of the *du'ā'* was a very significant move by the Āghā Khān towards projecting the Muslim identity of the Khojahs. The *du'ā'* - recited three times a day by the Ismā'īlīs - is an obligatory *(wājib)* congregational prayer, similar to the *salāt* (Muslim prayer), which is observed five times daily by Sunnī Muslims.[295] These changes in the *du'ā'* although they seemed to imply a profound change in the Ismā'īlī concept of the Imām, produced little significant reaction among the Ismā'īlīs. Whereas 'Alī was referred to as "truly God" *('Alī Sahī Allāh),* in the old version of *du'ā'*, he was now referred to as "from Allāh" (incorrectly inflected in Arabic as *'Alī ullāh* on the pattern of *Habīb ullāh* - i.e. the beloved of God). In its nominal sense, the phrase *'Alī ullāh* was translated in *du'ā'* books as 'Alī is from Allāh, although it could have easily understood simply as 'Alī is God. These changes in the *du'ā'* did not elicit significant reaction from among the Khojah Ismā'īlīs for several reasons. First, the changes were authorized by the Āghā Khān himself, an individual viewed by the

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293 Fazl al-Rahmān is not the philosopher and the student of Islamic thought who has authored many books including the famous book **Islam,** Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966.

294 G. Allana, **His Highness Aga Khan III,** p. 38.

295 The gestures accompanying the *du'ā'* as well as its contents are different from those of the *namāz* (the Persian term used by the Pakistānī Muslims for *salāt).* For instance, the *du'ā'* is not preceded by *adhān* (a call to prayer) or *Wudū'* (ablution) as the case is with *namāz.* Each part of the *du'ā'* ends with the mentioning the Imām's name followed by a declaration that the *Sujūd* (prostration) is due to Allāh alone. The *du'ā'* terminates with a ritual of *Shāh jo Dīdār* (which literally means "may you have the vision of the Imām"). The ritual is performed by offering one's right hand to the persons sitting on his right and left. This ritual is explained as 'strengthening one's consciousness of God who is everywhere and who resides in everyone.'

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Khojahs as the living basis of religious authority. Second, under the modernist Government in the pre-seventies, there was no significant challenge or pressure on the Ismā'īlīs and their concept of religious authority from the Sunnī Muslims in general. The issue for the Ismā'īlīs, therefore, was more one of projecting themselves as Muslims than of reconciling their concept of religious authority with that of the general body of Muslims.

Some Gināns with a high content of Hindu belief, tracing the descent of 'Alī from Vishnu, were either dropped or altered. For example, in 1956, in Karachi, the Ginān tracing the descent of 'Alī from the *avatārs* of the *Macch* (fish) *Kokub* (tortoise), *Shrī Rām,* etc., was modified to incorporate Ādam, Noah, Ibrāhīm, Issā (Christ), etc..[296] Justifying the changes in the Gināns, the president of Ismailia Association, Qāsim 'Alī Ja'far later argued:

> The idea of bringing modification in Ginans is not a recent development, it dates back to the early years of the Imamat of Hz. Imam Sultan Muhammad Shah. Even during the last years of his Imamat, ... in the year 1951 ... (he) said: 'stop reading Das avtār, and change the word *Hari* to *Ali*'[297]

These changes, however, do not indicate that there was any serious and systematic attempt by the Ismā'īlīs to study and examine the nature of religious authority. Again, the Ismā'īlī concern tended more towards defining their identity in modernist Islamic terms than towards reconciling their concept of religious authority with that of the majority of Sunnī Muslims. It seems that the Ismā'īlīs were more concerned about appearing to be Muslims than they were about conforming to the theologically fundamental Islamic positions, positions so basic as those related to the concept of religious authority. Mere replacement of Hindu names with names in Arabic does not

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296 The document recording the change was distributed by the Ismailia Association for Pakistan, 1956. The author does not possess the document. He was informed about it by Qāsim 'Alī Ja'far in 1975 when he was the president of the Ismailia Association for Pakistan. Presently, the Ismā'īlīs of Pakistan recite the modified version of the Ginān.

297 Qāsim 'Alī, M. J. "A note on Changes in Gināns", unpublished and u.d., p. 5.

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alter the whole religious out-look of a group. For instance, in the above mentioned changes in the Gināns, the names of the Hindu *avatārs* were replaced with the names of the Imām and Prophets, but what the terms connoted - i.e., they "are the truth" or divine - remained unchanged.

> O Lord (Imām), Ādam, Noah, Ibrāhîm *nūr* (light) of *Mūsā* (Mozes)
> and of *Isā* (Christ) you are the truth.[298]

These changes, at first, were not widely supported by the Ismā'îlîs. While some Sindhî Ismā'îlî officials of the community, such as G. Allana (then the president of Pakistan's Federal Council), Qāsim 'Alî Ja'far and Sher 'Alî 'Alidînā (the officials of the Ismailia Association), among others, supported the changes affecting the Gināns, some *muhājir* Khojah Ismā'îlîs, such as Ja'far al-Ṣādîq, led a movement to preserve the role of the Gināns and the status of Gujrātî among the Khojahs of Pakistan.[299] Certain influential Sindhî Ismā'îlî families of traders who already lived in the areas that formed Pakistan provided the community with leadership when Pakistan emerged. These leaders, in contrast with the immigrants, in the main supported the changes being introduced into the religious practices of the Khojah Ismā'îlîs in order to project their Islamic identity along with their modernist orientation. Although there was no apparent inclination on their part to make explicit their views on the issue of religious authority, they implicitly accepted the Imām's authority as the basis on which the Gināns were changed and the decidedly modernist orientations of the Imām were adopted. At a time when the Khojah community was undergoing the experience of rapid changes, the traditional basis of religious authority provided the Ismā'îlîs with a binding force.

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298 Qāsim 'Alî Ja'far, **A Note on Changes in Ginans,** p. 6.

299 The author was informed in 1973 of these developments by Prof. Jawād al-Masqatî (d. 1984) who taught religion at the Ismailia Association for Pakistan from 1963 to 1972.

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The Ismā'īlīs generally rationalized the need to purge their religion of Hindu elements by explaining that the *pīrs* had been kind enough to make things easy for Ismā'īlīs by allowing them to retain their Hindu customs in the beginning. These customs were now no longer necessary, and the Ismā'īlīs could return to the "original orientation of their faith".[300]

4.3 The Spiritual Dimension of Islam

Islamic Modernism is characterized by its emphasis on the rationality of Islamic revelation over against the rigidity of Islamic legalism and the authority of traditional religious institutions.[301] Since there is a living authority for the Ismā'īlīs, they have no real concern for Sharī'ah. There is in fact no Ismā'īlī *Fiqh* or a need for *uṣūl al-Fiqh*.[302] Therefore, the Ismā'īlīs do not face the same problems as do the modernist Sunnī Muslims in legitimizing changes or reforms. The latter are limited by the nature of the Sharī'ah. In the case of the Khojah Ismā'īlīs, the emphasis on the divine necessity for the Imāmah qualifies their modernist orientations in Pakistan. The necessity of the Imām, as an extension of Islamic revelation, followed not only from the need of the community to legitimize social reform but also from its inherited spiritual world view, in which the Imām, like other holy personalities, is graced with the inner *(bāṭin)* knowledge and experience of the truth. Usually the process of modernization entails anti-spiritual or anti-esoteric implications. This has been so especially in Pakistan where the modernist Muslims such as Fazl al-Rahmān have

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300 Hanna Papanek, **Leadership and Social Change,** p. 78.

301 For details, see Nadav Safrān, **Egypt in Search of Political Community,** p. 69, and also Malcolm Kerr, **Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad 'Abduh and Rāshid Ridā,** Berkeley: University of California, 1966.

302 C. J. Adams discusses this issue in **Ilahāmī az Shaykhu't Tā'ifa,** p. 231-36, by Murtazā Mutahharī. For further information, see Saiyid Rizvi, **A Socio-Intellectual History of the Isnā 'Asharī Shī'īs in India,** vol. 1. Canberra: Ma'rifat Publishing House, 1986.

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taken an anti-Sūfī position. In this, they are joined by the revivalist Muslims. The Khojah Ismā'īlīs, however, emphasize the spiritual aspects of Islam to combat rigidity in Islam.

The **Memoirs of Aga Khan,** published in 1954, deal with the role and experiences of the Āghā Khān in the changing Indian and international political scene. In one of the chapters, "The Islamic Concept and My Role as Imam", the Āghā Khān ascribes the birth of science and religion to the human attempt to explain natural phenomena.[303]

The birth of Islam, according to the Āghā Khān, represents the culmination of the human desire to understand "the realms of both spirit and intellect".[304] This is strictly a modernist position. Both intellect and spirit come to the same goal or are able to attain the greatest of the heights attainable. Every rational being is, therefore, a religious being also. In religion, man consciously enters into a relationship with God. This view of the relationship between reason and revelation and also between man and God does not necessarily elevate the position of revelation (Qur'ān) over and above human reason. Therefore, such a position would come directly into conflict with the conservatives and the revivalists who would never accede to a view that suggests parity of intellect with revelation, or that argues for development and evolution in religious thought. At the most, the intellect would be considered only as a tool or an instrument for understanding what is revealed. For the Āghā Khān, the revealed truth is not something given but something to be lived. It is essentially an experience always incomplete and in the process of development.

> Primitive religious experience and primitive scientific reasoning were linked together in magic, in wizardy...Aristotle, however, gave a more scientific turn to this mingling, introducing as he did categories and concepts that were purely reasonable and shedding those vestiges of religious awe and mystery that are visible even in Plato ...In the seventh

303 **Memoirs,** p. 169.

304 ibid. p. 170.

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> century of the Christian era, there was a rapid and brillant flowering of humanity's capacity... adventure and discovery in the realm of both spirit and intellect. That flowering began in Arabia.[305]

The epistemological difference between these two realms of intellect and spirit or science and religion according to the Āghā Khān consists in the belief that the knowledge arrived at through intellect is instrumental or indirect while the knowledge given through religious experience is direct. Since "the highest, most transcendent spiritual experience" must be represented in material terms, "man can study objectively the direct and subjective experiences of those who have had spiritual enlightenment".[306] Some individuals, according to the Āghā Khān, "are born with such natural capacities and possiblities of development, that they have a direct experience of that great love, that all embracing, all consuming love, given to the human soul".[307]

> Hafiz, indeed has said that men like Jesus Christ, and Muslim mystics like Mansour and Bayezid and others, have possessed that spiritual power of the greater love; that any of us, if the Holy Spirit ever present grants us that enlightenment, can, being thus blessed, have the power which Christ had, that to the overwhelming majority of men this greater love is not a practical possibility".[308]

God thus manifests Himself both in nature and in man. There is, here, an emphasis on the underlying unity of man and religion. There is also a notion of development and evolution, at least implicit, in this view. The former (the unity of man and religion) deepens with the latter (development and evolution). This implies that the lower is to be understood in terms of what is higher. In other words, even in history the mystery of God unfolds more and more and comes closer to man's consciousness.

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[305] ibid. p. 169-170.

[306] ibid.

[307] ibid.

[308] ibid.

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Through Islam, however, in the Āghā Khān's words, the Muslims "can attain this direct experience".[309] Therefore, in Islam, there is no "source of absolute authority". The Āghā Khān thus maintains that in reality one cannot talk about the source of absolute authority in religion because such a source - God or the Qur'ān and the Sunnah of the Prophet - has only functional or instrumental value so long as it is interpreted; and since it is the *'ulamā'*, or the *Fuqahā'* supported by the *ijmā'* of the majority, or the Imāmah - in the case of the Ismā'īlīs - who interpret the faith, it is they who really exercise religious authority. The issue is really one of how the Qur'ān or God's commands are interpreted - and who is in a position to interpret them. The Āghā Khān maintains that in the beginning when Islam emerged, it was the Prophet who exercised the religious authority. Although the Prophet's authority spanned both the religious and secular spheres, it was the Prophet's religious function which was, to the Āghā Khān, "essential and divinely inspired".[310] After the death of the Prophet, the Āghā Khān maintains, the Sunnī Muslims came to believe that no one could succeed to the Prophet's religious authority.[311] The Qur'ān itself has, however, solved this issue of religious authority, "for it contains a number of verses which declare that Allāh speaks to man in allegory and parable".

> Thus the Koran leaves the door open for all kinds of possibilities of interpretation without any one interpreter being able to accuse another of being non-Muslim".[312]

Here the Āghā Khān does not seem to be expressing concern to defend his inherited right to religious authority so much as being committed to forge a cordial relationship between the Ismā'īlīs and other Muslims. In 1954 he stated that:

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309 ibid. p. 171.

310 ibid. p. 173.

311 ibid.

312 ibid.

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> Ismailis have always believed and have been taught in each generation by their Imams that they hold the rightful interpretation...but that is no reason why other Muslims, who believe differently, should not be accepted as brothers in Islam and ... never publicly or privately condemned or abused them.[313]

Ismā'īlism, according to the Āghā Khān, is flexible. "Rigidity is contrary to our whole way of life and out-look".[314] He argues that the detailed Sharī'ah laws are not applicable for regulating the life of the Ismā'īlī community which has lived in various countries and which has had to adjust to different national host cultures.[315] If Islamic faith is to remain spiritually and morally forceful, it must adapt itself to the requirements of the modern world.[316]

In 1952, a group of Ismā'īlīs, led by 'Azīz Qāsim Devji of East Africa criticized the liberal policies of the Āghā Khān in an open letter. The letter stated that the Ismā'īlīs should not adopt Western ways of life but govern their lives like other Muslims on the basis of the Qur'ān. It expressed concern that "the vices of Hollywood were coming amongst the young ladies of Jama'at" and that the Ismā'īlī religious customs were "not the same as those of other Moslems".[317] In response, the Āghā Khān strongly defended his position by re-emphasizing that the Ismā'īlīs were essentially *Bāṭiniyūn* (esoterists) and, therefore, against formalism. He argued that the Muslims were faced with a choice between maintaining a "Western way of life in worldly and material things and keep the spiritual side of Islam" and governing their lives by the "formalism of the past". In defending the Ismā'īlī Modernist orientation he argued:

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313 Quoted from Qāsim 'Alī, M.J. **Ever Living Guide,** p. 51.

314 **Memoirs,** p. 185.

315 ibid.

316 ibid. p. 191.

317 **Tālika and Messages of Āghā Khān,** Mombasa: Shia Imami Ismailia Associations for Africa, 1955, p. 29-32.

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> that while the words of the Koran remain the same, every generation, every century, every period must have a new and different interpretation from that of the past, otherwise Islam will die and not survive...[318]

Citing what he considered a *Hadīth* of the Prophet, the Āghā Khān wrote:

> That then in Arabia if they give up one percent of the laws and customs introduced by the Prophet they would be ruined, while the time would come that if they kept more then one percent of these laws and customs they would be ruined.[319]

Because the Āghā Khān believed that Islam is liberal in spirit, he was opposed to formalism which hindered social reform. He maintained that the Qur'ānic revelation was not opposed to reason or science. While science deals with the laws of nature with a view to controlling them to serve mankind, Islam deals with the moral and spiritual dimensions of all existence because everything is governed by the will of God.[320]

> Formalism and verbal interpretation of the teachings of the Prophet are in absolute contradiction with his whole life history. We must accept this Divine message as the channel of our union with the 'Absolute' and the 'Infinite' and once our spiritual faith is firmly established, fearlessly go forward by self-sacrifice, by courage and by application to raise the scientific, the economic, the political and social position of the Muslims to a place of equality with Christians' Europe and America.[321]

The religious world view of the Āghā Khān, therefore, was characterized by a conviction that Islam can co-exist with modern science, commerce, and politics. Such a conviction was based on the modernist interpretation of the Qur'ān as being not opposed to reason.

Although there was a growing Khojah emphasis on the non-Ginānic and historical role of the Imām in having guided the Ismā'īlī community for fourteen hundred years, there does not seem to have been any attempt to lessen the emphasis on the divine

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318 ibid. p. 32.

319 ibid.

320 **Message to Pakistan,** p. 3. Helen E. Ullrich, in the "Introduction" to **Competition and Modernization in South Asia,** New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1975, discusses the role of emphasis on the spiritual dimension in accomodating modernist attitude.

321 **Message to Pakistan,** p. 3.

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authority of the Imām. A booklet, **The Glory of Ismailis,** published in 1947 by the Ismā'īlī Fidā'ī Force, argued:

> Listen, Oh people of the world, it is the same Light of God which was in Adam, and the great angel Azazil became devil for refusing to bow to it which was seen by Hazarat Moosa on mount Tur, which was in Hazarat Muhomed and Hazarat Ali, which shone in the 47 Imams and which now exists in His Highness Sir Sultan Mahomed Shah Aga Khan, the present Imam of Ismailis.[322]

The Ismailia Association for Pakistan hired the services of Jawād al-Masqatī (an Ismā'īlī teacher of Arabic from Masqat) and Moulvī Khān Bahādur (a Sunnī scholar with an M.A. degree from Aligarh University) immediately after 1947, when Pakistan came into being, to translate some historical writings of the Ismā'īlīs. Selections from Qādī al-Nu'mān's **Kitāb al-Himmah,** dealing with the "Code of Conduct" or the list of duties of the *Mu'minīn* towards their Imām, was published in 1950; it was followed by **Life and Lectures of al-Mu'īd fī al-dīn al-Shīrāzī.** The underlying theme of the former work is that obedience, love, and devotion to the Imām are made incumbent upon the *Mu'minīn* by God through the Qur'ān and the Sunnah of the Prophet.[323] A *Mu'min's* act of devotion to the Imām is, in reality, his devotion to God.[324] The faith of a *mu'min* is measured by his relationship with other *mu'minīn,* i.e., by how "forgiving", "forebearing", "humble", and "sympathetic" he is to others.[325]

While the selections from **Kitāb al-Himmah** of Qādī al-Nu'mān were more emphatic about the religio-social obligations of a *Mu'min,* **The Life and Lectures of al-Mu'īd fī al-dīn al-Shīrāzī** dealt with those aspects of his life and thought which articulated the esoteric meaning *(ta'wīl)* of religious language. For example, the mosque "stands for the Imām" when God says in the Qur'ān, "O momins go to the

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322 **The Glory of the Ismailis,** p. 8.

323 **Code of Conduct,** p. 46 and p. 79.

324 ibid. p. 17.

325 ibid. p. 99.

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mosque properly dressed;" and the "potential *jannat*" (heaven) means "the teachings of the Imam of the time". The Imām is endowed with the knowledge of the truth. Neither the truth of the Qur'ān nor faith in the Unity of God *(Tawhīd)* can be realized without the guidance of the Imām. Only the Imām is worthy of prostration before him. The book narrates al-Shīrāzī's experience of his visit to Imām al-Mustansir:

> I was taken near the place where-from I saw the bright light of the Prophethood. My eyes were dazzled by this light. I shed the tears of joy and felt as if I was looking at the face of Prophet of God and of the Commander of the faithful, Ali. I prostrated myself before the one who is the fittest person for the people to bow to him.[326]

The view of the Imām as expressed in **The Life and Lectures of al-Shīrāzī** (published in Karachi in the fifties) suggests that there was a growing tendency among the Khojah leadership to seek support for the Imām's religious authority not in the Gināns but in the literature of the pre-Indian period. Therefore, although attempts were made by the Khojah Ismā'īlīs to de-emphasize Hindu elements in their belief system, there was no tendency to down-play the authority of the Imām or the ideas exalting it.

4.4 The Consolidation of Ismā'īlī Identity in Pakistan: 1957-1968

The Āghā Khān III, Imām Sultān Muhammad Shāh, died at the age of eighty, on 11th July, 1957. The Pakistan Government declared that day an official day of mourning, and flags throughout the country were lowered to half-mast. Various institutions and groups, including well-known *'ulamā'*, such as Mowlānā Ihtishām al-Haqq, expressed condolences and paid high tributes to the Āghā Khān's dedicated and outstanding services to the Muslims of India in shaping their destiny. The condolence message of Mowlānā Ihtishām al-Haqq read as follows:

> Muslims throughout the world have been grieved to learn of the sudden demise of the Aga Khan who through his international political understanding selflessly served them and in particular the Muslims of Pakistan. The Aga Khan will always be remembered because of his introducing Islam to a large number of non-Muslims through his ability

326 **The Life and Lectures of al-Shīrāzī**, p. 28.

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and organizing capacity.[327]

His grandson, Shāh Karîm al-Ḥusaynî, (1936-), inherited the institution of the Imāmat upon his grandfather's death. The Āghā Khān III, in his will, asserted the Shî'î Ismā'îlî tradition of appointing the successor to the Imām through *Naṣṣ* (literally, to be explicitly named), and thereby re-emphasized the necessity of the Imāmah as a means of directing the changing Ismā'îlî attitude in the modern world. The will justified the choice - Karîm al-Ḥusaynî - in terms of his exposure to recent developments in the modern world and in terms of his being one "who brings a new outlook on life to his office as Imām".

> Ever since the time of my ancestors, Ali the first Imam...it has always been the tradition that each Imam chooses his successor at his absolute and unfettered discretion from among sons or remoter male issue and in these circumstances and in view of the world in the recent years...including the discovery of atomic science, I am convinced that it is in the interest of the Shia Muslim Ismaili community that I should be succeeded by a young man who has been brought up and developed during recent years...in the midst of the new age...[328]

The Āghā Khān IV was born in Geneva, on December 13th 1936. His father, Prince 'Alî Khān, until his death in 1960, was Pakistan's permanent representative at the United Nations Organization. The reason why Prince 'Alî Khān did not succeed to the Imāmate was given by the Āghā Khān III in his will which is quoted above. Leonard Slater, however, maintains that it was his glamorous lifestyle which caused him to be passed over.[329] His mother, formerly Joan Yarde Buller, known as Princess Tāj-al-Dawlah among the Ismā'îlîs, is related distantly to the British Royal family through Lord Churston and the Duchess of Leinster.[330]

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327 **Dawn,** July 14, 1957, p. 5.

328 See the Introduction to the **Speeches of His Royal Highness: Prince Karim Aga Khan Imam-i-Zaman,** Karachi: The Ismailia Association for Pakistan, 1958.

329 Leonard Slater, "The Aga Khan", **San Diego Magazine,** July 1984, p. 9.

330 See the **Souvenir on Takht Nashînî** (enthronement) celebrations, Karachi: The Ismailia Association for Pakistan, 1958, p. 17.

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During the Second World War, the Āghā Khān, at the age of seven, visited Kenya where he was exposed to the Ismā'īlī way of life. He went to Le Rosey School in Switzerland where in addition to the regular curriculum he was also taught Muslim History, Arabic, and Urdu, by Mustafā Kāmil.[331] Later, the Āghā Khān joined the Engineering Department of Harvard University. At Harvard he switched into the Department of Middle Eastern and Iranian Studies where, at that time, Sir Hamilton Gibb and Professor R.N. Frye (who later occupied the "Aga Khan Chair of Iranian Studies"), among others, were involved in teaching Islamics. He graduated with Honours in History, in 1958. Before resuming his studies at Harvard he visited the major world Ismā'īlī centres in Africa and Asia. In 1957 and 1958, the Ismā'īlīs and the governments of their adopted countries (which had recently achieved independence or were on the verge of gaining it) welcomed him during the *Takht-i-Nashīnī* (enthronement) ceremonies. The speeches during these ceremonies were mainly concerned with assuring the respective governments of his community's "secular" loyalty towards the development of their national programs. He indicated that the Ismā'īlīs were not a political group but mainly a religious community whose social (health and education) and economic institutions (such as the Diamond Jubilee Trust) were geared to serve not only the Ismā'īlīs but all the citizens of the countries in which they operated.[332] The Āghā Khān asked the Ismā'īlīs to preserve their religious identity which would help them significantly to face the impact of the abundant material wealth that would be generated with technological advancement.[333] He expressed his intention to devote his whole life to "guiding the community in all the problems which these rapid changes will bring in their wake".[334]

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331 ibid.

332 See the **Speeches,** Part I.

333 **Speeches,** p. 5.

334 ibid.

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In a message to the Ismā'īlīs Āghā Khān IV said:

> As true Ismailis you must remember that you will always have two principal obligations. The first and paramount of these is your religious obligation to Islam and to your Imam. Your second obligation is a secular one. You must always be loyal to the country of your adoption and to whatever Government is responsible for your security and well-being.[335]

The Imām's secularist view of separating religion and state as two distinct areas of activity was probably the only way to show the Ismā'īlī sympathy for secular nationalism on the one hand and, on the other, to preserve their religiously based Pan-Ismā'īlī Islamic identity. Under the circumstances, it would have been futile to press for the mediaeval political claims of the Imāmah. The dual loyalties of the Khojah Ismā'īlīs - secular and religious - did not however leave them invulnerable in the secular national states, such as Tanzania and Uganda. The Asians, including the Khojah Ismā'īlīs, and Europeans were seen by African nationalists as exploiters of the national economies of these countries. Racial loyalty thus was easily identified with nationalist sentiments.

In Pakistan, nationalism is identified with Islamic nationalism where, theoretically, it transcends ethnic and racial identities. Under the modernist régimes, the Khojah Ismā'īlīs were able to avoid the problem of dual loyalties - the loyalty to state and to Ismā'īlism - principally because of the attitude of the politicians and the bureaucrats in Pakistan. They were largely secularists. The talk about religion was mostly window dressing undertaken either to placate the religious types or to mobilize the Pakistānīs. Moreover, the memories of the Āghā Khān III's significant contribution to the cause of the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent earned the Ismā'īlīs a respectable position in Pakistan. Another reason why the Ismā'īlīs were able to avoid the problem of dual loyalties was that Ayūb was much interested in economic development, and the Ismā'īlīs were already significantly important in this area. He had no reason to

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335 ibid. p. 35.

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interfere with them but rather to encourage them.

The conditions under Ayūb during the years 1958-1965 were instrumental in facilitating the progress of the Ismā'īlīs in implementing their own social and economic reformist programs. The need to restate their views was not strongly felt, however, except in broad Islamic and Ismā'īlī terms in order to align them with the Muslim modernist attitude. The Ismā'īlī religious framework, (especially the need for the Imāmah to guide the Ismā'īlīs according to changing situations; the spiritual and moral aspects of Islam; etc.) continued to be emphasized as the basis for sanctioning changes in the Ismā'īlī attitude.

Ayūb's economic policies were based on a planned state capitalist system in which the role of private initiative in generating capital was encouraged, principally in order to improve the economy of the lower-income groups. The business communities such as the *Memons, Bohras, Khojahs,* etc., increasingly engaged themselves in industries, trade and commerce. These business communities, Papanek observes, passed on the benefits of what they gained in terms of banking services and co-operatives profits to the members of their respective groups.[336] By 1959, Papanek's surveys indicate that, "minor Muslim communities largely immigrants from India, represented under one percent of the population but controlled over half of Industrial assets".[337] This indicates the reason why the minority Muslim groups, including the Khojahs, suffered no interference in religious matters from the Government and, indeed, enjoyed Government protection from the religious pressures by others.

The Āghā Khān IV who took over the duties of the Imām in 1957, and who was aware of the volatile situation, assured the Pakistan Government that the Ismā'īlīs would not involve themselves politically as a group, but that their social and economic

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336 G. Papanek, "The Location of Economic Policies", p. 15.

337 Lewis, **Pakistan: Industrialization and Trade Policies,** p. 46.

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contributions to the country would be significant.[338]

The Āghā Khāñ, in order to introduce the Ismā'īlī traders to modern business and industrial promotional techniques, hired a group of German consultants, under Gerhard Kienbaum, first to gauge the economic situation of the Ismā'īlīs, and then to improve it.[339] According to the Kienbaum team, although the Ismā'īlīs were religiously dedicated and socially organized, they were mainly traders, who needed a well-organized institution to help them fit better into an industrially based economy. "The Industrial Promotion Services" (known as I.P.S.) was thus established in 1962, in India, Pakistan, East Africa, and other host countries, with the intention of transforming the economic life of the Ismā'īlīs. Since then (1962), the Pakistan branch of I.P.S. has mainly directed its activities towards assisting the Pakistan Government in marketing research, feasibility studies of its economic projects, and importing technical advisers. Through the I.P.S., tourism, numerous industrial and other commercial projects - such as textiles, export-import, mining and construction - were initiated with shares open to the public.[340]

The Āghā Khān in 1958 reminded the business communities in Pakistan to make certain that "the fruits of the advancement are not gathered by a few but fairly distributed over the whole nation".[341] The Āghā Khān seemed to be acutely aware of the consequences of the gap between the rich and the poor in the recently independent nations, such as Pakistan, where the acute problem of massive poverty could make the rich become the focus of political agitation. In order that the Ismā'īlīs not be guilty of ostentatiously exhibiting their economic well-being, he attempted to minimize the gap

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338 **Speeches,** Part I, p. 60.

339 Frischauer, **The Aga Khans,** p. 246.

340 ibid. p. 247.

341 See the Speech, delivered by the Āghā Khān to the Federation of Chambers and Industries, **Speeches,** Part I, p. 46.

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within the community between the rich and the poor through his emphasis on creating a strong Ismā'īlī middle class.[342]

> To build up this middle class of... traders and professional men, is probably the most effective way of providing stability and gaining time while the ideological vaccum...is gradually replaced by a soundly based national tradition.

He continuously advised the Ismā'īlīs to save and not to "spend excessively",[343] nor to live in a "luxurious or an expensive manner".[344] He, like his grandfather, continued to encourage the Ismā'īlīs to perform weddings in his presence in order to side-step the prevailing marriage customs which involved huge expenditures.

Besides improvement in its economic life, education became a major concern for the Khojah community in Pakistan. It was through education, the Āghā Khān maintained, that modernization could be introduced.

> As a community, our faith will always preserve our identity but there should be nothing exclusive in what you do. To partake more throughly in this country's development, I hope to see my spiritual children spread out into all the walks of life ...in Europe there has been a ...revolution in technology and industrial power. The huge new atomic power stations, the sputnik and the vast throbbing machines of modern industrial life are symbols of a fresh chapter in material progress...Of one thing I am quite certain: through a strong educational system sustained by Islam, our future prospects are happy ones. I do not believe that we should fear material progress.[345]

Although he was concerned with the impact of modern education on Ismā'īlī religious beliefs and practices, he held that it was only through education that man can become more rational and mobile and be less dominated by his past social and cultural heritage.

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342 The Āghā Khān's intentions are reflected in his speech at the "Royal Commonwealth Society", at Oxford, **Speeches,** Part II, 1960, p. 60.

343 **Firmān Mubārak,** Part I, p. 47.

344 ibid. p. 9.

345 **Speeches,** part I, p. 39.

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> Man's position in society, wherever he may be, will depend less and less upon his cultural or family heritage and more and more on the power and development of his mind.[346]

The problem that arises from the acquisition of secular education with a modern scientific content by the members of a religious community is that such education may contribute to the weakening of the relations of authority defined by religion because it emphasizes individual freedom. In coming to terms with the impact of modernization on the religious tradition of Islam, the Āghā Khān distinguished modernization from Westernization. The former is essentially concerned with the knowledge, as such, of science and technology geared towards expanding the capability and the power of man to guarantee his survival; the latter is merely a cultural form which has given impetus to science in modern history. Thus, modernization could be carried out by the Muslims in their own Islamic set-up without their necessarily adopting Western cultural and social values. It appears that the Āghā Khān, while distinguishing modernization from Westernization, hopes to legitimize change and also to predict that the consequences of such changes will not be similar to those found in the West. He thus appears to be aware of the difficulty of being both a modernist and a Muslim without being westernized. The difficulty lies in the fact that science or industrialization cannot be acquired without giving rise to a whole set of values affecting the family life and social structure of the Ismā'īlīs. The problem is how one can separate science and industrialization from their social consequences.

The Āghā Khān, without enumerating what the Islamic ideals were, expressed his awareness of the difficulty the Government of Pakistan was facing in adapting the "Modern values and the pressures of the changing society to the basic ideals of Islam to put modern democracy into Islamic form".[347] He also said that the Islamic values must not be seen as antithetical to material progress unless the latter became an

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346 **Fīrmān Mubārak,** Part I, p. 32.

347 **Speeches,** Part I, p. 39.

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"obsession".[348]

The Āghā Khān was thus convinced that there was not only no contradiction between religion and modernism,[349] but that "humanity cannot deal with present-day problems without the basis of religion".[350] Yet, the Āghā Khān believed that the religious traditions of Islam must adapt themselves to the changing situation.

> If Islam aspires, as I believe she must, to recapture the glories of the past, she must be ready to adapt, I do not say abandon, her own traditions - to the entirely different circumstances of today. If we fail to do this, not only shall we fail to progress ourselves, but the younger generation will become disillusioned and fall prey to alien and materialistic creeds, which have nothing whatsoever in common with Islam.[351]

The Āghā Khān thus tends to reify Islam and treat is as an abstract but real entity. The religion of Islam, according to the Āghā Khān, offers the spiritual or moral framework which furnishes the Muslims with a direction for shaping the process of modernization.[352] He sometimes advocates that Islam adapt to the demands of modernization and sometimes that the modern values of democracy, science, etc., adapt to the Islamic ideals. The difficulty, or the problem for the Muslims, lies, according to the Āghā Khān, in "putting people in the situation where they have to choose between the one and the other".[353] The Āghā Khān appears to be aware of the difficulty of being both a modernist and a Muslim without being Westernized and yet he maintains that there is no conflict between modernization and Islam.

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348 ibid. p. 40.

349 See the Āghā Khān's "Interview" with Radio Pakistan, **Speeches of Mowlana Hazar Imam His Highness the Aga Khan,** Part II, 1960, p. 47-50.

350 ibid. p. 8.

351 ibid. p. 52.

352 ibid. p. 48-49.

353 ibid.

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During the Ayūb era, no significant work on Ismā'īlism was produced by the Khojah Ismā'īlīs of Pakistan. In the hope of confronting the impact of modernism on the authority of religious traditions, the Āghā Khān advised Ismā'īlīs to encourage students to pursue higher studies in Islamic and Ismā'īlī History. Addressing the Ismailia Association for Pakistan in 1960, the Āghā Khān said:

> The most important problem by far for us today is to create students who are capable of going back and of reading the original texts of our history... For this reason I would like the Association in the years ahead to pick its best students and grant them scholarships to study in University...[354]

It may be recalled here that his grandfather, the Āghā Khān III had earlier, in 1955, discouraged the Ismā'īlīs from undertaking a University education and had instead advised them to go into trade and commerce. The present Āghā Khān felt that the study of history would help the Ismā'īlīs to understand the developments in the past and help them to "explain the meaning of Imām and faith" to their children.[355] In order to discourage the Khojah Ismā'īlīs from publishing literature on Ismā'īlism without first acquiring expertise in the area, the Āghā Khān asked the Ismailia Association for Pakistan "to see that none of my spiritual children, living in Pakistan, get printed either books or pamphlets referring to our religious history".[356] This directive was issued probably in response to certain Khojah Ismā'īlīs who had launched a magazine called **Payghām** (the 'news' or 'message') which aimed at criticizing the local Ismā'īlī leaders for functioning inefficiently.[357] Among the charges directed against the Khojah leaders were:

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354 **Speeches,** Part II, p. 24.

355 **Speeches,** Part I, p. 43.

356 **Firmān Mubārak,** 25-3-1958.

357 In 1964, the Āghā Khān again issued a Firmān stating that the individual Ismā'īlīs could write to their Imām directly if they wished to bring these issues to his attention, but there was "no point in washing one's dirty linen in public". **(Firmān Mubārak,** Part I, p. 32) The Magazine **Payghām,** later in 1970, ceased publication.

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1. That they were incompetent in providing the Ismā'īlīs with sound knowledge about the Ismā'īlī faith; and

2. that they were playing down the authority of Gināns.

In 1968, the editorial of **Payghām** stated that:

> the so called al-waazin [sic] and professors, when confronted with such problems, invite people to come to their office. If someone dares to go there, what they try to explain, is nothing but that proverbial version 'Empty vessels make more noise'...On the other hand, there are some less learned people who do not lag behind to play mischief even with the Ginan-i-Sharif composed by our worthy pirs...For the sake of mere hypocrisy, they do not hesitate to censor Ginans.[358]

This attempt by the local Khojah leaders to restrict the publication of literature on Ismā'īlism and the recitation of Gināns rich in Hindu elements probably led to an increase in the demand for reprints of Gināns and other literature previously written by the Ismā'īlīs, such as **Nūr-i-Mūbīn** (reprinted in 1961). It will be seen later how the availability of this literature has added fuel to the anti-Ismā'īlī manifestations recently in Pakistan. The popular religious ideas, myths, and symbols which constitute a religious world view of some people cannot be changed without causing a rupture somewhere. The popular religious ideas remain alive and volatile so long as they can be utilized by the masses to mobilize themselves in supporting their claims and interests. The élites and administrators may be interested to sanction changes in the religious attitude of the masses, but often they do not make a grass-roots level impact on what is traditionally been held by the masses.

In response to the Imām's advice to the Ismailia Association to encourage higher studies in Islamic and Ismā'īlī History, only a few Ismā'īlīs (two or three) were sponsored for higher education in London. Zawahir Nūr 'Alī and Akbar Lādak were two of these students who went to London for further studies. On returning to Pakistan, after completing their studies, they were unable to function effectively within the religious institutional organization. They, along with other graduates of local

358 **Payghām,** 1968, p. 9.

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universities in Pakistan, complained that the Khojah leadership, comprised mainly of traders, did not support the creation of an intellectual environment within the community necessary for a better understanding of the faith. They felt that the local Khojah leaders were apprehensive of the impact of emerging scholars on their authority. They argued that the Imām's directives were not being implemented.[359] Many of these students, who had joined the Ismailia Association, eventually sought job opportunities elsewhere. The function of religious teaching was thus left to the voluntary and paid traditional preachers or *Wā'izīn* who continued to emphasize the inherited religious traditions relating to the concept of the Imām, teachings which were already popular within the Jamā'at. These included rumours about the Imām's performance of *Mu'jizāt* (miracles). For instance, an Ismā'īlī, Nūr 'Alī Ahmad wrote in **Payghām** that during the acute water shortage in Karachi due to the bursting of the main water pipe in 1968, the well in the Āghā Khān Park had supplied the residents of Karachi with water. The way he narrated the event suggests the extent to which the popular religious ideas were being played upon. He stated that:

> Strange enough, the water of Aga Khan Park is sweet for we know, there are number of wells in the area which have only salty water and this well fortunately has the sweet water. I personally think this is all due to the most auspicious visit of Noorani Family on this land. Miracle of all miracles is that our two motors kept running non-stop from 6 a.m. until midnight for four days, but water of this under ground well never got exhausted.[360]

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359 Zawahir Nūr 'Alī and Jawād al-Masqatī repeatedly expressed their frustrations to the author. While the former left for London in the nineteen seventies, the latter left the Ismā'īlī faith and became an agnostic. The author himself worked as a Research Assistant for the Ismailia Association for Pakistan from 1974 to 1977 during which he observed the lack of incentives and encouragement for serious studies on Islam and Ismā'īlism. He found that the situation had not changed when he visited Pakistan in 1984. He expressed his concern about the situation in a letter to the Institute of Ismaili Studies, London, in 1985. Akbar Lādak, who had received his Ph.D., in the late sixties from London School of Oriental Studies, for instance, expressed his frustrations to the author in 1973.

360 **Payghām**, October 1, 1968, p. 1.

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The miracles occupy a significant place in the Ismā'īlī belief system. They suggest a type of world view in which man, through some sort of divine intervention, interacts with God or nature. Such a world view, according to Michael Gilsenan, denies "chance or accident" to the events and circumstances of life.

> ...virtually any conjunction of events can be held to demonstrate the workings of a saint, however matter-of-fact such events may seem to be.[361]

In the case of the Khojah Ismā'īlīs, the reliance on a world-view in which the Imām can intervene and effect changes in the natural order of things may have contributed towards their sense of security in Pakistan while in the process of creating social and economic institutions to address their changing needs. Falling back on the old ideas partly contributed towards exacerbating the tensions within the Ismā'īlī community as it sought to adapt itself to the Islamization process in Pakistan. It will be seen later how the revival of the old Ismā'īlī ideas is currently used by some Muslim extremists in fuelling anti-Ismā'īlī propoganda.[362]

Education with scientific and liberal content is a pre-requisite for modernization. But it may contribute towards the dilution of the authority of religious traditions. It is, however, possible to divide knowledge and reality into two compartments which, some hold, can be kept entirely separate from one another. For instance, those who pursue scientific careers implicitly distinguish between the scientific and spiritual kinds of knowledge whose methods and sources are different. In such cases, a religious group either (i) shuns the processes of change, or (ii) adopts changes through the re-interpretation of religious traditions, or (iii) gives up its inherited traditions. The interpretive response may dilute the traditional basis of authority.

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361 Michael Gilsenan, **Recognizing Islam**, p. 79-83.

362 Most of these preachers who remained with the Ismailia Association for Pakistan did not possess University qualifications.

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The Āghā Khān, it will be seen, views the role of Islam and Ismā'īlism as being tied to their moral and humanitarian values. He believes that the importance of observing religious practices lies mainly in their inculcating the moral and spiritual values essential for Muslim unity and for extending the benefits of modernization to all segments of the society. Although the Āghā Khān's Firmāns and speeches seem to imply that religion has a functional and utilitarian value, he does not specifically indicate that religion has no value for its own sake. However, when religion is dominantly characterized in moral and material terms while ignoring those elements of mystery and majesty for which the worshipper deeply aspires, then religion tends to be identified with ethical humanism. In such a case, according to John Macquarrie:

> Who cannot be exhaustively characterized in moral terms is a humanized God... It may be an exaggeration to say that God cannot be worshipped, but it is true to say that this conception of God is too thin to answer to the deepest needs of the religious consciousness.[363]

In this sense, the Āghā Khān's views appear to indicate that he is an ethical humanist, (or more appropriately an Islamic humanist) in that he views religious practices as cultivating essentially a sense of morality and concern for humanity - rather than just being pleasing to God or some transcendental entity. For instance, he has encouraged the learning of the Qur'ān and the Gināns - which, as seen in the previous chapter, contained some Hindu mythological elements - for the purpose of cultivating moral consciousness. The Gināns were described by the Āghā Khān as the "Wonderful Traditions" which needed to be preserved.[364] The Qur'ān and the Prophetic traditions, too, were referred to as a source of moral and social inspiration and as a guide. The importance of the *Akhbār* (traditions) of the previous Imāms was also emphasized. Thus, the Āghā Khān's syncretic approach was aimed not only at projecting the elasticity and the diversity of Islam and Ismā'īlism, but at articulating

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363 John Macquarrie, **Twentieth Century Religious Thought,** p. 93.

364 The Firmān was issued in Dacca, in 1960.

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them as a culture with a strong humanitarian and, so, universal emphasis. The Firmāns issued at Karachi in 1964 reflected the Ismā'īlī attempt at reinterpreting the religious world-view in the light of modernist trends:

> My beloved Spiritual Children,
>
> I am very happy to see how well you are learning your Ginans and Quran, I would like you in your studies not only to look at what is written and what is compulsory upon Muslims, but I would also like you to take from its traditions, your own history, that which can help you in guiding your everyday lives, so as to live within the spirit of Islam. Quran says: *Khalaqnakum Min Nafsin Wahidatin.* This means that God says to you He has made you out of one soul. This means that you are at all times brothers and sisters, that you can really act as Jamat...there is another tradition, a *Hadith,* which may or may not be absolutely a hundred percent correct, but again when you are reading your history I would like you to take from it that which will help you to live within the spirit of Islam...This *Hadith* says that the Prophet (s.a.s.) never took food without washing hands...this is a small matter, it is a habit which will help you in everyday life...This means to live honestly, to live purely, to know that you are brothers and sisters, to be available at all times when one or the other needs help, to be generous.[365]

The above Firmān sets out the Imām's advice to Khojahs to seek inspiration from both the Gināns and the Qur'ān in guiding their lives. The Firmān links the Qur'ān and the Gināns closely to moral values. To act morally is to be religious. Here, the role of the Qur'ān and the Gināns is as an adjunct or spur to moral action. There is no necessary connection between the two, religion and morality. A thorough ethical humanist may discount the role of religion altogether and simply advocate a moral life; also he may have a very functionalist understanding of religion. The latter position, which the Āgā Khān seems to hold, amounts to appealing essentially to reason but not to religious traditions.

The authority of the Imām was also explained in human and secular ways. At one level, while the role of the Imām continued to be qualified by the inherited Ginānic traditions, it was being redefined in general terms at another level. The concept of the Imām linked the Āghā Khān spiritually with the Ismā'īlīs. This relationship, extending

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365 **Firmān Mubārak: Pakistan Visit: 1964,** Part I, Karachi: Ismailia Association for Pakistan, u.d. p. 11-12.

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to the metaphysical realm, was also explained in terms of the human attributes of "love", "affection", etc. The necessity for the Imām was re-emphasized in the Firmāns in terms of the historic Ismā'īlī belief that "since 1300 years" there has been need for divine guidance to direct the activities of the Ismā'īlīs at all times.

> For hundreds of years, my spiritual children have been guided by the rope of Imamat; you have looked to the Imam of the age for advice and help in all matters and through your Imam's immense love and affection for his spiritual children, his *Noor* has indicated to you where and in which direction you must turn, so as to obtain spiritual and worldly satisfaction.[366]

Earlier, the Ismailia Association for Pakistan, in a souvenir published during the *Takht-i-Nashīnī* celebrations in 1958, had restated the belief that the Imām was fundamental for the direction of the community in the path of Allāh.[367] It argued, based on the traditional philosophical concepts of change and changelessness,[368] that the world always changes and that the physical aspects of the last Prophet (of Islam) and the Imāms undergo change and are mortal, but that their spiritual aspect - the divine guidance - is eternal and changeless.[369] Thus, the official Ismā'īlī restatement implied that the present Imām, in whom the *Nūr* (light) of God resides, is the Absolute source of authority commanding the absolute allegiance of the *Mu'minīn*.

Although this position seems to imply that those who do not recognize the Imām are not *Mu'minīn*, there is no missionary zeal on the part of the Ismā'īlīs, presently, to press such a view on other Muslims. It is rather for the sake of self-assertion that the idea of recognition - *Shanākhī* - as a doctrine within Ismā'īlism is reiterated. The

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366 ibid. p. 40.

367 **Souvenir,** p. 9.

368 While the problem of change and changelessness - in the sense of describing the reality of the world - gained predominance in ancient Greek Philosophy, it continued to feature prominently in the history of Medieval and Modern Philosophy. see Fredrick Copleston, **A History of Philosophy,** New York: Image Books, 1962.

369 **Souvenir,** p. 9.

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Ismā'īlī perception of the Imām's authority during this period was thus expressed at, at least, three levels:

1. At the level of the Imām, the statments of the Āghā Khān on the issue of religious authority were too broadly based to suggest any modifications other than the legitimate role of Imām's authority in effecting social and economic reforms within the community;
2. The continuous espousal by the Khojah Ismā'īlīs of the inherited syncretic traditions which, in general, view the Imām alone as the basis of religious authority constitutes the second level.
3. At the level of the local Ismā'īlī leadership, some religious traditions regarding the authority of the Imām were modified only with the intention of projecting a Muslim identity for the community. These modifications were confined to the removal of certain Hindu elements from some important religious practices. At this level, the authority of the Imām was set beyond the temporal appeals of Islam and modernism and, thus, did not warrant any serious examination of the issue of religious authority. In the next chapter I will examine how the emerging resurgence movements in Islam have forced the Ismā'īlīs, in recent years, to come to grips with the issue of the basis of religious authority.

The Ismā'īlī response to events in Pakistan during this period can be summarized as an attempt to restate the Islamic ideals, as seen by the Ismā'īlīs, with a view to mobilizing the group to bring about social and economic reforms. To this end the Ismā'īlīs articulated a modernist attitude through which the Islamic and Ismā'īlī belief system provided moral and spiritual significance to the newly-acquired social and economic concepts. It may be added that the prospects for opposition to the traditional basis of religious authority within the Ismā'īlī community were being

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minimized with the improvement in the social and economic life of the community. Such improvement would generate considerable social support as the growing expectations of the community were satisfied.

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Chapter V

ISLAMIC RESURGENCE IN PAKISTAN: 1977-1985

"Islamic Resurgence" refers to "increasing political activism in the name of Islam by Governments and opposition groups alike".[370] It also refers to the greatly increased role of Islam in public life. In this sense, the Islamization process being carried out by the present Government of Pakistan, under Zia al-Haqq, shows the characteristics of "Islamic resurgence". Esposito describes the process of Islamization as the process of "creating a more Islamic system of Government *(Nizām-i-Islām)*".[371] In the process, various problems have emerged. This chapter examines these problems and how they have affected the minority groups in Pakistan, primarily the Khojah Ismā'īlī community.

5.1 Meanings of Islam and Islamic Nizām

Zia al-Haqq, when he assumed control of Pakistan in 1977, declared that *imān* (faith) *taqwā* (piety) and *jihād* (struggle in the name of God) "were the guiding principles for the people of Pakistan".[372] In 1979, on the occasion of *'Īd-i-mīlād al-nabī* (the Prophet Muhammad's birthday), Zia exhorted the people of Pakistan to cultivate the "Islamic way of life", instead of turning their backs on the obligatory

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370 Ali Hillal Dessouki, "The Islamic Resurgence: Sources, Dynamics, and Implications", in **Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World,** ed. by Dessouki, New York: Praeger, 1982, p. 4.

371 John L. Esposito, "Islamization: Religion and Politics in Pakistan", **Muslim World,** vol.72(1982), p. 197.

372 Khalid B. Sayeed, **Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change,** New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980, p. 162.

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practices of Islam and "leading a life wedded to materialism".[373] On that occasion, Zia announced that he was formally introducing "the Islamic system in the country".[374] Zia appeared to be more concerned with the moral implications of the Islamization process and the observance of religious practices than with the application of concrete programs to solve social and economic problems. In this respect, the Islamic resurgence in Pakistan has much in common with that of other Muslim countries, such as Egypt.[375] Zia repeatedly announced that all the previous Governments had merely talked about making Pakistan an Islamic State to "enable its citizens to mould their lives in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam, but none of them took concrete steps to translate this objective into legislative and administrative realities".[376] When he was asked which Islam he was talking about, he insisted that it was "the very Islam which came to us right from the Holy Prophet Hazarat Muhammad (peace be upon him), of the Islam which is the religion of the past as well as the future...that it can provide guidance in all times under all conditions".[377] According to Zia, Islam "has always left the doors of *Ijtihād* (interpreting Islam in the light of the requirements of the time) open".[378] He emphasized that "there was no concept of priesthood in Islam nor does any particular class hold a position of supremacy in it."[379] In the following pages we will see whether Zia, unlike his predecessors, is

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373 Muhammad Zia al-Haq, "Introduction of an Islamic System", **Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives,** ed. by John Esposito and John Donohue, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 272.

374 ibid.

375 Dessouki, **Islamic Resurgence,** p. 28.

376 Sayeed, **Politics in Pakistan,** p. 181.

377 See "President Zia al-Haqq's Election: referendum in 1984", **Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies,** vol.VIII(1985), p. 68.

378 ibid.

379 ibid.

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really committed to Islamizing the country and what steps he has taken in that direction.

Zia has taken it upon himself to implement an Islamic order, both as a commitment to transform Pakistan into an Islamic State and also as a move to accede to the demands of Islamic resurgence movements. The demand for the implementation of the Islamic system has come primarily from the Jamā'at-i-Islāmī, the Jam'īyat-i-'ulamā'-i-Pakistan, and the Jam'īyat-i-'ulamā'-i-Islam. Amongst these, the Jamā'at-i-Islāmī is the most prominent and highly organized. It was founded in 1941 in pre-partition India by Sayyid Abu-l-A'la Mawdūdī (1903-79). It is a powerful and effective revivalist movement for the creation of the Islamic State.[380] It is essentially an urban-based movement which aims at mobilizing the politically relevant strata of the population comprised of middle class literates, professionals, students, etc... It has therefore contributed significantly towards broadening the political decision-making mechanism which was previously controlled strictly by the modernist élites. Its success in appealing to the urban middle class probably lies in the way Islam, provides anchorage to this uprooted class seeking new opportunities in the fast changing urban set-up.[381] Jamā'at-i-Islāmī claims 5,000 fully dedicated members, 500,000 *Muttafaqīn* (those who cannot devote full time), and approximately 3 million *Mu'aththirīn* (the sympathisers).[382]

Mawdūdī organized his party with the intention of infusing into the minds of the leadership and the Muslims in general the teachings of Islam so that social mobilization

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380 For an excellent analysis on Mawdūdī and Jamā'at-i-Islāmī, see Charles Adams, "Mawdudi and the Islamic State", in **Voices of Resurgent Islam,** ed. by John Esposito, New York: Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 99-133.

381 For discussions on the process of change and social mobilization see Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development", **American Political Science Review,** vol. 55 (1961), p. 493-508.

382 See Interview of Mian Tufayl Muhammad in **Arabia,** February 1985, p. 31.

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along religious lines would take place effectively.[383]

> The task then was one of education in the principles of Islam, of religious nurture, and of correction of the erroneous ways of thinking into which the Muslim upper classes had been seduced by the agents of *Jahiliyyah*.[384]

Mawdūdī's emphasis, in the early phases of his activities, prior to 1964, lay upon the "rectification of individual Muslim character and life" and not so much on the concrete programs to transform the socio-economic life of the country as a whole.[385]

According to Mawdūdī, the universe is governed by the will of God. Since man has been endowed with reason and freedom to choose to live according to that will, God has laid down a *Sharī'ah* (law) for him to govern his life. A Muslim is, therefore, one who submits (Islam) to the laws of God as laid down in the Qur'ān and Sunnah. To submit to any other system of law (man-made law), or entity such as a nation or a man, is to commit the grave sin of associating a partner with God *(shirk)*.[386]

Sharī'ah, according to Mawdūdī, is a complete system which touches all aspects of individual as well as collective life. Sharī'ah ensures that faith does not remain merely a personal and private affair but "issue into social actions and attitudes, must strive for the creation of an Islamic society...".[387] Muslim society should not make the mistake of separating religion from the state as the West has done by excluding "all morality, ethics, or human decency from the controlling mechanism of society".[388]

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383 Adams, "Mawdudi and the Islamic State", p. 102.

384 ibid.

385 ibid. p. 130.

386 See Charles Adams, "The Ideology of Mawlana Mawdudi", in **South Asian Politics and Religion,** ed., by D.E. Smith, Princeton: Princeton Unviersity Press, 1966, p. 382.

387 Adams, "Mawdudi and the Islamic State", p. 118.

388 ibid.

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In order to evaluate Mawdūdī's and other Muslims' generally held views concerning the West, it would be appropriate to raise a point regarding western societies. Some western societies which are experiencing a post-industrial phase are characterized politically as societies in which the role of the government is minimal.[389] In such societies, Huntington maintains, the bulk of the population experiences economic well being; higher levels of education "with a college education becoming general, in constrast to the norm of primary education"; and "a new 'postbourgeois' value structure concerned with the quality of life and humanistic values" becomes predominant.[390]

> The concept of post-industrial society with its emphasis on knowledge, rationality, and technology... where the governing of men is replaced by the administration of things... such models... are the product of man's hope to transcend the irrationalities of conflict and power. Earlier ages sought such escape through religion and mysticism. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have searched for it by means of science, technology, and economic affluence.[391]

Many Western societies operate on a different scale of development from that of Pakistan. To maintain that Western moral laxity results from the separation of religion and state is to offer a very simplistic view and discount the historical processes involved in the formation of both societies. The matter is even more complicated. Mawdūdī's teaching that Muslim society should not make the mistake of following the West fails to take into account that both "Western Society" and "Muslim Society" are abstractions. There are, in fact, many Western societies and many Muslim societies which have followed their own historical processes and developments. As much as France is different from Russia, so is Morocco from Pakistan.

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389 Samuel Huntington, "Beyond Modernization", **Comparative Politics**, ed., by Roy Macridis and Bernard Brown, Illinois; Dorsey Press, 1977, p. 502.

390 ibid.

391 ibid. p. 503.

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It is generally believed that the process of Islamization being carried out by General Zia reflects Mawdūdī's influence.[392] Richter believes that Zia has much in common with Mawdūdī and probably is a "relative of the present Amir of Jamā'at, Mian Tufail Muhammad."[393] Tensions, however, have emerged between Zia and the Jamā'at-i-Islāmī over some issues which will be dealt with at a later point.

Among the other two politico-religious parties, represented by the *'ulamā'* (religious scholars trained at madrasahs), the Jam'īyat-i-'ulamā'-i-Pakistan belongs to the Barelvī tradition. Bareilli, from which the group derives its name, is a town in Uttar Pradesh. It was founded by Mawlānā Ahmad Raza Khān Barelvī (1856-1921). Hamza Alavi characterizes their version of Islam as[394] emphasizing "belief in miracles and the powers of saints and *pīrs*, worship at shrines, and the dispensing of amulets and charms, all of which are condemned by Dēōbandīs as un-Islamic".[395]

Barelvī teachings are popular mainly with the rural segments of Pakistānī society. The group had supported the Muslim League before the partition. Leonard Binder maintains that the Barelvī *'ulamā'*, such as Mawlānā 'Abdul Hamīd Badā'ūnī, were then not as influential as the Dēōbandīs who had instead supported Indian Nationalism.[396] After partition, the Barelvī *'ulamā'* who migrated to Pakistan formed a Political Party, Jam'īyat-ı-'ulamā'-i-Pakıstan, in 1948.[397] The Barelvī *'ulamā'* do not seek reforms in their religious practices which are strongly characterized by a

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392 William L. Richter, "Pakistan", **The Politics of Islamic Reassertion,** ed. by Muhammad Ayūb, London: Croom Helm, 1981, p. 151.

393 ibid.

394 Barelvī or Barelawī is the *nisbah*, that is, the adjective or the noun formed from the place noun - Bareilli.

395 Hamza Alavi, "Ethnicity, Muslim Society and the Pakistan Ideology", in **Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan,** edited by Anita Weiss, p. 30-31.

396 Binder, **Religion and Politics,** p. 28-31.

397 ibid.

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"custom laden style of sufism". Barbara Metcalf states that:

> The Barelwis placed relatively little emphasis on individual responsibility and much more on intercession of the *'ulamā'* and the *Shaikhs*. Nothing characterized their teachings more than hierarchy, a hierarchy that elevated the Prophet, the saints, and *'ulamā'* themselves as benefactors, patrons, and intercessors. The community they defined was more tied to particular shrines and fixed occasions, and tended to be rural than urban. True to their concept of hierarchy, they accepted the existence of the colonial authority apparently without question.[398]

The relationship between spiritual hierarchy and the neutrality of attitude towards the British among the Barelvîs may also explain their attitude towards the present Government of Zia in Pakistan. The tension between them and the Government is rather confined to the encroachment of Islamization programs upon the Barelvî customs. They are less interested in imposing their view of Islam on Pakistānîs than the Dēōbandîs and the Jamā'at-i-Islāmî. Katherine Ewing, in her essay on "The Politics of Sufism",[399] discusses the attitude of the successive Governments of Pakistan towards the Sūfî saints and shrines. She maintains that the Sūfî *pîrs* and shrines represent such a force that any Government wishing to control and organize the country politically and socially must come to grips with this force. While Ayūb Khān tried to use the shrines directly as a vehicle of modernization, Bhutto encouraged his government to participate in the festivals of the rural people and thereby gain mass support for the Government. Saints like Data Ganj Bakhsh were viewed as preachers of egalitarianism who "visualized a classless society based on the concept of *mussawat-i-Muhammadî* which Allama Iqbal and Qaid-i-Azam later termed as 'Islamic Socialism'".[400] The Government of Zia has not adopted Mawdūdî's anti-Sūfî policies, but has instead "attempted to minimize the distinction between Sufism and Shari'at".[401]

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398 Barbara Metcalf, **Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900** Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982, p. 267.

399 **The Journal of Asian Studies**, vol. 42(1983), p. 251-267.

400 ibid. p. 261.

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> In defining Sufism and the significance of the saints, Zia's administration has emphasized the idea that the original saints were themselves *'ulamā'*, trained religious scholars who followed the *Shari'at*.... The present government, taking an essentially reformist position, stresses the synthesis of Sūfī and *'alim* in its definition of the saint, while denying the legitimacy of the hereditary *pīr*.[402]

The drawing of parallels between the social objectives of the Government and the *pīrs* may lend some legitimacy and depth to government policies, but ironically such parallels also strengthen the beliefs and practices of such groups. Although the Barelvîs are a Sūfī oriented group, they adhere fast to the broadly interpreted Hanafī law. Their belief in the religious hierarchy of saints and their perception of the Prophet Muhammad as the bearer of the "light of God" come into direct conflict with the views of the Dēōbandîs and the Jamā'at-i-Islāmī.[403] The latter categorically deny any power to the *'ulamā'* and the saints to intercede between man and God. Apart from their dislike of the Shî'ah, and the demand for the implementation of classical legalism, the Barelvîs do not have much in common with the Jam'îyat-i-'ulamā'-i-Islam which represents the Dēōband school of thought. They have been and are rivals. Often they engage in fights over sectarian differences.

Dēōband is a town ninety miles from Delhi in which a madrasah was founded by Rashîd Gangōhî, Muhammad Qāsim Nanōtawî, etc., in 1867. Dēōband became famous for its widely spread network of schools; innovative methods of teachings; and inclination towards the Chishtî Sūfī order; etc..[404] The Dēōband school aimed at training *'ulamā'* who would, by leading the Muslims in prayers and other religious acts, eventually set a standard form of prayers, teachings, and worship. Their method of

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401 ibid. p. 251-254.

402 ibid. p. 254.

403 J. D. Kraan, "Religious Education in Islam With Special Reference to Pakistan: An Introduction and Bibliography", **al-Mushir**, 25(1983), p. 36.

404 For an excellent study on Dēōband, see Barbara Metcalf, **Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1800-1900**, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982.

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training differed from those of other madrasahs in that they adopted the organizational techniques of the British in running their madrasahs.[405] Barbara Metcalf maintains that the Dēōbandîs were effective also because they emphasized the synthesis of "the two main streams of the Islamic tradition, that of intellectual learning and that of spiritual experience".

> They themselves understand this unity of Shariat (the Law) and tariqat (the path) to be firmly within the bonds of Islamic orthodoxy, for they took the Law and the Path to be not opposed but complementary... A religious person could emphasize either the Law or the Path, but he should understand both dimensions to be inherent in the religion.[406]

The Dēōbandîs are puritanical and condemn syncretic views and practices. They adhere strictly to the Hanafî school of thought and, unlike the Barelvî, place more responsibility on individuals. They have gained a significant position of authority, and their *fatāwā* (plural of *fatwā* - the opinion of an *'ālim* or an expert on law) act as authoritative guidelines for the Muslims.[407]

They were hostile to the British and supported Indian Nationalism. Their stand was stimulated, according to Hamza Alavi, by the impact of the changes in India, under the British, on their lives. Formerly overseers of the judicial system, in precolonial India, the *'ulamā'* saw their prestige and authority replaced by a new class of "English-educated" lawyers and judges under the British. The *'ulamā''s* influence, according to Hamza Alavi, was declining also in the educational sphere. Their followers, mainly *jurahas* (weavers), whose livelihoods were affected by the impact of colonial economic interests, added support to the anti-colonial posture of the *'ulamā'*.[408] They justified their support for an Independent India - not for an Islamic State or Muslim State - on the grounds:

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405 ibid. p. 100.

406 ibid. p. 139.

407 ibid. p. 145-156.

408 Hamza Alavi, "Ethnicity, Society, Ideology", p. 29.

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> (i) that faith was universal and could not be contained within national boundaries but (ii) that nationality was a matter of geography and Muslims were bound to the nation of their birth by obligation of loyalty along with their non-Muslim fellow citizens.[409]
>
> They would live together in harmony in independent India which, although not dar-ul-Islam (under Muslim rule) would be dar-ul-aman (the land of peace), where Muslims would be guaranteed freedom to practice their faith and where it would be their duty to live as loyal and law-abiding citizens.[410]

In 1945, the Muslim League was able to win over some influential Dēōband *'ulamā'*, including Mawlānā Shabbīr Ahmad Usmānī and the *pīr* of Mankī Sharīf, who together formed the religio-political party called the Jam'īyat-i-'ulamā'-i-Islâm (JUP) in the same year. As soon as Pakistan emerged, they engaged themselves in planning to create a ministry of religious affairs to supervise the religious life of the Muslims of Pakistan.[411] In Pakistan, JUP is influential among urban Muslims, mainly *Muhājirs* and *Pathans* of the North West Frontier of Pakistan.[412], JUP, however, views a Sūfī saint or a *pīr* as an exemplary or a guide and not as a mediator.

All three religio-political parties joined with other religious and secular parties (in all nine parties) including the Nizām-i-Islamī, Tahrīq-i-Istiqlāl, etc., to form the Pakistan National Alliance in order to bring down Zulfiqar 'Alī Bhutto in 1977. They used the very powerful symbol of *Nizām-i-Mustafā* (the Prophet-type Government: Literally, Mustafā means 'chosen or selected'). They had initially supported Zia in establishing the Islamic *Nizām* (order) in Pakistan. But the problem is that there is no such order existing as a paradigm for the Muslims to use in governing themselves. What is supposed to constitute the Islamic *Nizām* has never been laid down either in the Qur'ān or exemplified in subsequent Muslim rule. This is especially true with

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409 ibid. p. 30.

410 ibid.

411 Binder, **Religion and Politics,** p. 29-33.

412 Hamza Alavi, "Ethnicity", p. 31

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regard to the issue of electing the head of state. The first four Caliphs provided four different examples of ways of choosing a head of state. Subsequent Muslim history has witnessed all kinds of governments including dynastic monarchies, benevolent dictatorships, and authoritarian régimes. The Islamization process in Pakistan thus raises the fundamental question of which period is to be selected as ideal and whose opinion will reign supreme in selecting the model. The religio-political parties have moreover failed to agree among themselves on the specific issues relating to the status of women, election procedures, the function of Sharî'ah courts, contents of Islamic Studies *(Islāmîyāt)*, etc..[413] Their disagreements have contributed significantly to strengthening Zia's position. Moreover, they have found it difficult to attack him because he claims to promote the Islamic order. However, in the Islamic State, "since the religious law is defined as being in force, cooperation with an unjust ruler can be tolerated."[414] Other factors contributing to the strength of Zia include: (i) significant improvement in the economy of Pakistan since 1977; (ii) continued moral and economic support from the oil rich Arab countries; (iii) the fear of Indian and Russian expansionism;[415] and, above all; (iv) the absence of a foreseeable alternative and workable political basis to carve an integrated national entity out of the numerous, diverse and tense ethnic, cultural, and sectarian elements that constitute Pakistan.[416]

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413 ibid.

414 Michael Gilsenan states that, "very different political and economic structures are thereby justified, placed beyond argument, or rendered 'invisible' or irrelevant. Although the religious law may therefore appear largely indifferent to the wider political economy, in practice it provides that political and economic system with a moral and ideological underpining." See **Recognizing Islam**, London: Croom Helm, u.d., p. 35.

415 Richter, **Pakistan**, p. 158-160.

416 Esposito maintains that "A major factor undermining cooperation among Muslim leaders is the problem of religious sectarianism - both between Sunni and Shi'ah as well as among Sunni Muslims themselves." "Islamization", p. 220.

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Zia al-Haqq consolidated his position by holding a national referendum in December 1984. The people were asked whether they supported his measures to Islamize the society "in accordance with the Holy Quran and Sunnah and...whether they supported the Islamic ideology of Pakistan."[417] If the people were in agreement with his Islamic measures, this fact would also mean that they were mandating his rule "for a term of five years".[418] In February, of the following year Zia held elections for parliament on a non-party basis. Such a procedure would guarantee, according to Zia, the election of "only those who are firmly committed to national integrity, unity, and solidarity instead of factional politics and sectarianism".[419] Such a person "should be a practicing Muslim and should not be known for deviation from the tenets of Islam...he should have sufficient knowledge of the teachings of Islam."[420] Craig Baxter maintains that both these processes of referendum and election do not confer legitimacy on Zia and his government. In the case of the former, the question of legitimacy is ruled out because of "the absence on the ballot of any alternative to the person and program of the ruler asking for confirmation."[421] As far as elections were concerned, he maintains, the electorate voted blindly and not on the basis of party platforms, policies or programs.[422]

The elections were boycotted by the eleven party Movement for the Restoration of Democracy. The Jamā'at-i-Islāmî and the Pakistan Muslim League, however, sponsored candidates. It is significant to note that only nine out of sixty one candidates

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417 Zia al-Haqq, "Referendum Speech", p. 78.

418 ibid.

419 ibid. p. 78.

420 ibid. p. 83.

421 Craig Baxter, "Conclusion: Legitimacy for Zia and his Regime", **Zia's Pakistan,** p. 111-120.

422 ibid. p. 114.

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of the Jamā'at-i-Islāmī were elected. A majority of the seats went to candidates associated with the Pakistan Muslim League and the Pakistan Peoples Party.[423] **Dawn** noted that individuals with influence and family ties probably fared better in the elections.[424] Subsequently, in December 1985, martial law was lifted in Pakistan, and power began to be shared between the military and the elected representatives.[425] The President, Zia al-Haqq, has continued to retain much of the power which he had assumed earlier.

This power relationship between the President (who is also the chief of Army Staff), the elected representatives, and the Islamic resurgence movements has had a two-edged impact on the formation of the political pattern in Pakistan. On the one hand, Zia appears to accede to the demands of the politico-religious groups, especially the Jamā'at-i-Islāmī, by introducing Islamic measures and propping up the influence of the Islamic resurgence movements. On the other hand, Zia retains the major decision making privilege which he utilizes to blunt the extreme manifestations of Islam. Miyān Tufayl Muhammad, the chief of the Jamā'at-i-Islamī said that:

> We welcome the steps General Zia has taken in the field of Islamization...His Hudood Ordinance is quite in conformity with the Holy Quran and Sunnah. His enforcement of Nizam-i-Zakat, Nizam-i-Ushr, Nizam-i-Salat, setting up of the Shariat court, ammendment of the Evidence Act in the light of Shariat, establishment of the Islamic University... are praise worthy moves... However... the powers of the Sharī'ah Court are ridiculously limited ... It cannot interfere in any constitutional, monetary or martial law regulations matters.[426]

This power relationship, Zia believes, will lend him the opportunity to forge unity among the people of Pakistan and curb sectarianism, regionalism, etc.. He hopes to infuse all aspects of Pakistānī society with the teachings of Islam so that the type of

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423 See "News from the Country", **al-Mushir**, 27(1985), p. 110.

424 **Dawn**, 21st March 1985.

425 **al-Mushir**, 28(1986), p. 20.

426 "Interview of Mian Tufayl", **Arabia**, p. 31.

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democracy which emerges as a result of his policies will be Islamic.[427]

Islamic democracy, according to Zia, is a process in which the people determine whether the head of the state has acted in accordance with the Qur'ān and Sunnah. Not only is the principal element in this process morality, but the process itself is moral in the sense that the chief criterion for the head of state is his moral and/or Islamic behaviour. People must be moral in order to make democracy work in Pakistan. It is by practicing the Islamic faith that corruption and mismanagement will be eradicated from Pakistan.[428] In this he is in agreement with Mawdūdī that everything depends on having good people in a position of leadership. When such a state of affairs, where people are moral, occurs, then democracy will be Islamic; and this kind of democracy will be different from Western democracy. Khalid bin Sayeed however argues that Zia repeatedly emphasizes that Islamic democracy is something different from western or parliamentary democracy, "but he never tells us what is the kind of democracy Islam stands for".[429] Moral underpinning does not explain democracy. The latter involves the process whereby the majority of the people are represented in determining how they want to be governed.

This view indicates that the very Islamic order that Zia champions is expected to evolve in time and, therefore, lies in the future - not in the past. Yet he, along with the fundamentalists, believes that the Islamic model for governing the Muslim society has always existed since it was patterned by the Prophet and the rightly guided Caliphs. "Inherent in this... view", according to Dessouki, "are two unsubstantiated assertions."

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427 Zia al-Haq, "Referendum Speech", p. 78.

428 **al-Mushir,** 26(1984) 3 & 4, p. 186.

429 Khalid bin Sayeed, "Islamic Resurgence and Societal Change", **The Islamic Quarterly,** vol. 30(1986), p. 55.

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> **(i) that there are eternal and unchanging behavioural features that Muslims share in all times and places and (ii) that Muslims constitute an undifferentiated entity that transcends differences in education, class, social status, and cultural and national variations.**[430]

Such assumptions, according to Dessouki, overlook the differences between the universal norms or values, which are 'utopian' in nature, and the specific situations created in the history of the Muslims.[431] The Islamization process of Zia is ambiguous in the sense that he supports the idea of implementing the ideal Islamic model of the past on the one hand and, on the other, he believes that Islam is adaptable and, so, capable of meeting the challenges of nation building. Moreover, Zia's view of the Islamic System as possible only in future implies, first, that Islam is compatible with modern developments. But by letting the views of the conservatives and the revivalists permeate the lives of the Pakistānīs, Zia, while attempting thus to legitimize his own rule, has legitimized the formers' interpretation of Islam, which in turn poses a threat to his own position. Second, Zia, in hoping to evolve the Islamic System in future, has set the stage for competition not only among the various religious sects but between himself and the religious groups in positing the true Islam.

5.2 Islamic Measures and their Implications

To transform Pakistan's socio-economic and political life in accordance with Islam, Zia first reorganized the Council of Islamic Ideology in 1978. The provision for its appointment was contained in both the constitutions of 1962 and 1973. As stated in the 1973 constitution, its function was to bring all the existing laws into conformity with the injunctions of Islam. The Council of Islamic Ideology was to be comprised of eight to fifteen members having knowledge of the Qur'ān and Sunnah. "At least two members, including the chairman, must be present or past judges of the Supreme court

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430 Dessouki, Islamic Resurgence, p. 7.

431 ibid. p. 19.

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or of a High court, and at least four must be persons who have been engaged in Islamic research or teaching for at least fifteen years...one member must be a woman".[432] Zia has given the Council of Islamic Ideology much more prominence than the previous régimes and has increased its membership to the maximum of twenty.[433] Its scope has been broadened to include the function of recommending ways to implement the Islamic system of Government. Its recommendations to impose *hadd* or Islamic punishments (which will be discussed later) were promulgated in February 1979. Until 1985, the Council remained an advisory body with no power to enforce its suggestions unless the President promulgated them. For example, the Council's recommendations to bring the existing family law ordinance into conformity with the injunctions of Islam have been deferred by the President. Moreover, it was the President alone who appointed members to the Council. Its membership however, comprised mainly the *'ulamā'* and the revivalists.[434] After the elections of 1985, the Council's recommendations were to be submitted to the Parliament. Many of its recommendations, the Council complained, were rejected and were not being implemented. It complained that:

> The presentation of recommendations of the CII and its consideration and finalization by the cabinet are also causes for delay of Islamization in the country... sometimes the measures taken by the government in the field of Islamization lose all their effectiveness and are even negated by other actions. This creates bewilderment among the people and even causes mistrust with regard to the intentions of the government which impedes the process of Islamization.[435]

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[432] Lucy Carroll, "Nizam-i-Islam: Processes of Islamization, with special reference to the Position of Women", **Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics,** vol. 20(1982), p. 66.

[433] ibid.

[434] Esposito, "Islamization", p. 202.

[435] **Dawn,** 18th December 1985, p. 6.

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It is thus evident that while the Government of Zia and the proponents of the Islamic Nizām have different understandings of the Islamic Nizām, they both are using Islam to legitimize their positions.

On the recommendation of the Council, Zia, in March 1981, formed a Federal Advisory Board *(Majlis-i-Shūrā)* whose functions were:

- to help the government accelerate the process of Islamization;
- to create conditions congenial for the establishment of Islamic democracy;
- to advise the government of its views on important international issues;
- to assist the government in overcoming social and economic difficulties faced by the people.[436]

The Majlis-i-Shūrā, which has been scrapped since the general elections of 1985, was to function "as may be specified in an Order made by the President" and its membership "consisting of such persons as the President may, by Order, determine".[437] Esposito states that its 350 members came "from a cross section of Pakistan Society and are appointed by the President".

> Most of those selected have not been among Pakistan's more prominent political figures. In addition, this Council...is strictly advisory since only General Zia, as Chief Martial Law Administrator, can legislate.[438]

As in the case of the Council of Islamic Ideology, Zia placed his authority above that of the Advisory Council. The latter contributed significantly to Zia's plans in charting out the course of events leading to the 1984 referendum, followed by the elections of 1985. Zia, no doubt is using Islam to legitimate his rule and "to control and suppress domestic dissent".[439] For instance, prior to the elections, the Council had declared that elections on a party basis were un-Islamic. This measure, adopted by Zia, put the

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436 **al-Mushir,** 24(1982), p. 21.

437 Quoted from Edward Mortimer, **Faith and Power,** p. 222-223.

438 Esposito, **Religion and Politics,** p. 204.

439 Lucy Carroli, "Nizam-i-Islam", p. 87.

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political parties with a broad support base at a disadvantage. In the process, he has not only given a prominent position to the *'ulamā'* and the revivalists, but has in accordance with the demands of the latter introduced Islamic measures which will be discussed in the following pages. Since the premise underlying the implementation of Islamic measures is the "belief that Islam is a total way of life *(dīn wa dunyā)*",[440] all the socio-economic and political measures discussed below are also religious measures. For instance, *zakāt and 'Ushr* are economic measures but also constitute obligatory religious practices of Sunnī Islam. Similarly, *Namāz and Hajj* are religious rituals, but fall within the realm of law in Islam. For convenience, however, three major areas of Islamization will be surveyed, viz. law, education and cultural reform, and economics, within which the problems affecting women, minority Muslim groups, etc., will be dealt with.

5.2.1 Law

The implementation of Sharī'ah is the primary goal of all Islamic resurgence movements. It is integral in Pakistan and elsewhere. Up until 1985, Zia had been introducing the Islamic Law through martial law ordinances. In 1978, Zia began to restructure the court system in Pakistan by introducing Sharī'ah benches or courts to determine whether or not the existing laws were repugnant to the Qur'ān and Sunnah.[441] In order to appreciate the measures Zia has undertaken to restructure the court system, it is important to discuss briefly the situation as it existed prior to Islamization.[442]

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440 Esposito, "Islamization", p. 202.

441 ibid. p. 207.

442 For documentary reports on the pre-1977 and post 1977 court structure see **Pakistan Year Book,** Karachi: East and West Publishing Co., 1986.

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Since the partition, Pakistānī courts applied Muslim Law, not only on the basis of either classical traditions and interpretations or the text of Qur'ān alone, but also on the basis of personal judgement pertaining to the requirements of a specific situation. In 1960, Justice Muhammad Shāfi' of the Lahore High Court, defending his decision to bypass the definite rules laid down by the classical commentaries relating to the custody of a child, argued:

> If the interpretation of the Holy Qur'an by the commentators who lived thirteen or twelve hundred years ago is considered as the last word on the subject then the whole Islamic society will be shut up in an iron cage and not allowed to develop along with the time. It will then cease to be a universal religion and will remain a religion confined to time and place where and when it was revealed...unfortunately since several centuries the doors of interpretation of the Holy Qur'an in the light of new circumstances have been completely shut out with the result that Muslims have succumbed to religious coma, cultural deteriorations, political paralysis and economic decline...Muslims have to wake up and march with the time...in order to apply the general principles of the Holy Qur'an to the changing needs of the society it has to be interpreted intelligently... Like all other human beings, Muslims are also endowed with divine gift of intelligence and it is meant to be used and not grow rusty.[443]

In 1967 the Supreme Court stated that "the founders of the various schools of Jurisprudence 'never claimed finality for their opinion' and that the 'doctrinaire fossilisation' that had overtaken Muslim Law was entirely without warrant".[444] Aslam Syed reports that the court system prior to Islamization, was entirely based on the British tradition. English was the only language used in the High Courts. The lawyers, during the court hearings, quoted extensively from English law books. As far as the personal law was concerned, it "was adjudicated by the Western-style courts".[445] The present Government has ensured that the judges and lawyers "put on Pakistani dress - sherwani and shalwar - and the lawyers are not obliged to address them as 'My Lord'

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443 Quoted from Lucy Carroll, "Nizam-i-Islam", p. 62.

444 ibid.

445 Muhammad Aslam Syed, "Modernism, Traditionalism and Islamization in Pakistan", **Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies**, vol. 8(1985), p. 78.

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or 'Your Lordship' as had been the practice prior to 1978".[446] While Lucy Carroll observes that these measures "concern symbolic matters",[447] Aslam Syed feels that these measures are taking the Muslims back to "Medieval times".[448]

In 1980, the Sharî'at Benches were reorganized under the Federal Sharî'at Court which consists of a panel of eight judges - of whom three are *'ulamā'*, "whose primary qualification is that of an *'ālim* and thus they need not be qualified judges or lawyers."[449] To provide additional jurisdiction to the Federal Sharî'at Court, Zia amended certain parts of the constitution in 1980. These amendments stipulated that the Courts of Sessions would try all offences punishable under the *Hadd* ordinance of 1979; and "appeals from the sentences of the Court of Sessions would be taken to the Federal Sharî'at Court".[450] In 1986, two Bills - the Ninth Amendment Bill and the Sharî'at Bill (see Appendix 'C') - were placed before the National Assembly. The Ninth Amendment Bill would empower the President and the Federal Sharî'at Court to be the supreme law-making authority over and above the National Assembly; and the Sharî'at Bill would give the courts and the parliament power to enforce Sharî'ah in the country. This bill undercuts any semblance of democracy because it puts law-making into the hands of a small group over and above the people's elected representatives. The architects of both Bills were the conservatives and the revivalists who wish to see that all obstacles to the implementation of Sharî'ah are removed. Both Bills have been strongly opposed by several women's and lawyer's groups. They view the Bills as a threat against the security of minority groups and women.[451] The

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446 ibid.

447 Lucy Carroll, "Nizam-i-Islam", p. 78.

448 Aslam Syed, "Modernism, Traditionalism and Islamization", p. 78.

449 ibid. p. 208.

450 **Pakistan Year Book,** 1985-86, p. 193.

451 **Dawn** 30th Jan. 1986, p. 5; also see **al-Mushir,** vol. 28(1986) p. 59.

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minority Muslim groups would be alarmed because the Federal Sharī'at Court would almost by definition be both Sunnī and Hanafī. As far as the Ismā'īlīs are concerned they have not as yet reacted to the Ninth Amendment Bill. The issue emerging from the raging controversy seems to centre more on the question of who should have the authority to interpret and enforce the Sharī'ah than on implementing the Sharī'ah in Pakistan.[452] In the face of this opposition, the Bills remain at a standstill. This fact shows that Zia's Government has taken steps to implement what Zia thinks to be an Islamic legal system in Pakistan, but these steps have been rendered inoperative as they contain inherent contradictions. The contradictions emerge from the issue: What is an Islamic legal system, and how does one decide on its nature? In the absence of any effective judicial and political apparatus, the Government of Zia remains in absolute authority, a situation which it perhaps seeks. According to Maleeha Lodhi, "Pakistan's dilemma lies in its inability to develop a form of Government and the necessary institutions and processes required to support it, which can endure beyond the political life of a dominant leader".[453]

The amendment of the Pakistan Penal Code constitutes the most controversial legal reform in Pakistan. The limits *(Hudūd)* or punishments, in the sense of the punishments God has set in the Qur'ān for the offences of drinking, theft, adultery *(zinā')* and false accusation *(qadhf)*, have been instituted. This means that theft or adultery could be punishable by severing the thief's limb or by stoning to death a person guilty of adultery. The Islamic penal code came into force in February, 1979. Among the offences that attracted much attention were particularly those of *zinā'* and theft.

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452 **Dawn,** 17th August 1986.

453 Maleeha Lodhi, "Reflections on Pakistan's Dillema", **Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics,** vol. 20 (1982), p. 96.

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> Offence of Zina: If the offence has been committed by a married person he is to be stoned to death at a public place and if the offence is committed by a person who is not already married he has to be punished at a public place with whipping.
>
> And if a person commits Zina-bil-Jabr (rape)... such a person may be punished with death or with rigorous imprisonment up to twenty-five years...
>
> punishment for theft liable to *hadd* is amputation of right hand from the joint of the wrist, and if committed for the second time, amputation of the left foot up to the ankle,...[454]

It appears that Zia, when pressed to translate Islam into specific and practical matters, turned "to the medieval fiqh manuals rather than undertaking a fresh interpretation in the light of revealed sources".[455] Instead of viewing the Islamic law as having been inspired by revelation and developed "to meet the needs of a specific time and place, the corpus of law is often treated as if it were itself revealed".[456] The whole Islamization excercise of replacing the laws, that are repugnant to Qur'ān and Sunnah has led to the enactment of Islamic laws that are equally repugnant to the customs of the majority of Pakistānīs, especially to those Pakistānīs who constitute the rural population.[457]

The *hadd* punishments have not been carried out widely except in cases of drinking in which those found guilty have been flogged. Esposito attributes this rare application of *hudūd* punishments to "internal criticism as well as to adverse publicity in the international media."[458]

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454 **Pakistan Year Book,** 1980, p. 205-206.

455 Esposito, "Islamization", p. 233.

456 ibid.

457 For an extended treatment on the impact of Islamization on the rural population of Pakistan, see Richard Kurin, "Islamization: A View from the Countryside", **Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan,** ed., Anita Weiss.

458 ibid. p 206.

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> Amputations have been imposed by the court, but none have been carried out since physicians have refused to perform them. A sharp controversy has surrounded the imposition of stoning *(rajam)* for adultery. Although ordered by the courts, such verdicts are appealed to the *Shariat* Court, and, in a recent decision the court ruled by a vote of 4-1 that *rajam* is repugnant to Islam.[459]

Khalid bin Sayeed reports that the modernist Muslims are alarmed at Zia's attempt to reduce what is, according to them the dynamic and flexible spirit of Islam to a mere hard and fast code of conduct.[460]

Another area that has been affected by the Islamization of laws - i.e. the effort to bring all existing laws into conformity with the Qur'ān and Sunnah - is the position and rights of women. The Pakistānîs are divided on the issue of women's status in Islam. The issue of the status of women serves not only as a testing ground for the implementation of the Islamic Nizām in Pakistan but reflects the seriousness of the conflict between the supporters and the opponents of Islamization. Moreover, it brings to light the problems of governing Pakistan on the basis of Islam.

Prior to 1977, attempts though inadequate, were made by the modernist régimes to interpret Muslim personal law in order to improve the status of women and facilitate the growth of the nuclear family system.[461] The nuclear family system is congenial to the capitalist form of economy and to the secularization of society. In this system, where the relationship between the husband and the wife are strengthened and where women are given more economic importance, the solidarity of traditional kinship groups which sustains feudalism is broken. In the secularization of a society, therefore, are found the traits that make possible a transition from a feudal to a capitalist mode of economy.[462]

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459 ibid. p. 207.

460 Sayeed, **Politics in Pakistan**, p. 183.

461 John Esposito, "Law in Islam", **The Islamic Impact**, eds. Haddad, Haines, and Findly, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1984, p. 80.

462 Anita M. Weiss, "Implications of the Islamization Program for Women", **Islamic**

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To ensure protection of the rights of women, the Muslim family law was reformed through the Muslim Family Law Ordinance, promulgated by Ayūb in 1961, based on the recommendations of the Marriage and Family Law Commission established in 1956.[463] The ordinance has been viewed by the conservatives and the revivalists "as a blatant derogation of the sacred law". To safeguard it, "the Constitutions of both 1963 and 1973 contained provisions protecting the ordinance from judicial scrutiny".[464] Under Bhutto, the 1973 Constitution went even further and enshrined the provisions to improve the status of women in Pakistan. It contained articles declaring that:

> there 'shall be no discrimination on the basis of sex alone' (article 25(2)), and that there shall be no discrimination against qualified candidates for the federal service on the basis of sex alone (article 27 (1)). Among the principles of State Policy, article 34 declares: steps shall be taken to ensure full participation of women in all spheres of national life; while article 35 asserts: 'The state shall protect the marriage, the family, the mother and the child'. Another, and potentially significant... provision ...(is) that at least one women shall be a member of the Council of Islamic Ideology.[465]

The Family Law Ordinance covers three major areas of reforms, viz, marriage, divorce and intestate succession. Traditionally, marriage with up to four wives at any one time is allowed by both Sunnî and Ithnā 'asharî Shî'ah law. The latter, in addition, could contract temporary marriage *(Mut'ah)* with an unlimited number of women. The Ordinance imposes restrictions on marriages. The restriction is that a man wishing to have more than one wife must obtain permission from the Arbitration Council and also from his wife (or wives). A man who marries without such permission is "liable to penal sanctions of up to one year's imprisonment and/or fine of up to Rs. 5,000".[466] In addition to that, the ordinance also requires registration of marriages and the

Reassertion in Pakistan, p. 108-109.

463 Lucy Carroll "Nizam-i-Islam", p. 58.

464 ibid. p. 61.

465 ibid. p. 64.

466 ibid. p. 60.

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purchase of the licence.

The Ordinance, aimed at giving more rights to women, also places restrictions on divorce *(talāq)*.[467] In order for a divorce to be effective, it must first be submitted to the Arbitration Council, and a period of three months must elapse after such notification.[468]

Concerning intestate succession, the Ordinance, in accordance with the needs of a nuclear family, guarantees "to the children of a pre-deceased child (either sex) the share of their grand parent's estate that would have passed to their parent had he/she been alive at the time of the grand parent's death". Otherwise, traditionally in the Hanafī Law, the children of a pre-deceased child "are excluded by the presence of a surviving child". Such a basis of inheritance, according to Lucy Carroll, is suitable in a tribal society and not in a nuclear family based society.

> In a tribal society where the extended patrilocal family was the rule, and the surviving son took over responsibility for the children of his deceased brother, the exclusion of the children of a pre-deceased son from a share of their grandfather's estate may not have occasioned much hardship. But in a society where geographical mobility and nuclear families are more common, the total exclusion of one line of the deceased's descendants appears to be both unjust and unjustified.[469]

The Family Law Ordinance has come under the criticism of supporters of the Islamization process in Pakistan. In addition, there is a growing demand from the emphasizers of Islamization that women observe *pardah* (veil); refrain from participating in national sports; and avoid mixing with men at work or school.[470] The *'ulamā'* have already succeeded in getting the Islamic penal laws, containing ordinances which lend less credibility to women, promulgated through the Council of

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467 On the rights of women respecting the divorce, see **The Family Laws Ordinance,** Dacca: Dacca Law Reports, 1969.

468 ibid. p. 59.

469 ibid. p. 60.

470 Miriam Habib, "Pakistan: Women - A Fractured Profile", **Sisterhood is Global,** ed. by Robin Morgan, New York: Anchor Books, 1984, p. 525-535.

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Islamic Ideology.[471]

Several women's groups have emerged under an umbrella organization, called the Women's Action Forum, to protest against the ordinances affecting their status, such as the rules of evidence which state that the testimony of two female witnesses is equal to that of one male witness; and the laws governing the compensation for a murdered victim, which state that if the victim was a female, the blood money *(diyāt)* may be half that for a man.[472]

The question of women's status has become a subject of raging debate in Pakistan, especially with respect to some of the following conservative and revivalist demands: that the 1961 family law ordinance (guaranteeing protection to women against the Qur'ānic terms of divorce, polygamy, and inheritance which are in favour of the males)[473] be amended; that women be forced to observe *pardah* (veil) "in order not to attract men's attention"; that women should be segregated from males in work places as well as educational institutions; and that they should be encouraged to remain at home; etc..[474] These demands affecting the status of Women were voiced in 1982, by Dr. Israār Ahmad, a former member of Jamā'at-i-Islāmī who had given up the medical profession to become a preacher. He appeared on television with a series of sermons on Islam, called *al-Hudā* (the right guidance or true religion). The series was sponsored by the Government.[475] In December 1981, he was appointed a member of *majlis-i-Shūrā* by Zia al-Haqq. He is the publisher of the monthlies **Mīthāq** and

471 **Pakistan Year Book,** 1980, p. 204.

472 H.Mintjes, "The Doctor and the Ladies: A New Debate on 'Women and Islam' in Pakistan", **al-Mushir,** 25(1983), p. 40.

473 For details see, John L. Esposito, **Women in Muslim Family Law,** New York: Syracuse University Press, 1982; Rashida Patel, **Women and Law in Pakistan,** Karachi: Faiza Publishers, 1979; and Fazlur Rahman, "The Controversy over the Muslim Family Laws", in **South Asian Politics and Religion.**

474 Mintjes, **The Doctor and the Ladies,** p. 6-11.

475 ibid. p. 7.

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Hikmat al-Qur'ān and the founder of a Qur'ān academy, called *Anjumān Khuddām al-Qur'ān.* His views on women evoked strong reaction from among women's groups, and various of them protested against his teachings on the position of women in Islam. These protests were, however, dismissed by many *'ulamā'* and the members of Jamā'at-i-Islāmī as embodying the very Western secular influences which they were attempting to eliminate from Muslim society. They reinforced their position on the status of women by mobilizing *pardah* observing women to counter the anti-Isrārī views.[476] Women's groups, such as *Majlis-i-Khawātīn-i-Pakistān,* reject "the validity of the United Nations Convention on the elimination of discrimination against Women by claiming it is repugnant to Islam".[477] The women, who are agitating against their own emancipation, as in the case of Irān, are causing a major dent in the struggle of those women who intend to participate fully in public life and who are determined not be forced to lead the life dictated by the ethos of Islamic resurgence.[478]

The women's groups, such as APWA (All Pakistan Women's Association) under the leadership of Begum Liaqat 'Alī Khān, have demanded that Zia's government clarify the issues raised by Isrār Ahmad relating to the status of women in Pakistan. Zia declared that "Dr. Isrār is not an authority. I am the authority."[479] Salīmah Ahmad, the president of the Business and Professional Women's Club, wrote that:

> We are of the opinion that it is not ignorance that has prompted the learned doctor to make these statements but his own weak thoughts which can only visualize women as sex symbols. We are of the opinion that he is not fit to give religious talks on the t.v. and misguide young minds. He should also be removed from *Majlis-i-Shura* and from the council of Islamic Ideology due to his anti-Islamic teachings, and

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476 Ibid. p. 8.

477 Anita Weiss, "Implications", p. 104.

478 For details on the position of women in the Iranian context see Cheryl Benard, "Islam and Women: Some Reflections on the Experience of Iran"; and Nesta Ramazani, "Behind the Veil: Status of Women in revolutionary Iran", both in the **Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies,** IV(1980).

479 Mintjes, "Women and Islam", p. 8.

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> thinking, which will eventually harm the Muslim nation as a whole, and women in particular who are struggling to earn a living and maintain entire families in these days of hardship.[480]

The T.V. program, *al-Hudā,* was discontinued inspite of the support it received from the Jamā'at-i-Islāmī.[481] Israr resigned from *Majlis-i-Shūrā* in 1982, declaring that the whole Islamization process was merely a "lip service," and that Islam could not be "established by presidential orders and martial law, but by a change of heart." Israr was also opposed by certain *'ulamā'* who claimed that "he had insufficient or little knowledge" about Islam.[482] On the other hand, Zia and his minister for Finance and Planning, Mahbūb al-Haqq have repeatedly assured the women that "Islam is a great liberator of both men and women".[483] Zia has accused the *'ulamā'* of "fomenting religious and political sectarianism in Pakistan", and also of espousing rigid views about women.

> While the Ulema wanted...women to walk with down-cast eyes, or remain covered, why did they not make similar observations about men, why did they not mention of widows, nor of orphans whose household was being run by a solitary woman...there should be a full appreciation of the conduct and responsibilities of both sexes...[484]

Zia, therefore, is pulled two ways at once and finds himself in a dilemma. He views Islam as championing the freedom and rights of women but, at the same time, his Islamization policies are supported by the conservatives and the revivalists who wish to see women in *pardah* and physically limited in participating in the society. He finds himself competing with the supposed spokesmen of Islam, trying to be more Islamic than they are. He also finds himself debating with them, - at least implicitly, about what constitutes true Islam. He seems to be facing the same problem that governments

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480 ibid. p. 7.

481 ibid. p. 9.

482 ibid. p. 10.

483 Anita Weiss, "Implications", p. 105.

484 **al-Mushir,** 26(1984), p. 188.

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elsewhere in Muslim countries such as Egypt face in that he can neither ignore Islam nor support it too strongly. Dessouki characterizes this position by the phrase "Islam as an Apology". Apology, according to Dessouki, "is an orientation that manifests itself in thought and action".

> An examination of their thought shows that their reasoning operates in the face of two challenges: the material advancement of Western civilization, on the one hand, and the impact of ideas derived from this civilization upon Islamic teachings, on the other. When challenged by Western material civilization, these thinkers enumerate the achievements of a 'secular' Islamic civilization in the field of science, philosophy, mathematics, agriculture, and others, disregarding the fact that science and philosophy declined with the triumph of orthodoxy. At the same time, when reacting against the Modern ideas based on science and technology of the nineteenth century, they uphold the tenets of an orthodoxy they identify with Islam.
>
> At the level of practice, Islam functions as an ideology. It is used, in most cases consciously, by a ruling class to legitimize its position, justify policies, create consensus, generate mass support, and discredit opponents. In this endeavour, the ruling class is usually supported, to varying degrees, by official 'ulamā', by sheikhs and Imams...[485]

Both in thought and practice, the problem with apology, as it manifests itself in the process of Islamization in Pakistan, is that it fails to integrate the past political and religious legacies with the practical needs of the contemporary society. This generally leads to a formulation of not very "consistent ideological perspectives".[486]

Zia's attempts to introduce Islamic measures have undoubtedly increased the influence of the *'ulamā'* and the revivalists in Pakistan. For instance, when, in 1978, Zia issued directives to all Government departments to offer *namāz*, the *'ulamā'* pressured the Government to 'compel' Muslims to observe this practice. In 1984, Zia introduced a system of *nizām-i-salāt* in which a warden for every locality is appointed to ensure that the Muslims observe *namāz*.[487] The Council of Islamic Ideology even went so far as to recommend that "any Muslim found not offering Juma prayer should

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485 Dessouki, "The Islamic Resurgence", p. 17.

486 Anita Weiss, "Implications", p. 107.

487 ibid. p. 190.

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be punished."[488]

Since the Khojah Ismā'īlīs do not offer prayers *(ṣalāt or namāz)* in the same way it is as offered by the majority group of Sunnī Muslims, they have increasingly come under pressure in Pakistan. The issue of *namāz* has added fuel to the anti-Ismā'īlī manifestations which will be discussed later in the context of the overall impact of the Islamization process on the Ismā'īlī community.

5.2.2 Education

The primary aim of education according to Zia is to cultivate the dual sense of Islamic as well as Pakistānī identity in order to "overcome factionalism and regionalism."[489] Its aim is also to direct the Pakistānīs toward unity and the cultivation of morality. The primary aim of education, therefore, seems to be the achievement of a political end - unity - rather than one's obedience to God's commands in order to be a good Muslim. This aim is to be achieved through measures such as: replacing English with Urdu and Arabic as mediums of instruction; the compulsory teaching of *Islāmīyāt* at all levels of education; propagating Islamic teachings through television and radio broadcasts; creating the physical and psychological environment for maximizing the impact of Islam on the people through, for example, renaming streets and emphasizing the wearing of national dress; and incorporating the traditional madrasah system of education within the existing framework, etc..[490] The establishment of the Islamic University in 1980 has been one of the major steps towards the Islamization of education in Pakistan. The study of Sharī'ah law has been added to the curriculum of all Law schools in Pakistan. Earlier, in 1979, the Sharī'ah

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488 **Dawn,** Jan. 6, 1984.

489 Esposito, "Islamization", p. 214.

490 For an excellent detailed study on Islam and the processes of education see J.D.Kraan, "Religious Education in Islam, with special reference to Pakistan: an Introduction and Bibliography", **al-Mushir,** 25(1983) p. 1-76.

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Faculty was created to become a wing of Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad. This faculty later became the central faculty of the Islamic University and is located at the Faysal Mosque in Islamabad.[491] The Islamic University Ordinance states the objectives of the Islamic University:

> To produce people who are imbued with Islamic learning and character and capable of meeting economic, social, political, technological, physical, intellectual and aesthetic needs of the society...so as to provide an Islamic vision for those engaged in education and enable them to reconstruct human thought in all its forms on the foundations of Islam.[492]

The establishment of the Islamic University in 1980, comprising The Sharī'ah College (founded in 1978), The Islamic Research Institute (established in 1962), The Institute of *Da'wah and Uṣūl al-Dīn* (preaching and fundamentals of Islam), The Institute of Islamic Education, and The Institute of Islamic History, Culture and Civilization reflects the seriousness with which the Government has launched the Islamization programs While The Institute of *Da'wah and Uṣūl al-Dīn* is geared towards training students in the traditional disciplines, such as *Qirā'āt* (Qur'ān recitation), *hadīth and fiqh*, combined with economics and sociology, The Institute of Sharī'ah Training is aimed at producing lawyers and judges specializing in Sharī'ah law.[493] The establishment of a separate university for women is being demanded by the Jamā'at-i-Islāmī.[494]

In 1978, the Government announced the proposed reforms in Education as a part of the Five-Year Development Plan (1979-1983). Its aim, among other things, was to orient education "towards Islamic Ideology and character building".[495] It is aimed at

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491 ibid. p. 166.

492 Quoted from Esposito, "Religion and Politics", p. 215.

493 Esposito, "Islamization", p. 215-216.

494 Mian Tufayl Muhammad, "Interview", p. 31.

495 A. Ghafoor, "Pakistan: System of Education", **The International Encyclopedia of Education,** vol. 7, ed. Torsten Husen, Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1985.

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incorporating mosques, madrasahs and *Mohallah* (community) schools in the presently recognized educational system which will be examined in this section. The Government intends to make education available to a wider segment of society and also to regulate the areas of madrasah and *mohallah* education which at present are operating autonomously.[496]

The mosques are readily accessible, and widely spread, strong, physical structures in the country. The tapping of this resource as a means to educate the children in conventional subjects could prove very economical for the Government. Between 1984-85, more than 2,500 mosque schools *(makātib)* were opened.[497] The *makātib* are to have secular teachers along with the teachers of Islamic subjects. The Government's policy of bringing the *makātıb* system into parity with the more formal educational sector is aimed at enabling the students from the former to get admission into the latter sector at any stage of their schooling.[498] Thus, the attempts by the Government to introduce secular subjects into the traditional education system and to introduce one curriculum for all schools, while propping up the status of religious studies, would place the Government in a better situation to regulate the activities of the traditional sector of education, particularly the mosques. The mosques have been instrumental in providing bases for the *'ulamā'* and their breeding of sectarianism in Pakistan.[499] Every year, especially during the month of *Muharram* (the month during which the Shî'îs mourn the death of Imām Husayn and his companions at Karbalā'), the mosques are used for fuelling Shî'ah-Sunnî sectarianism. The Shi'î-Sunnî conflict will be discussed at a later stage. However, for instance, in 1983 it is reported that:

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496 Kraan, "Education in Islam", p. 56-57.

497 **Pakistan Year Book 1986. p. 257.**

498 **The Pakistan Times,** 11-9-1979.

499 ibid. p. 58.

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> The violence was continually fuelled and exacerbated by the publication and distribution of inflammatory handbills and posters of a religious nature, as well as the misuse of mosque loud-speakers, use of which is supposed to be confined to announcing the daily call to prayer and Friday sermon *(Khutba)*...[500]

The Government, therefore, is attempting subtly to influence mosque activities by (i) placing many *'ulamā'* on the Government payroll; (ii) bringing some important mosques under the administration of the Awqāf Department of the Ministry of Religious Affairs; (iii) helping the preachers prepare sermons to be delivered in advance and with the supervision of the Government; etc..[501] Most governments in Sunnī countries do this to co-opt the *'ulamā'* in order to control them. More important, in 1984, the government, announced that *zakāt* funds would be allocated only to those religious institutions "which have no political affiliations and whose teachers are not involved in political or sectarian activities".[502] These measures are resented by many *'ulamā'* who feel that Zia is attempting to reduce their influence.

The *mohallah* system of informal education, in which a teacher (usually a woman) teaches a few neighborhood children at his or her residence for modest pay, is another significant resource that the Government intends to tap in order to realize its objective of making education available to a wider population. As yet the Government has not carried out these reforms. The *mohallah* system has been used only for Qur'ān reading sessions. How the Government will introduce other secular subjects within the system remains to be seen.[503]

The madrasah system comprising approximately 1,200 madrasahs in the country as a whole, with an enrollment of 58,000 students, is to become a very significant and integrated part of the new education policies. These madrasahs have so far been self-

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500 "News from the Country", **al-Mushir,** vol. 25(1983), p. 199.

501 Kraan, "Religious Education in Islam", p. 60.

502 **Dawn,** 9th October 1984.

503 ibid. p. 44.

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financed, are well organized and follow a systematic program of study. On completing the program, the students are awarded *sanads* (certificates) which, under the present system, are recognized as equivalents of the degrees granted at the universities within the country. The Government would allocate funds to the madrasahs for the teaching of science subjects and to ensure that the madrasahs raise their standard of education. The Government has already brought in experts from the Arab countries to teach Islamic subjects at the madrasahs. The Government's interest in the madrasahs, however, is resented by some *'ulamā'*.[504]

The restructuring of the educational system in Pakistan, although there are potential local resources available, is likely to have a negative effect on the quality of education, which is already burdened by the lack of finances, the poverty of laboratory facilities for teaching science and technology, etc.. It was reported, by way of criticism, that the Government spent 80% of its 1983-84 budget on "defence, administration of law and order, and debt servicing", while it allocated a mere 6% to education.[505] The financial restraints and the official adoption of a traditional system of education are feared by some educationists to be enhancements of traditional ways of thinking at the expense of the growth of critical and creative attitudes.

> The system is so unoriginal and uncreative that the subjects taught in these madrasahs are those written for medieval times... the graduates of the madrasahs usually become the main source of sectarian politics and they also spread religious dogmatism. They have a medieval outlook and from their entrenched positions they can only offer medieval ideas as solutions for the socio-economic and political problems of present-day Pakistan.[506]

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504 ibid. p. 60.

505 ibid. p. 44.

506 Mir Baiz Khan, "Education in Islam, With Special Reference to the Traditional and Modern Systems in Pakistan", M.A. Thesis submitted to the University of London, 1982, p. 79-80.

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The problem that arises from tying educational ideals to the ideological (religious) commitment is that the process of critical thinking is compromised because it cannot then be rationally justified.[507] Anwar Ināyatullāh, in 1986 commenting on the Government's attempt to incorporate secular and religious education within one system, remarked that it was "invigorating vision, but what followed blurred that vision and created new, frightening spectres shrouded in fallacies".[508] He adds that the educational reforms have so far resulted in further deterioration and regression in education instead of progress and improvement".[509] Adding to the deteriorating conditions of education is the quality of *Islāmīyāt* courses. According to Anwar Ināyatullāh, the standard of *Islāmīyāt* textbooks is very low and inconsistent.[510]

The teaching of *Islāmīyāt* was first integrated into the range of courses being taught in schools and colleges in 1963. *Islāmīyāt* was revised in 1979 "in consultation with the *'ulamā'* so as to inculcate in the students a greater sense of commitment towards Islam."[511] It has been made a compulsory subject at all levels of education. The topics covered in the course of *Islāmīyāt* include a short history of the Prophet's life and the first four Caliphs; the *Uṣūl al-dīn* (the principles of faith, viz., *tawḥīd* and *nubuwwah);* the 'pillars of faith' (viz. *namāz, rōzah, ḥajj, zakāt, etc..).* The students are also required to be able to recite selected verses of the Qur'ān and to know their meaning.[512] On the insistence of the Shī'ah community, *Islāmīyāt* is taught in accordance with either Shī'ah or Sunnī view-points.[513] In Shī'ah *Islāmīyāt,* the

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507 For an extended treatment on this issue, see Harvey Siegel, "Rationality and Ideology" in **Educational Theory,** vol. 37(1987), p. 152-167.

508 **Dawn,** 3rd January, 1986.

509 ibid.

510 ibid.

511 Kraan, "Religious Education in Islam", p. 55.

512 ibid.

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mention of twelve Imāms is added and so is the teaching of some hadîths which are authenticated by Shî'ah sources. No arrangements are, however, made to provide Shî'ah teachers to teach Shî'ah *Islāmīyāt* in all the schools, either because of the lack of finances or the small number of Shî'ah students in any given school. In most cases a Sunnî teacher also teaches Shî'ah *Islāmīyāt* or the matter is left to the individual to study the subject on his own and appear in the examination. The changes in the attitude of the Ismā'îlîs towards the Qur'ān will be examined in the next chapter.

The Islamic education measures increasingly manifest the impact of Islamic resurgence in Pakistan. As the consciousness of Islam deepens with the Islamic measures being introduced by the Government of Pakistan there will come to be a consensus or general agreement on a normative Islam which people will be pressured to follow. Since the formation of Islamic norms will be determined by the dominant Sunnî conservative and revivalist world view, the authority of the *'ulamā'* and the revivalists will grow as well.

5.2.3 Economics

The attempt to restructure the existing economic system in Pakistan is an extremely bold one on the part of Zia's Government. To transform the existing economic system entails immense difficulties in terms of retraining personnel; reorienting the attitude of the people used to conventional economic methods; and changing all the other linking institutional frameworks to accomodate the new economic mode; etc..[514]

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513 For Shî'î viewpoints see **Islāmīyāt Lāzmī (compulsory) for Shî'î Tulbah (students)**, Karachi: Sind Text Book Board, 1982.

514 See Muhsîn S. Khān and Abbās Mirokhor, "The Framework and practice of Islamic Banking", in the **Journal of Finance and Development**, 23(1986), p. 36.

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The three main areas affected by the Islamic Economic measures are private property, taxation *(zakāt and 'ushr* - the agriculture tax), and interest *(ribā)*. While the concept of private property is upheld as Islamic, legitimization for introducing land reforms is sought in the "Islamic teaching that all land belongs to God and that the right of private property is limited by the demands of social justice."[515]

The more popular and central notion that characterizes the kind of Islamic economic system conceived by Zia and his supporters is the interest-free economy. Interest *(ribā)* is being phased out of the Pakistānī economic system and is being replaced with a profit and loss sharing system called *mudārabah and mushārakah* (partnership). In such a system, the lender and borrower enter into a sort of partnership and share the losses or profits that accrue on the invested principal amount. The system would operate on a pattern similar to that of the mutual fund or mutual trust.[516]

The interest-free economy was initiated with the introduction of an interest-free banking system in 1979-80, when the banks were allowed to accept deposits on a profit-loss sharing basis. In June 1984, the Government announced a program for the phased transformation of the entire financial system to a "non-interest bearing mode" - to be completed by April 1985.[517] So far the system continues to operate as before. The term interest has been replaced with Islamic terms, but the basis of the economy remains capitalist. Given Pakistan's capitalist economy, which is interlinked with the international economic system, the claims for an interest-less economy is another attempt to placate the Islamic opposition.[518] According to Muhsin Khān, a Pakistānī

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[515] Esposito, "Islamization", p. 120.

[516] M. Khān, "Islamic Banking", p. 34.

[517] ibid. p. 35.

[518] See Zia ul Haque, "Pakistan and Islamic Ideology", in **Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship,** eds. Hasan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid, London: Zed Press, 1983.

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economist, who assumes that there is such a thing as Islamic economic system, the success and implementation, of an Islamic economy depends on how well it is able to meet the "requirements of security, viability, and profitability which conventional banking systems have tried to meet...and which have become well established."[519] Muhsîn, like Zia, is only interpreting what an Islamic economy means. The idea of an Islamic economy is new, and this leaves room for other interpretations including that of Bhutto's Islamic Socialism. The economic policies of Zia's Government have been geared towards providing protection, incentives, and support (both moral and financial) to the private investors in the country. Emma Duncan, a South Asia Correspondent for **The Economist,** reports that the economy of Pakistan "has been growing at the average of 7% a year while President Zia has been in power, compared with 4% in the Bhutto years".[520] She attributes the economic growth to various factors including good harvests, remittances from Pakistānîs abroad, U.S. Aid, and most important, strict government control on labour activities to ensure that they give "the businessmen no trouble".[521] Recent researches on modernization and political change have revealed that under authoritarian rule, for instance, in some Latin American countries such as Argentina, there has been a better economic growth than is the case with weak democratic governments. In other words "the industrial modernization occuring in Latin America tends, in fact, to be associated with new forms of authoritarian rule".[522] Similarly, it seems that, under Zia's authoritarian form of Government, just as was the case with Ayūb's régime, the improvement of the economy can be attributed to the prevalance of imposed stability.

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519 ibid. p. 36.

520 **The Economist,** 17th January 1987, p. 4.

521 ibid. p. 7.

522 David Coller, "Industrial Modernization and Political Change", **World Politics,** vol. 30(1978), p. 595.

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The implementation of the *zakāt and 'ushr* ordinance in 1979 has raised various issues. The Government set up a system of collecting *zakāt* directly at the source from financial institutions. The collected *zakāt* is then channeled through a nationwide network of local *zakāt* committees to widows, orphans, students, and other needy people.[523] As a religious obligation, many Muslims believe the practice of *zakāt* and *'ushr* to be a private affair and claim that the Government has no right to realize it from their bank accounts directly without prior notice. The Shī'ah community was exempted from paying *zakāt* to the state after it protested, claiming that in Shī'ah Islam *zakāt* is not compulsory and moreover, it argues, is payable to the Shī'ī Imām. In reponse to the Shī'ī threat to protest against the *zakāt* ordinance, Zia amended article 227 of the constitution with a view to accomodating their demands. The modified version of the article states that:

> In the application of the clause of personal law of any Muslim sect, the expression Qur'ān and Sunnah shall mean the Qur'ān and Sunnah as interpreted by that sect.[524]

The amendment of article 227, according to Lucy Carroll, reflects the limitations upon the political authority in implementing Islamization policies in Pakistan and, thus, in predicting the shape of political development.[525] No government in all of Pakistan's history has had a very far-reaching authority. The reasons are numerous: the social organization of the country, the lack of legitimacy of most Governments of Pakistan and so their lack of effectiveness in evolving a civil polity, the continuous attempt by the Government and opposition to placate Islam - which strongly lacks a consensus on the concept of central authority.[526] In the absence of a strongly defined institutional

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523 For details on the *zakāt* and *'ushr* system, its operation and limits, see Grace Clark, "Pakistan's *zakat* and *'ushr* as a Welfare System" in **Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan,** p. 79-95.

524 Riaz Hassan "Islamization: An Analysis of Religious, Political and Social Change in Pakistan", **Middle Eastern Studies,** 21(1985), p. 279.

525 ibid. p. 280.

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basis of authority the authority relations usually fail to restrain or effectively control the situation of unrest in the country.

According to Riaz Hassan, mass protest in the name of Islam "remains the obvious answer for a quick social reform or revolutionary movement."[527] This habit of falling back on Islam to muster support for social protest restricts the Government in "exercizing the prerogative of progressive reinterpretation *(ijtihad)*" and thereby bringing about the evolution of ethnic and religious harmony in the country. He states that:

> It therefore seems ironic that a movement, which is considered by its protagonists and supporters as the only basis for a united, cohesive and just society, should in fact create social schisms which the society may not be able to manage successfully, and which may ultimately lead to further disintegration of Pakistan society.[528]

The deeper consciousness of Islam being cultivated through the above Islamic measures in turn, fosters, more fundamentalist and extremist forms of Islam which manifest themselves increasingly in violent sectarian conflicts.[529]

Sectarianism has been the most visible symptom of growing fundamentalism in Pakistan. Every year during the month of *Muharram,* Shī'ī Ithnā 'asharîs and some Sunnî groups clash, resulting in the loss of lives and property. The Government ensures that no wide coverage is given to such incidents, since "press freedom is linked with national interest".[530] For instance, in 1984, when a Shī'î-Sunnî conflict erupted in

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526 For an extended treatment on Muslim Political thought, see Iqbāl Ahmad, "Islam and Politics", in **The Islamic Impact,** eds. Yvonne Haddad, B. Haines and E. Findly, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1984.

527 ibid. p. 279.

528 ibid. p. 280.

529 Esposito argues that "Islamization 'from above' is a risky proposition unless accompanied by Islamization 'from below.' Effective change cannot simply be mandated or legislated. Societal acceptance is based both on involvement through representation in the process of change and on understanding, attitudes, and values". "Islamization", p. 221.

530 **The Pakistan Times,** July 8, 1985.

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Karachi resulting in several deaths and in the burning of the *Imām Bārā* (Ithnā 'asharī Community Centre), several houses and buses, etc., a curfew was imposed on the affected areas. The Government issued a press statement that the incident was triggered by rumours spread "by malcontents that the *markazī Imām Bārā* in Liaquatabad has been set on fire".[531] Zia declared that it was anti-Islamic elements which were causing the Shī'ī-Sunnī conflicts.

> On this sacred and memorable occasion, I wish to draw your attention to the fact that, whereas the Movement for the establishment of an Islamic order, and for Islamic resurgence in Pakistan and the rest of Islamic world, has been very encouraging and praiseworthy. It is at the same time, a matter of concern that there are many inimical forces which are actively engaged in seeking to thwart this process. These forces are bent upon fanning sectarianism in Pakistan, and to create a rift in the ranks of the Islamic World. My message to you on *Ashura-i-Muharram-ul-Haram* is to beware of the elements which are aiming at sowing the seeds of hatred and dissension, shun sectarianism, and frustrate the nefarious designs of such anti-Islamic forces...I firmly believe that by persevering on the path of *tauhid* and Sunnah, in the noble tradition of Hazrat Imam Husain (R.A.)... we shall face the heaviest odds...[532]

Following the incident, some *'ulamā'*, such as 'Allāmah Dilbār Naqshbandī and Mawlānā Anīs al-Rahmān urged Zia to ban the Shī'ī processions. Zia declared that he was opposed to the ban on religious processions.[533] To do so would negate the claim for the role of Islam in forging unity among the people of Pakistan. The increase in the role of Islam in Pakistan is, on the other hand, unleashing hatred based on sectarian differences.

In 1981, a well known *'ālim*, Shāh Balīgh al-Dīn, delivered a sermon at Nishtar Park, in Karachi. In the sermon he said that the Shī'ah are a minority and that they are allowed to practice their faith openly and create *fitnah* (discord) among the Muslims. To destroy them would bring a *sawāb* (reward). Following the sermon, one

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531 **Dawn**, 8th October, 1984.

532 **Dawn**, 6th October 1984.

533 **Dawn**, 12th October, 1984.

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of the *Imām Bāṛās* was attacked and set on fire.[534] In 1986, Shī'ī-Sunnī clashes flared up again. This time Dr. Isrār Aḥmad, in his sermon, claimed that Shī'ī claims about Imām Ḥusayn were false. In response, a Shī'ī *'ālim* in his sermon condemned views such as those held by Dr. Isrār Aḥmad. The **Dawn** reported that in the clash which ensued, more than half a dozen *Imām Bārās* were set on fire. The Shī'ī leaders claimed that provocative materials against the Shī'ah, which were distributed just before the incident, actually sparked the riots.[535]

In Islam the Pakistānīs have attempted to find the basis of their identity. Ironically it is Islam which has torn them asunder. With the emphasis on Islam, the gap between the past and the present has widened. The resurgence of Islam has made escape from the shackles of the dogma a difficult task. The rigid and simple expression of Islam leaves little or no room for adventure and innovation.

5.3 The Anti-Ismā'īlī Manifestation of Islamic Resurgence

The Khojah Ismā'īlī community of Pakistan has, since 1977, come under severe pressure from anti-Ismā'īlī manifestations of Islamic resurgence in the country. There have been attempts by some extremist groups to spread provocative propaganda literature and posters against the Ismā'īlīs and to incite anti-Ismā'īlī agitation. The Ismā'īlīs fear that they will be the next target of sectarian violence after the Aḥmadīyah. An Ismā'īlī, expressing his fears, stated that:

> If we still maintain an indifferent attitude towards these problems, then time might come when these hostile elements may start saying that we are more dangerous than the 'Qadianis'.[536]

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534 This account was related to the author by Pervez Hayāt who witnessed the scene.

535 **Dawn,** 19th September 1986.

536 The concern was expressed by a Pakistānī Ismā'īlī, Islām al-dīn, in an open letter distributed to the Ismā'īlīs, December, 1981

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The Ahmadîyah community in Pakistan continues to be persecuted. They were declared a minority in 1974 under Bhutto's régime amidst growing demands from the *'ulamā'* and the revivalists. In 1983, Zia imposed further restrictions on them. They are forbidden to call themselves Muslims or to employ terms such as 'masjid' for their prayer houses, or *'amīr al-Mu'minīn' or 'Ahl al Bayt'* for Mirzā Ghulām Ahmad or his family, etc.. Violation of the restrictions imposed upon them by any member of the group is punishable under the Pakistan Penal Code by imprisonment of the accused for up to three years.[537] It appears that these measures against the Ahmadîyah community are aimed at thwarting their proselytizing activities which have offended the Sunnî revivalist and conservative *'ulamā'*.

The Ismā'îlî community does not encourage conversion of Muslims to the Ismā'îlî faith nor, does it, like the Ahmadîyah,[538] support any political movement as a group.

It is important to note here that, contrary to past Ismā'ili practice in proseletyzing, efforts at conversion have not been undertaken by the Isma'ilis in Pakistan since the country's creation, except for one case involving a Hindu peasant community of approximately three hundred members at Khayber, in Sindh. This group was converted by an Ismā'îlî preacher *(al-Wā'iz)* Qāsim 'Ali Badinwalā in the late sixties. The Ismā'îlî preacher was well versed in Hindu teachings as well as the Shī'i traditions. Whether the convertees in this case joined the Isma'ili faith due to their being able to relate better to the Ismā'îlî practices or for purely economic reasons needs to be examined in a separate study.[539]

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537 **Dawn,** Friday, April 27, 1984.

538 Sayeed maintains that the Ahmadîyah community had supported Bhutto's Peoples Party in the 1970 elections. In 1974, he declared them non-Muslim. **Politics in Pakistan,** p. 155.

539 The author visited the village in 1972 accompanied by al-Wā'iz Badinwālā. He said that the flexible belief structure of the Ismā'îlî community was serving the cause of Islam far better than Islam as given expression by the orthodox Muslims. For political reasons, he was not encouraged by the Ismā'îlî community to indulge in such activities.

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In 1982, a group of Chitrālī Sunnīs, provoked and led by some *'ulamā'*, attacked and burnt the Ismā'īlī centre in central Chitrāl, comprising a Jamā'at Khānah, hostel and social services unit. It is reported that up to sixty Ismā'īlīs were killed in the conflict.[540] The Āghā Khān is said to have ordered the Ismā'īlīs - who are as large a group as other Muslims in Chitrāl - not to react, thus preventing the situation from worsening.[541] The attackers are reported to have chanted that the Ismā'īlīs were *Kāfirs.*

It appears that anti-Ismā'īlī manifestations serve to enhance the appeal to Islam as a way of mobilizing mass protest to effect political change in Pakistan. The rapid social and economic growth of the Ismā'īlī community may also serve to trigger reactionary movements. Mancur Olson in his article "Rapid Growth as a destabilizing force" attempts to show (in contrast to the generally accepted view "that economic growth leads toward political stability and perhaps even to peaceful democracy"), that "rapid economic growth is a major force leading towards revolution and instability."[542]

It is significant to add that the Ismā'īlīs are presently engaged in the rural areas of Pakistan, particularly in Northern Areas, in actively mobilizing their own resources under the direction of the Aga Khan Foundation. The Aga Khan Foundation aims at improving the living conditions of the inhabitants of these remote areas of Pakistan.[543] Towards this objective, the Āghā Khān Foundation has developed the Rural Support Program aimed at providing assistance to the villagers in adopting methods and techniques to improve the economy through planned farming and marketing, better

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540 The news item appeared in **The Guardian** of Friday 13th August 1982.

541 The author was so informed by Qāsim 'Alī Ja'far, former President of the Ismailia Association for Pakistan.

542 Mancur Olson, "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force", in **Comparative Politics,** p. 438.

543 See Information Bulletins of the Aga Khan Foundation 1983-1985.

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primary health care facilities, literacy programs, etc..[544]

The fall-out of these programs in terms of benefits extended to other Muslims is probably affecting the existing class structure of Muslim groups which are mainly dominated by the local *'ulamā'* and other religious leaders. The rapid socio-economic growth initiated by the Ismā'īlīs in Chitral may pose a perceived threat to the traditional authority of the local Sunni *'ulamā'*. The *'ulamā'*, prior to their leading the mob to attack the Ismā'īlīs, had circulated a pamphlet declaring that the Ismā'īlīs were trying to convert the Muslims to their *tarīqah* (path) by luring them with material rewards. The pamphlet also claimed that the "Agha Khanis" posed a great danger to Pakistan and to Islam. They were allegedly Russian agents who wished to establish the "Agha Khanī Sultanate in the areas forming Northern Afghanistan, Kashmir, Chitral, Hunza and Gilgit." The 'ulamā' inflated their charges by arguing that "the Āghā Khān had requested for the development of the airport in Northern Areas so that it could be used as a base for the Russian helicopters with which they are already killing our brothers, the Afghan *mujahidīn* (freedom fighters)." The Isma'ilī Jamā'at Khānahs were out of bounds for non-Ismā'īlīs because the Ismā'īlīs were creating their secret army inside. The pamphlet ended by demanding that the Aghā Khānis be declared *Kāfirs* because they worship the Āghā Khān as Allāh.[545]

The conscious inflation of religious symbols, according to Akbar S. Ahmad, helps the *molvī* or the *'ālim* "to maintain his position and importance as interpreter of religion."[546] He states:

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[544] Approximately 417 village organizations have been formed to function as co-operatives in generating social and economic projects.

[545] The pamphlet was signed by several *'ulamā'* and posted at public places.

[546] See Akbar S. Ahmed, "Religious Presence and Symbolism in Pakhtun Society", in **Islam in Tribal Societies,** eds. Akbar Ahmed and David M. Hart, London: 1984, p. 311.

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> Religious groups ensure that these symbols are constantly activated partly to enhance their own social prestige and permit them a certain leverage in society.[547]

Earlier in 1977, the December issue of a monthly magazine, **al-Rāshid,** had published a *fatwā* by an anonymous *'ālim,* declaring the Ismā'īlīs to be *Kāfirs.* It claimed that the Khojah Ismā'īlīs practiced some form of Hinduism.

> Concerning the acts of believing in *hulūl* (incarnation of God), revering the portrait, etc., (by the Ismā'īlīs) they are the acts of *Kufr...* whoever performs these acts is a *Kāfir.* Such a person's claim to be a Muslim and his observance of *rōzāh* (fasting), *hajj* (pilgrimage), etc., is not sufficient for being a Muslim.[548]

A similar charge was laid a few years later, in 1980, and was published by *Maktabah dār al-'ilm,* in a book called **Qur'ān aur Hadīth kī Roshnī main Āghā Khāniyyat Kī Haqīqat** (Aghā Khānism in the light of Qur'ān and Hadīth). It stated that the Khojah Ismā'īlīs believe that the present Qur'ānic text is incomplete; that the Imām is their 'living' or 'speaking' Qur'ān; that 'Alī is equated with the *Nūr* of Allāh; that *ta'wīl* (interpretation) of Islamic practices like the *hajj* exempts the Ismā'īlīs from performing these practices like other Muslims; etc..[549] In 1984, a group of 'ulamā', calling itself *Dār al-'ulūm ta'līm al-Qur'ān* published two books, **Āghā Khānīyat** (In the light of the Ismā'īlī Writings concerning Their Basic Beliefs), and **Āghā Khānīyat** (In the Views of *'Ulamā'-i-Ummah).* The former consists of selected passages in Gujrātī from the Ginān̄s and the Firmān̄s of the Āghā Khān III, etc., with their meanings in Urdū. One of the selected Ginān̄s is *Moman Chetamanī* (understand followers) by *Pīr* Sayyid Imām Shāh. The underlined verse states:

> Forty chapters of the Qur'ān
>
> but thirty exist in the world

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547 ibid.

548 Fāzil Ḥabībullāh, ed., **al-Rāshid,** Sāhiwāl Dīn: Jabhīgī Mujjallāh, vol. 5(1977), 12.

549 Published by Maktabah Dār al-'ilm, Namak Mandī, Peshawer, 1980.

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> O people but ten chapters remain which are but in the House (family of the Prophet)
>
> you can call it *athar ved*
>
> its essence is in the *satgūr* (the true Gurū)[550]

The book, **Aghā Khānīyat** - in the views of 'ulamā'-i-Ummah - is divided into two parts. The first part deals with Ismā'īlī history, focusing on those periods which are obscure, such as *dawr-i-satr* (the period in which the Imāms went into hiding). It aims at showing that "the Ismā'īlīs had never stood for the unity of the Muslims" and that the *'ulamā'* in the past had issued *fatwās* declaring the Ismā'īlīs to be *Kāfirs*. It enumerates the *fatwās* of the famous *'ulamā'* of the past against the Ismā'īlīs, including that of al-Ghazālī.[551] The *fatwā* of Mowlānā Muhammad Ashraf 'Alī Thanawī stated that:

> For those heretics, preaching of Islam, fasting and prayers are not accepted in Islam nor can they bury their dead in the Islamic way...such people should not be called Muslims nor can they be allowed to interact with other Muslims.[552]

The second part lists the beliefs of the Ismā'īlīs on the basis of which, the author claims, the *fatwās* declaring the Ismā'īlīs to be *kāfirs* have been issued. The *fatwās* have been compiled in this section.

Recently, between 1983 and 1984, an open letter to the Āghā Khān in the form of a questionnaire was widely circulated by a group called *Jam'īyat-i-ṭulabā-i-Islām* (a student wing of Jamā'at-i-Islāmī). It was addressed to the Āghā Khān asking him to declare:

- Whether he was a Muslim and had a right to forgive the sins of the Ismā'īlīs;
- Whether the Gināns were equal in authority with the Qur'ān;

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550 **Āghā Khānīyyat, p. 47.**

551 ibid. p. 31.

552 ibid. p. 34.

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- Whether he had exempted the Ismā'īlīs from performing *Hajj, Rōzah,* etc;
- Why he did not let the non-Ismā'īlīs visit Jamā'at Khanāhs which, according to Islam, should be open to all as in the case of Mosques;
- What was the reason for observing secrecy; etc..

The letter demanded that the Āghā Khān and the Ismā'īlīs respond to these questions by publicly declaring what they believe.[553] These provocations have not elicited much support either from the Government or the people at large. The following two chapters will examine at length the reasons why the Government and the people have not supported the anti-Ismā'īlī movements as yet. It may, however, be mentioned here that all the governments of Pakistan have assigned great importance to economic development, and the Ismā'īlīs play a crucial role in this area. Zia, it will be seen later, has encouraged the Ismā'īlī community to participate fully in the socio-economic life of Pakistan. Zia, praising the efforts of the Āghā Khān in providing services in education, health and economic development, to the people of Hunza, said that:

> Sunnis, Shias and Ismailis were believers of the same God and the Holy Book and followers of the Holy Prophet...shun sectarianism and work unitedly for national integrity and solidarity... (and) stick to their respective schools of thought but at the same time they should not criticize others.[554]

Moreover, there is a significantly powerful sector of those Muslims who are nationalists and who do not support the millitant attitudes of the conservatives and revivalists in Pakistan. Also, the Ismā'īlīs on their part have sought to adapt to the situation imposed by Islamization rather than to antagonize the majority of the Muslims. What steps they have taken in this regard will be discussed in the following chapters. Nonetheless, the Ismā'īlīs have clearly come under pressure in Pakistan to show that they are Muslims. If they do not succeed in demonstrating their Muslimness, they are

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553 The letter, written in Urdū, was widely circulated both among the Ismā'īlīs and non-Ismā'īlī Muslims. Some were found posted on the walls of Jamā'at Khanāhs in 1984.

554 **Dawn,** 24th July 1986, p. 8.

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likely to be seen as heretics by the majority of the Muslims.

The process of Islamization has fostered a deeper consciousness of Sunnī Islam in Pakistan. This, in turn, has inflated and exaggerated the Islamic symbols which have served to intensify sectarian tensions. The dominant Sunnī ideology of resurgence has created a feeling of anxiety among the Muslim minority groups in Pakistan. The Khojah Ismā'īlīs, in recent years, have come under intense pressure to show that they are Muslims. Their religious practices have been targeted as being un-Islamic. They are under pressure to conform to the authority of the Qur'ān and Sunnah, a situation which creates great stress on a community used to a system of religious authority which de-emphasises the role of the traditional roots of Sunnī Islam. The Ismā'īlīs of Pakistan are thus being forced to evaluate their doctrines and practices. This anti-Ismā'īlī posture raises the crucial issue of the location of religious authority for the Ismā'īlī community of Pakistan.

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Chapter VI

THE ISMĀ'ĪLĪ CONCEPT OF RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY

(1970-1985)

This chapter examines the Ismā'īlī religious response to the impact of the Islamization process in Pakistan. This response will be measured against the Ismā'īlī restatement of the basis of religious authority. The Ismā'īlī statement is characterized by two main developments within the Ismā'īlī system of religious beliefs.

1. The growing emphasis on the affirmation of the transcendence of Allāh, and upon the Qur'ān as the basis of religious authority, and
2. The emphasis on the Shī'ī concept of the necessity of Imāmah, in general, and the Ismā'īlī esoteric definition of the Imām's role, in particular.

6.1 The Qur'ān as the Basis of Religious Authority

The Khojah Ismā'īlī community of Pakistan has taken various steps to affirm publicly its belief in the fundamental Islamic principles of *tawḥīd* (unity of Allāh) and the finality of the Prophet Muḥammad (*khatm-i-nubuwwah*) through various channels, such as their publications and the annual celebrations of *'Īd-i-milād 'al-Nabī* (the birthday of the Prophet). The latter is open to the general public. Among the guests invited to speak are influential Government officials and leaders of various religious groups. The Ismā'īlī official publications, such as the issues of the magazines **Hidāyat** (the Guidance) - known as **Ismaili Bulletin** prior to 1982 - also play a significant role in conveying the Ismā'īlī adherence to the fundamental Islamic beliefs. For instance, the speech made by the Āghā Khān at the Seerat Conference in 1976, is often quoted as representative of the Ismā'īlī position on the nature of Qur'ānic authority.

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> In the face of this changing world...I ask, do we have a clear, firm and precise understanding of What Muslim Society is to be in times to come? And if, as I believe, the answer is uncertain, where else can we search than in the Holy Qur'ān, and in the example of Allāh's last and final Prophet? There is no justification for delaying the search for the answer to this question, by the Muslims of the World, because we have the knowledge that Islam is Allāh's final message, the Qur'ān His final book, and Muhammad His last Prophet.[555]

The Āghā Khān's public statements, which will be dealt with extensively in the following chapter, serve as an interface between the Khojah community and other Muslims.

In December 1983, **Life Magazine** published a write-up on the Āghā Khān, stating that he was a "living God, direct descendant of Muhammad and the spokesman for the Almighty Allah".[556] The Āghā Khān's secretariat immediately issued a communique, refuting the statements. It also outlined the Ismā'īlī beliefs.

> The very first sentence referred to Āghā Khān as 'a living God' and the spokesman for Almighty Allah. Both of these assertions are not only fundamentally erroneous, but of immeasurable offense to Muslims everywhere.
>
> In common with all Muslims throughout the world, the Ismailis affirm the fundamental Islamic testimony of truth, the Shahada, that there is no God but Allah and that Muhammad was the last and final Prophet of Allah - the monotheistic deity to whom all Muslims direct their prayers, and that the Holy Qur'ān, is Allah's final message to mankind, was revealed through him.
>
> In common with all Shia Muslims, Ismailis affirm that after Prophet Muhammad's death, Hazarat Ali the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law, became the first Imam - of the Muslim community, and that this leadership (known as Imamat) continues thereafter by heredity through 'Ali and his wife Fatima, the Prophet's daughter. The Aga Khan is the 49th hereditary Imam - spiritual leader - of Shia Imami Muslims.[557]

This modest claim of the Āghā Khān - to be a mere spiritual leader - is a considerable retreat from the traditional ideas of the past, and is having a considerable effect on the Ismā'īlīs. It has evoked a debate within the community on the nature of religious

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555 **The Ismaili Bulletin,** 1979, p. 1.

556 **Life,** p. 70-78.

557 **Life,** Feb. 1980, p. 15.

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authority. For, if such a position is accepted by the Ismā'īlīs, it may contribute to the dilution of the authority of the Firmāns within the community. The following pages attempt to examine the issue emerging from the debate.

The Āghā Khān's concern to show that the Ismā'īlīs are Muslims and that they adhere to the fundamental principles of Islam has contributed significantly towards the community's emphasis on the Qur'ān as the basis of religious authority. This concern of the Āghā Khān is being internalized by the Khojah Ismā'īlīs through the restructuring of their pattern of religious authority.

The emphasis on the Qur'ān as the basis of authority amongst the Ismā'īlīs is affected also by the development of certain ideas about the relationship between the Qur'ān and the Gināns. The new developments aim at seeking the validity of the Gināns in the Qur'ān itself. The validity is sought in two ways.

1. Firstly, the Gināns have been sifted - and some have been modified - to make them agree more closely with the Qur'ān.

2. Secondly, they have come to be viewed as having provided the Khojah Ismā'īlīs with the benefit of understanding the Qur'ān in their own vernacular languages.

For Satpanthis, especially Pirana Satpanthis Ginans provide better understanding of Hindu religion

6.1.1 The Gināns Reconsidered

In 1975, a conference of the World Ismailia Associations, chaired by the Āghā Khān, was held in Paris. The conference resolved, among other things, that the history of the Imāms as well as the beliefs and practices of the Ismā'īlīs should be reviewed and restated to achieve a uniform or a standard religious education syllabus among the Ismā'īlīs of different parts of the world. At the time, it was resolved that the Gināns should be classified into three categories.

In the first category were to be placed only those Gināns that did not contain "Hindu elements" - the elements which dealt with Hindu mythology and which explicitly

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viewed the Imām as an *avatār, naklankī, dev,* etc.. For instance, the following Ginān (recited frequently by the Ismā'īlīs) applies the constrasting symbols of 'high' and 'low' or 'spiritually exalted' and 'earthly bound' to evoke a powerful sense of moral consciousness.

O believer! from the high (you) came
why then so low (you) stoop,
for four days (only) you came
then why unlawfully you reap,
in sinning this way O you
what fruit shall ye reap,
lose not yourself in the world O you
walk humbly for death is certain.
O believer! naked (to this world) you came,
wrapped (to the eternal) you return,
why reap unlawfully and lose the moment,
(by) sinning you abandon the true path,
lose not yourself in the world O you
walk humbly for death is certain[558]

The Gināns of this category with high moral and non-controversial contents, such as *Bujh Nirijan, Sloko Motc,* etc, were to continue to be recited in the Jamā'at Khānah. The Gināns in the second category were to comprise those Gināns which contain a few Hindu terms and which, if altered, would not be affected in their structure and contents. For instance, it was proposed that the *Harī* be replaced with 'Alī.

O our hope, miss not time for evening (prayer)
the time set by the *gūr* (teacher)

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558 Ginān attributed to *Pīr* Shams, quoted from **Ginan Souvenir,** Karachi Ismailia Association for Pakistan, 1974, p. 17.

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that is the time set for you

and he indicated to you the window of the *dīn* (faith)

Harī (God), you are the eternal,

Harī (God), the *Sāmī* (Lord) of the eternals

Shāh (Lord), only you know the eternal of the eternals.[559]

The Gināns in the third category, which contain excessive Hindu elements, were to be banned from being recited in Jamā'at Khānahs. Gināns, such as *das avatār,* which view 'Ali as the tenth and the last, long awaited *(naklankī avatār)* of *Lord Vishnū,* were to fall under this category. The following verse from *das avatār,* for example, typifies the Gināns in this category.

then the *avatār* of the great *naklankī* (awaited one) finally perfected itself,

so tells the *gūr* (teacher).

From hence the tenth avatār of Shrī nārāyan *dev* (God) emanated a trully perfected law,

embodied in *gūr* Hasan Shāh

so says *Pīr* Imām Shāh.[560]

At the time when this classification of the Gināns was proposed, the detailed formula for carrying out the review of the Gināns had not been formulated. The formula was to be evolved at subsequent workshops on the Gināns. These decisions which aimed at eliminating some Gināns and modifying others, had a considerable impact on the status of the Gināns in the community. It was becoming evident that the Gināns, which had enjoyed much authority amongst the Ismā'īlīs, were being played down. It will be examined at a latter stage how this attempt to redefine the status of the Gināns was feared by some Khojah Ismā'īlīs as implying, in turn, the imposition of

559 This verse belongs to the Ginān **Anant Akhādo,** attributed to Pīr Hasan Kabīr al-Dīn.

560 Quoted from **moto das avatār,** attributed to Sayyid Imām Shāh, published by Lāljī Devrāj, Bombay: 1923, p. 82.

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limits on the authority of the Imām.

Following the Paris Conference, two International Work-shops on the Gināns were held in 1977 and 1981 in Karachi and Bombay respectively, with the purpose of selecting and identifying Gināns according to the above mentioned categories. The Pakistan Ismailia Association initiated the move to shelve Gināns in the third category and to replace certain terms in the Gināns belonging to the second category. For instance, the terms *Naklankī, Harī, Dev, Swamī* etc., which appeared in the Gināns in reference to the concept of the Imāmah, were replaced by terms such as *Nar,* (male) *'Alī, Nūr, Mawlā,* respectively.[561] Justifying the changes made in the Gināns, one of the officials of the Ismailia Association for Pakistan argued that the concept of Imāmah itself suggests the idea of 'Guidance according to the changed times'. According to him, there was guidance from Imām Sultān Muhammad Shāh concerning the need to "effect minor changes" in the Gināns.[562] He further argued that:

> For basic Religious Education this is necessary; young children to have (Ginans) in Islamic Form...It is indeed our great fortune that as a result of minor modifications, we are able to make most use of the Ginans, which is our wonderful and unique heritage, otherwise, as we know, the writings of many of our past writers have had to be compeletely set aside and shelved.[563]

This move on the part of the Ismailia Association for Pakistan sparked a controversy from within the community on the question of deciding what were Islamic terms and themes and what were not Islamic ones. Some Ismā'īlī communities in the western world, in particular, felt that the local religious leadership in Pakistan had arbitrarily altered the contents of the Gināns. They argued that:

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561 "Observations and Comments on our Modern Ginanic Literature", Paper presented at Ismailia Association International Review Meeting - 1980.

562 **On Changes in Ginans:** A note by Qāsim 'Alī Ja'far.

563 ibid.

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1. The message of Islam need not be given expression in the Persian and Arabic languages only;
2. Such changes would limit the authority of the Imām and devalue the Ginānic 'spiritual' traditions;
3. The replaced supposedly 'Hindu Elements' were symbolical expressions of the same reality expressed otherwise by 'Islamic Elements';
4. The changes in the Gināns were affecting their 'original' meaning, context, and their poetic value, etc..[564]

Within Pakistan, however, the issue is further complicated by the development of ethnic and regional conflicts.

The different groups of Ismā'īlīs have developed different attitudes towards the Gināns, each for its own reasons. The Sindhī Ismā'īlīs, living in Sindh, have come to consider many Gināns, composed in Sindhī, as part of their cultural heritage. Some Sindhī Ismā'īlīs, as seen previously in chapter IV, had earlier (in the sixties) attempted to play down the role of Gināns. Presently, the Ginānic heritage is emphasized by them as an aspect of the cultural and political assertion of Sindh against other regions like Panjāb and the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. While Sindh's cultural and political assertiveness is viewed by the Jamā'at-i-Islāmī as anti-Islamic,[565] some Sindhī politicians feel that Islamization is equivalent to the Panjabization of Pakistan. They feel this especially after Bhutto's fall.[566] For the *Muhājir* Ismā'īlīs, the Gināns assume more importance in their lives than among the Ismā'īlīs of Panjāb. The former, besides having a long established cultural heritage, seem to have sought to conserve these traditions while in the process of adjustment to the newly created Pakistan, whose political and social direction have been uncertain.

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564 Observations and Comments, p. 6.

565 Sayeed, **Politics in Pakistan,** p. 155.

566 E. Mortimer, **Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam,** p. 229.

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The Panjābî Ismā'îlîs, known also as Shamsies - claiming to have first been converted by *Pîr* Shams al-Dîn - have been considerably affected by the increasingly dominant Sunnî revivalism. Since the creation of Pakistan, the majority of them have left the Ismā'îlî faith and have become Sunnîs. Presently, there are fewer than 10,000 Panjābî Ismā'îlîs in Pakistan.[567] Among the reasons why they are most affected by Sunnî Islam are:

1. Many Panjābî Ismā'îlîs were converted from Hinduism between 1920 and 1940. The Āghā Khān III had encouraged them to mix with the Sunnî Muslims. For instance, in 1934, a Firmān was issued to the Panjābî Ismā'îlîs stating that:

> I am happy to learn that you go to the mosque. You must go on every Friday and mingle with other Muslims...[568]

Such directives of the Āghā Khān, encouraging the Ismā'îlîs to mingle with Sunnîs, may have contributed to the gradual assimilation of the Ismā'îlîs into the dominant Sunnî Islam.

2. The centre of the Ismā'îlî activies and institutions being located in Karachi, away from Panjāb, may have also contributed to the weakening of the religious bond cementing the ethnically different groups, viz., the Sindhîs, Kāthiawārîs, and Panjābîs.[569]

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567 Prior to 1947, there were approximately 30 to 40 thousand Ismā'îlîs. No work exists on the Panjābî Ismā'îlîs of Pakistan, their problems (including the problem of identity), or their number. The above information was given to the author by al-Wā'iz Khizr Hayāt, a Panjābî Ismā'îlî who was the member of the Board of the Ismailia association for Pakistan in 1973.

568 **Kalām** vol. II, p. 160.

569 The author was informed by Khizr Hayāt that the Khojah leadership in Karachi had neglected the Panjābî Ismā'îlîs and did not take them into confidence in the dicision making.

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Again, those Ismā'īlīs who are socially mobile, and who live in urban centres would most likely support the move to down play the Gināns with a view to merging themselves, at least socially, with the dominant traits of the Pakistānī urban society. For the time being many of these traits find expression in the resurgence of Islam. This latter group of Ismā'īlīs, it must be mentioned, administer the Imāmat Institutions in the urban centres such as Karachi. Moreover, these Ismā'īlīs are prosperous and would not want to rock the boat by becoming a centre of controversy. They are under much stronger pressure than the rural Ismā'īlīs to adapt themselves to the demands of Islamic resurgence. Their position on the Gināns thus would find expression in the Ismā'īlī publications and the Wa'izāt that emerge from these institutions.

This development of diverse attitudes towards the Gināns mirrors partly the Ismā'īlī responses to Islamization in Pakistan. These responses, however, appear to be misunderstood by the Ismā'īlī communities of the other parts of the world, especially those who live in the Western world. They erroneously view the attempts of the Pakistānī Ismā'īlīs to set aside some Gināns and modify some others as a monolithic Pakistānī Ismā'īlī response, resulting from the community's "short sightedness". For instance, one of the Canadian Ismā'īlī officials wrote that:

> Because of this unique, artful, divinely inspired independent style and mode of expression, our Holy Ginans are also a Divine Literary Corpus in its own right, with all the honours and dignity that pertains to any divine literature. They express the eternal message of divine will and wisdom equally to any other expression of the kind...
>
> Why then, might be asked, that we reject the same divine eternal message in our Holy Ginans because of its typical linguistic expression? What is the fundamental cause for this rejection? Or might we have a short sightedness in understanding the meaning of Islam or of our Holy Tradition? Or is it inferiority complex vis-à-vis the Arab speaking Muslims or others?[570]

570 "Observations and Comments", p. 16.

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Gināns, as we saw in chapter one, are considered by the Khojah Ismā'īlīs to be divinely inspired and as containing the same essence or teachings as the Qur'ān. Such a view of the Gināns cannot be reconciled with changing the Gināns or banning some of them. The insistence on retaining the Gināns in their original form by a Canadian official, of course, may be explained by the fact that the non-Pakistānī Ismā'īlīs do not feel the same pressure that bears on the Ismā'īlīs of Pakistan.

Although language seems to be cited as a major issue in the modification of the Gināns, it is the implications of these changes for the Ismā'īlī perception of the Imām that some Khojah Ismā'īlīs have been increasingly concerned with. They argue that changes in the wordings of the Gināns signify an attempt to diminish the status of the Imām in relation to the Prophets. This effort amounts to tempering the Ismā'īlī doctrine that the Imām is the *mazhar* (manifestation) or the *avatār* of Allāh.[571] Although *mazhar* and *avatār* are identified in this context to demonstrate that the Hindu and Islamic terms mean the same thing, they are different. The word *mazhar*, derived from *zāhir* which means 'external' or 'visible', refers to the 'manifestation of God'. The term *avatār* more specifically refers to the human form that God assumes.[572] They also claim that this Ismā'īlī doctrine of the Imām as *mazhar* or *avatār* is not in conflict with the Holy Qur'ān, because Qur'ān has two aspects - *zāhir* and *bāṭin*. The Ginānic terms, such as *avatār* refering to the Imām, merely suggest that the Imām helps to "penetrate the inner *(bāṭin)* significance of Qur'ān rather than the external *(zāhir)* aspects".[573]

It appears that these Khojah Ismā'īlīs, especially those who live in countries of the Western World, such as Canada, are probably not aware of the implications of the Islamization process for Pakistan's Ismā'īlī community. Their resentment over the

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571 ibid. p. 50.

572 See Azim Nanji, **The Nizārī Ismē'īlī Tradition,** p. 203- 209.

573 ibid. p. 12.

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changes proposed by the Khojah Ismā'īlī community of Pakistan, especially those seeking to play down the Ginānic assertion about the nature of Imām's authority may be attributed to various causes.

First, the image of Islam in the West appears to be causing problems for some non-Pakistānī Ismā'īlī groups living in the Western World. They hesitate to associate Islam with the militant form of Islamic resurgence. They view the Pakistānī Ismā'īlī attempt at re-stating their belief structure in Pakistan as a deviation from the true liberal and flexible Islam. This has probably contributed, among other things, to the resurfacing of certain inherited syncretic and mystical traditions, particularly those that view the Imām's authority in gnostic terms. This development conflicts not only with the trends of thought espoused by contemporary Islamic resurgence movements, but also with what the Imām himself says. There is an irony in their assertion of great authority for an Imām who himself repudiates that authority and down plays his own role. Second the revival of Ismā'īlī religious traditions could perhaps be explained also as a consequence of the Western tradition of freedom of expression of one's faith. Third, the affirmation of these religious ideas may be the strategy of a newly emigrating Ismā'īlī community to fall back on its past heritage while adapting to the overwhelming host culture of the West.

The revival of these Ismā'īlī syncretic ideas, by some Ismā'īlīs in the West, especially those which attribute divinity to the Imām, have come to the notice of the Ismā'īlī community of Pakistan. The Pakistānī Ismā'īlī leaders fear that these ideas, if they come to the attention of the Muslim fundamentalists in the country, will cause physical and social harm to the Ismā'īlīs.[574] The Āghā Khān has taken various steps to curb the revival of these syncretic ideas amongst the Ismā'īlīs at large. He continues to refute ideas which attribute extra-human appellations to him. It is more

574 One of the Ismā'īlī leaders, Khān Muhammad, the incharge of the Research and Publication Department of the Ismailia Association For Pakistan expressed his concern to the author during his visit to Pakistan in 1984.

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out of conviction, however, than for practical reasons that the Āghā Khān refutes these ideas.

For instance, in October, 1984, a book **The Aga Khans** by a journalist, Mihr Bose, was published by World's Work Ltd. of Britain. The book, among other things of an historical nature, contains a description of the Ismā'īlī beliefs and practices. The author writes that the Ismā'īlīs worship the Āghā Khān as "a living God" and that he encourages them "to believe in him as such."[575] The Āghā Khān sued the author and the publisher in the High Court of England on the grounds of publicizing false assertions about the Āghā Khān, which amount to charges of blasphemy and heresy against the Ismā'īlīs.[576] The Āghā Khān claimed that neither he "nor his grandfather had ever laid claim to divinity but on the contrary have consistently emphasized the fundamental Islamic doctrines of *tawhīd* - the unity of God". The author and the publisher apologized to the Āghā Khān in the court for having offended the Ismā'īlīs and agreed to withdraw the unsold copies of the book.[577] The report of this outcome, including the Imām's stand on the Ismā'īlī belief in the Imām, was read to the Ismā'īlīs in the Jamā'at Khānahs all over the world.

Inspite of these public statements by the Āghā Khān, denying that he has ever claimed divinity or that the Ismā'īlīs believe him to be God, the debate on the nature of the Imām's authority continues amongst the Ismā'īlīs. Those who are contributing towards reviving the inherited syncretic and mystical Ismā'īlī traditions argue that "the Imām is practicing *taqīya* when he expresses his views in public".[578]

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575 **Globe and Mail** Nov. 30, 1985.

576 **Daily Nation,** Nairobi, Kenya. July 30, 1986.

577 ibid.

578 The author heard this opinion from Ismā'īlīs he interviewed in Montreal, in 1986.

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There are, however, others who view the Imām's public statements as indicative of the steps that the Ismā'īlīs must take to identify themselves as Muslims, and those include locating the basis of religious authority in the Qur'ān. This view is becoming dominant in Pakistan and is reflected strongly in the belief that the Gināns essentially represent the teachings of the Qur'ān. There are yet others who are few in numbers but have taken a more extreme stand. They have demanded religious reforms from within the Ismā'īlī community along the majority Sunnī lines. For instance, a group of a few Ismā'īlīs (approximately, five to ten families) led by Akbar 'Alī Ghulām Husayn, has established a splinter group, calling itself the *Muslim Ismā'īlīyya tablīghī Jamā'at.* It intends to persuade the Ismā'īlīs "into following the true Islam of the Qur'ān and Sunnah" which, according to them, places on the Ismā'īlīs an obligation to observe such practices as *namāz* with all the accompanying Sunnī rituals and ablutions. This group has recently established a mosque in Karachi. Its *Namāzī Khidmat Committee* published a book, **Namāz Ismā'īlī Birādharion kē liē'** *(Namāz* for Ismā'īlī Brothers). It contains pictures of the Āghā Khān IV in the congregational prayers *(namāz)* with other Muslims. Its author, Akbar, maintains that the Ismā'īlī Imāms have always observed the *namāz,* but the Ismā'īlīs have been misled into praying *du'ā'* three times per day instead of "five time *namāz"* - which is compulsory for the Muslims. "Whoever does not recite *namāz* has no *īmān* (faith)....and they will be punished as Pharaohs...and their *du'ā'* is unacceptable to God." The author gives illustrations of the ways to perform ablutions and to recite the *namāz.*[579] Following the publication of the book, he distributed a pamphlet with an illustration of a coffin and a warning to the Ismā'īlīs "to observe *namāz* five times a day in accordance with the *tarīqah* of the Prophet, before the *namāz* is recited over you (your dead bodies)."[580] In 1986, Akbar 'Alī filed a suit in the Federal Shar'īat Court against the

[579] Akbar Gulām Husayn, **Namāz,** p. 38.

[580] Published and circulated by Ismā'īlī Namāzī Khidmat Committee, u.d. realpatidar.com

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Ismā'īlīs for not letting him and his group make the call *(adhān)* to Muslims for *namāz* from within the premises of the Jamā'at Khānah.[581] The suit was later forced to be withdrawn by the court.[582] This further indicates the extent to which the Government protects the Ismā'īlī community.

His group, and other Ismā'īlīs, who have broken away from the main Ismā'īlī group, have circulated among fundamentalist Muslims many Ismā'īlī religious texts, written in Gujrātī in prepartition India, reflecting heterodox and polemic elements in Ismā'īlī practices. Some of these Ismā'īlīs are probably influenced by the dominant Sunnī trends of thought and are convinced that the Ismā'īlī community has gone astray by revering the Imām. For instance, one Ismā'īlī, Mansūr Lakhānī, wrote a letter to the Urdū newspaper **Jang,** stating that:

> With the blessings of God I have left that community...The followers of this faith (Ismā'īlīs) pray to the Imām for forgiveness of their sins...they pray three times a day contrary to the teachings of God and Prophet. They do not perform ablution nor they consider *fasting, zakāt, and hajj* as compulsory.[583]

These Ismā'īlīs are probably thinking that the pressure on the community from outside will force the Ismā'īlīs to come back to the true Islamic fold. Others may be motivated by personal rivalries. For example, Akbar 'Alī Maher 'Alī, who was once the president of the local council of Karachi in the early seventies, has come into conflict with some Khojah leaders who, he claims, have mistreated him. He has turned to writting and distributing pamphlets highlighting prevalent herterodox practices among the Ismā'īlīs.[584] This action has put the Ismā'īlīs in an even more vulnerable position, since these religious texts add credibility to the already inflated allegations of the

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581 **Dawn,** June 9, 1986.

582 The author was informed of this development by Dr. Shīrīn Walīyānī, the daughter of one of the Ismā'īlī leaders in Pakistan, in December 1986.

583 **Jang,** 27th November 1981.

584 The author interviewed Akbar Maher 'Alī who presently resides in Vancouver British Columbia.

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extremist groups against the Ismā'īlīs.

6.1.2 The Qur'ān-Ginān Parallelism

In 1983, the Ismailia Association for Pakistan published a book, **Ginans of Ismaili Pirs,** by G. Allana. The President of the Association wrote in the foreword that "Deeper and more objective study of the Ginans show that many of the concepts elaborated in Ginans emanate from our Holy Book Qur'ān and the teachings of our Holy Prophet Muhammad (s.a.s.) and our Imāms"..[585] He further argued that the Ginānic "literature" was rich in the concepts of Sūfī and mystical *ṭarīqahs* from which other *ṭarīqahs* also drew inspiration. The book itself states the commonly and recently accepted version of the Ismā'īlī history of the Gināns - that they constitute a continuity in the *da'wah* (teachings) which spread Islam through the translated Qur'ānic message in the language of the convertees.[586] The study not only cites Gināns supporting the thesis that the Gināns are Islamic by virtue of their containing themes that are similar to those dealt with in the Qur'ān, but also claims that their teachings were along the lines of historical Sūfī traditions in Islam.[587]

The Ismā'īlī emphasis on the newly acquired role definition of the Gināns - as constituting the teachings of the Qur'ān in a different form - has found expression in the preachings (Wa'iẓāt) within the community. The Wa'iẓāt draw extensive parallels between Qur'ānic and Ginānic verses. Most of the verses selected, however, deal with the concepts of *tawhīd;* the transcendence of Allāh; the Prophecy of Muhammad; and, more emphatically, moral teachings.[588] Those verses that deal with the ideas exalting the Imām or that discuss rebirth are not utilized for comparsion with Qur'ānic verses.

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585 G.Allana, **Ginans of Ismaili Pirs,** vol.I, Ismailia Association for Pakistan, Karachi, 1984.

586 ibid. p. 69-119.

587 ibid.

588 Kamālluddīn, **Wa'z on Qur'ān and Gināns,** 1980-1984.

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For instance, in one typical Wa'ẓ the preacher carefully selected verses from the Qur'ān and the Gināns about the concept of *tawḥīd,* and eventually argued that the Gināns were basically variant forms of the Qur'ānic teachings.

> God has used the term *nūr* for his *dhāt* (essence) in the Holy Qur'ān. The *sūrah* (chapter) in which the term *nūr* appears *(sūrah-i-nūr)* is the essence of the Qur'ān and the verse, 'Allāh is the light of Heavens and Earth' is the favourite verse of *hādir* Imām.. How beautifully the *pīr* has expressed in the Ginān that the 'light emanates from light *(nūr thī nūr pragatya)';* and *Pir* Sadr al-dīn himself read the Qur'ān ... and listen to the Ginān 'Allāh is the maintainer of everything. The world belongs to Him. He is eternal and everything else will perish'. How closely it resembles the Qur'ānic concept of Allāh.[589]

The Wa'ẓ (sermon) thus seeks to demonstrate that the Qur'ān and Gināns have basically taught the same things about the Ismā'īlī beliefs. It also seeks to emphasize the primacy of the Qur'ān by arguing from the Imāms' and the *pīrs'* authority. The Wā'iẓ (preacher) thus continues to argue "how significant it would be for our children to say that they know Qur'ān rather than saying that 'our Qur'ān is in Gujrātī'.[590]

> Since Ginān is the explanation of Qur'ān, we must know the Qur'ān. Secondly, the Qur'ān is the word of God, and the Gināns are the teachings of the *pīrs.* How bad it is to compare Kalām Allāh with, for instance, Diwān-i-Shams... Ginān is the interpretation of the Qur'ān in the Indian context, but Ismā'īlism is the result of the whole spectrum of historical development...[591]

In bringing about a change in the attitude of the Ismā'īlīs concerning the basis of religious authority, the Wā'iẓ is utilizing the very traditions which are popular with the Khojah Ismā'īlīs and which are themselves played down. That is, he quotes and interprets the Gināns and Firmāns to show that the Ismā'īlīs have all along located the basis of religious authority in the Qur'ān. This sort of argument gives continuity to the two elements which are involved in the transition from one set of traditions and ideas to the other.

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589 ibid.

590 ibid.

591 ibid.

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The Wa'iẓāt, however, are not merely persuasive; more significantly they are expressions of the already felt need of the Jamā'at to restructure and define its religious identity. The effort to locate the basis of religious authority in the Qur'ān coincides with the changing expectations of the Ismā'īlī community. This is evidenced in their having already introduced the recitation and teaching of the Qur'ān into their religious education school network. Presently, most of the Ismā'īlī children in Pakistan can recite Qur'ān verses as comfortably as other Muslim children in Pakistan or in other Muslim countries.[592] This has helped the Ismā'īlī children considerably to remain un-isolated in the social and educational sectors where the teaching of either Shī'ī or Sunnī *Islāmīyāt* has become compulsory. This arrangement has had an immense impact on the Khojah Ismā'īlī students. Doctrinally, it is their Imām who interprets the true meaning of the Qur'ān for them; and since their Imām is available to guide them in accordance with the changing needs of the time, even the learning of the Shī'ī version of *Islāmīyāt* (based on the Ithnā 'asharī school of thought) has posed difficulties for the Ismā'īlī students. The whole idea of twelve Imāms and the concept of occultation *(ghaybah)* is repugnant to the Ismā'īlī belief in the *ḥāḍir* or living Imām. Many Ismā'īlī students thus rather opt for Sunnī *Islāmīyāt.*[593] The Ismā'īlīs are therefore caught up in a position where they have to chose to learn the non-Ismā'īlī expression of Islam. Earlier, in 1969, when recommendations were made to the Government by both Shī'ah and Sunni *'ulamā'* to introduce separate Shī'ah and Sunnī *Islāmīyāt,* the editorial of the Ismā'īlī magazine **Payghām** expressed the view that:

> according to Shiaism, we believe in Imams and our belief is in present (Hazar) Imam...we carry and accept orders from our present Imam, who guides us in the field of religion as well as worldly matters. Most of the Shia sects believe in 12 Imams, or their belief is that Imam is GAIB, and he shall come out some day! Our belief is quite contrary to this as we have Hazir Imam...at the same time we cannot follow Sunni teachings, who rarely believe in all the Imams, present Imam or under

592 The author carried out the survey in December 1984.

593 The author was informed of this by some students in Karachi during his 1984 visit.

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> cover...If the child takes any of the syllabi, it will clash with our Ismaili syllabi (teahings) and in the minds of the children unnecesssary doubts will be created and with the result, he would stick to neither of it.[594]

Moreover, the Sunnî emphasis on the individual reading of the Qur'ān is contrary to the Ismā'īlî emphasis on the authoritative interpretation of the Qur'ān by the Imām and not an individual reading of it. The individual reading of the Qur'ān, until recently, was not considered essential by the Khojah Ismā'īlîs. This Ismā'īlî trait is tied to the hierarchical spiritual order which characterizes the Ismā'īlî belief system. Since the Imām represents the living source of guidance, the emphasis on the text of the Qur'ān itself was not so strong.[595] This is, however, changing with the Imām's emphasis on the Islamic roots of the Ismā'īlîs.

On the issue of 'Hindu' terminology and the concepts of *das avatāra* (ten incarnations), *lakh choriasî* (a hundred thousand rebirths or wanderings), etc., found in the Gināns, ideas which are often the focus of attacks by Sunnî *'ulamā'*, the Wa'izāt generally argue that these concepts were instrumental in the conversion of Hindus.[596]

> What is the sense of Hindu terms, such as *lakh choriasî* in the Gināns. Before we understand that, let us look at the *da'wah* system. *Da'wah* does not mean that you go to someone and say 'believe! or else I will kill you!'... To make *da'wah* effective, the *pīrs* gradually converted the Hindus by first becoming themselves just like Hindus ...and talking to them in their language .... None of the Ismā'īlî *t'alīmāt* (teachings) is without the Qur'ānic *t'alīmāt.* We say that the essence of the Qur'ān is in the Gināns. This does not mean that the *pīrs* went to the Hindu *mandirs* (temples) and told the Hindus to stop worshipping the idols and become Muslims. Our *pīrs* did not do that...they (Hindus) didn't even realize that the *pīrs* had given the whole Qur'ān to them in the Ginānic form - in their own language.[597]

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594 **Payghām,** vol. 12(1969), p. 9.

595 This trait is reflected strongly in the Wa'izāt delivered prior to 1970.

596 Kamālluddîn, **Wa'z on Qur'ān and Gināns,** 1981.

597 ibid.

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The *da'wah* is accordingly viewed as a proof that Islam was not spread to India by force; but through the penetration of the 'Hindu' world view and the utilization of that world view in expounding the message of Islam.[598] According to Azim Nanji the Hindu cultural themes imported into the Gināns assisted considerably in providing a kind of continuity between the Shî'i Islamic tradition and Hindu elements in the Indian context.[599] It appears that the Hindu ideas were used to make it seem that there was no great difference between Hinduism and Shî'îsm, and in this sense the excercise might have helped to establish a kind of continuity between the two traditions.

The implications of the Ismā'îlî attempt to facilitate the acceptance of Qur'ānic authority through the drawing of parallels between the Qur'ān and the Gināns are, however, far reaching.

Firstly, the Ginānic traditions are syncretic, and so the process of drawing parallels between the Qur'ān and Ginānic verses involves the selection of only those verses which are not considered to come into conflict with the general Muslim perception of Qur'ānic verses. Many Ginānic verses dealing with the transmigration of souls, divine epiphany, rebirth and mythical stories, etc., are left out. Secondly, the Ginānic traditions are not 'Kerygmatic' in the sense of relating themselves to events in time and history. The shift from Ginān to Qur'ān therefore involves the transition from the ahistorical Ginānic to the historical Qur'ānic emphasis. In the Ginānic context, inward states of mind and inner happiness are more emphasized than is conformity to social norms, which is the case with the present-day Islamization process. The objective of the former is the attainment of illumination and spiritual liberation, while the latter is more oriented towards reforming the society to accord with ideal historical Islamic models. Thirdly, the syncretic character of the Gināns, which enables the Ismā'îlî community to acclimatize itself readily to the changing situation, has itself

598 ibid.

599 For details see Azim Nanji, **Nizārī Ismā'îlī Tradition.**

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come under scrutiny, thus creating a serious identity crisis for the Ismā'īlīs themselves. Fourthly, and very important, the focus of the Gināns is the ideal man-teacher concept versus the book-teacher concept as espoused by Sunnī legalist and revivalist thought. In the former, the emphasis is on the divinity of a man-teacher and, in the latter, the emphasis is on the divinity of the Book.

Therefore, the standard Pakistānī Ismā'īlī interpretation of the Ginānic position, vis-à-vis the Qur'ān, evidences the irreconcilable nature of the two traditions. Moreover, the present controversy has raised a whole set of questions relating to the compilation and authenticity of the Ginānic traditions. The Āghā Khān himself appears to have encouraged research into the Ginānic tradition by ensuring that the Ginān documents be made available for research purposes.[600] The Āghā Khān's interest in research on Ismā'īlism led to the establishment of the Institute of Ismaili Studies, in London between 1975 and 1977. Its purpose is to enhance "awareness of spiritual and cultural heritage of Islam, more particularly its Shia branch".[601] The objective of the Insititute is stated as follows:

> The Institute of Ismaili Studies has been established under the patronage of the present Imam of the Ismaili Muslims, the Aga Khan, in order to encourage scholarship and learning in Islam and particularly the Shia branch of Islam and its Tariqah (persuasion).[602]

Inaugurating the Institute of Ismaili Studies, in 1977, the Āghā Khān emphasized that the Institute was primarily geared to benefit the Ismā'īlīs through its "superior level" of religious education and through its other undertakings, including the writing of Ismā'īlī History.[603] In 1980, the Āghā Khān Foundation entered into an agreement with McGill University to encourage co-operation in the areas of Health Science and

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600 Qāsim 'Alī Ja'far, **On Changes,** p. 4.

601 See the preface of the 'booklet' on **Institute of Ismaili Studies,** London.

602 ibid. p. 1.

603 **Ismaili Bulletin,** Dec., 1977.

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Islamic Studies. Co-operation in the latter area between the Institute of Islamic Studies of McGill University and the Institute of Ismaili Studies provides yet another dimension to the field of Ismā'īlī Studies.

Recently some Ismā'īlī students have attempted to carry out research in areas dealing with the Gnānic traditions. Some of their findings have suggested that certain Ginān̄s were not necessarily compiled or authored by the Ismā'īlī *pīrs,* but were lifted, for instance, from the mystical and devotional literature of the *Bhakti* traditions and given a Shī'ī Ismā'īlī framework. For instance Hasina Jamani concludes in her study of the Ginān called *Brahm Prakāsh* that:

> The use of *tantric* vocabulary and also the presence of these terms in the entire Ginān corpus strongly indicate that the Ginān finds its basis in the Hindu school of thought. The study further reveals that the *Brahm Prakāsh* restructures the *tantric* element in its frame-work so as to make it an integral aspect of Ismā'īlism. An aspect which is still reflected in a fundamental practice of the Indian Ismā'īlīs, namely the *bayt al-khyāl.*[604]

It therefore appears that the whole exercise of drawing parallels between the Qur'ān and Ginān̄s in order to enhance the acceptance of the Qur'ān as the basis of authority within the Ismā'īlī religious framework overlooks both the historical development of the Ginān̄s and also the Muslim attitude towards the Qur'ān.

Moreover, as we saw previously, the Ginān̄s (which already existed in Khojkī script) were transliterated and compiled for incorporation within the Ismā'īlī framework at a time much later in history than is generally thought by the Ismā'īlīs.[605]

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604 See Hasina Jamani's Masters Thesis on "Brahm Prakāsh: A Translation and Analysis", submitted to the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, 1985. p. 105.

605 Most of the Ginān̄s available in Gujrātī were transliterated into Gujrātī from the Khojkī script in the early 20th century by Lālji Devrāj who appears to have then destroyed the original manuscripts. Hasina Jamāni, "Brahm Prakāsh", 'Alī Asānī has convincingly argued that the Ginān, **Bujh Nir-ɲjan,** was not authored by an Ismā'īlī *pīr* Sadr al-dīn and also that it was composed at a time much later than *pīr* Sadr al-dīn is assumed to have carried out his *da'wah* activities. Unfortunately his thesis "Bujh Niranjan: A Critical Edition of a Mystical Poem in Hindustani with its Khojki and Gujrati Recensions", Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1984, is not yet available to me.

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The Gināns appear to have continued to be composed until the 1940's when "the composition process ceased and the Ginān corpus was frozen",[606] probably on the basis of the Āghā Khān III's directives.[607] Thus, it appears likely that the Gināns probably did not provide continuity for the Persian Shī'ī themes in the Indian context as held by the Ismā'īlī historians. The Gināns, as we saw previously in chapter 2, seem rather to have been instrumental in:

1. Forging an Ismā'īlī identity against the powerful Sunnī puritanical movements of the 19th century by using Hindu ideas, popular with the Khojahs, and making it seem that there was a continuity between Shī'īsm and the Hindu ideas of the Khojah Ismā'īlīs, and
2. Effecting a shift in the local community leadership from Persian control to that of the Indian Ismā'īlī traders.

The later development took place in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Some Persian Ismā'īlī followers of the Āghā Khān I, Ḥasan 'Alī Shāh, who migrated to India had come into conflict with the Āghā Khān III, Sulṭān Muḥammad Shāh, and also with the local Khojah Ismā'īlīs. Under the stimulus of the challenges that the Persian Ismā'īlīs posed to the religious authority of the Āghā Khān, the Khojah Ismā'īlīs appear to have turned to the Ginānic traditions as a means to assert the Imām's authority in India.

Just as the Wa'z overlook the historical development of the Sunnī and Shī'ī attitude towards the Qur'ān, they also overlook the historical development of the Gināns. The Gināns played a crucial role in the definition of Ismā'īlī identity and its authority structure in the Indian environment. As such, they not only mirror Ismā'īlī thought in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, but they served as means through

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606 Hasina Jamani, "Brahm Prakāsh", p. 39.

607 The author was informed of this by 'Azīzah Hayāt who worked for the Ismailia Association for Pakistan, where she learnt of this development.

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which the Ismā'īlīs have sanctified the changes in their lives. To play down the historical context in which the Gināns actually emerged as authoritative traditions among the Ismā'īlīs is to undermine the creative ways in which the Khojah Ismā'īlīs addressed the problems that confronted them in the past. That is, the authority of the Gināns is the result of an historical process. The question this issue raises is why the authority of the Gināns should not now change again when the circumstances are different?

In the pre-seventies, the Khojah Ismā'īlīs had introduced changes into some of their religious practices. These changes included those which were geared towards eliminating certain Hindu elements from the Gināns. These changes, however, did not affect the existing traditional Ismā'īlī view of the Imām's authority With the resurgence of Islam, the Ismā'īlīs have now come under pressure to show that they are Muslims. In response, the Ismā'īlīs have attempted to demonstrate that the Qur'ān is the fundamental and principal basis of the Imām's teachings and is also the source of the Ginānic traditions of the *pīrs*. Yet it is on the basis of the Gināns and the Imām's teachings that this transition in the emphasis from the Ginānic authority to the Qur'ānic authority is being effected. This emerging formulation of the status of the Ginānic authority in relation to the Qur'ān has forced the Ismā'īlīs also to review their concept of the Imām's authority in relation to the Qur'ān. The Ismā'īlīs have responded to this development by emphasizing the Shī'ī concept of the necessity of Imāmah, in general, and the Ismā'īlī esoteric definition of the Imām's role, in particular.

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6.1.3 The Shī'ī Concept of Imāmah Reconsidered

In 1970, the Āghā Khān issued a Firmān stating that Shī'ah Islam "is an historical fact" and that it should not be hidden.[608] In an interview, he defined the role of the Imām as being the interpreter of the Qur'ān at the spiritual level and as being one who gives "assistance to the Ismā'īlīs in their material life." He is not to function in the latter capacity directly, but does so in the sense that he helps the Ismā'īlīs to follow the necessary steps for their material progress.[609]

> It is two-fold. The Imam must direct the Ismailis in the practice of their religion and constantly interpret the Koran to them according to our theology. On the spiritual plane the Imam's authority is absolute. Ismailis believe therefore that what the Imam says is the only interpretation possible.[610]

The notion of religious authority is central for any religious system. It must be located somewhere. In theory, God is implicated as the source of authority, but He has no instrumental value: He does not rule. His authority must be located somewhere in order to effect changes.[611] We may distinguish here between the substance of authority and the functional basis of authority. Substantially for Muslims, the Qur'ān and the Sunnah are authority, but functionally there are other agencies that set out what is supposedly found in Qur'ān and Sunnah, for example, the religious class. Functionally it is the *'ulamā'* and the *fuqahā'*, supported by the *ijmā'* of the majority who excercise religious authority. The conflict with the Ismā'īlīs in these terms would be a matter of the religious class versus the Āghā Khān

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608 **Ismaili Mirror** July 1980, p. 49.

609 This interview with the Āghā Khān was conducted in French and has been inaccurately translated into English from **l'Expansion,** No. 83. March 1975.

610 ibid.

611 Louis D. Hayes, **Politics in Pakistan: The Struggle for Legitimacy,** Colorado: Westview Press, 1984, p. 186.

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The Ismā'īlīs and other Muslims would agree that ultimate authority in religious matters belong to God. The problem is: how do we find out what God wants and intends. Mawdūdī, for instance, would say that God's will and intentions are known from the Qur'ān by the processes developed in Islamic *fiqh*. For the Ismā'īlīs God's will and intentions are known from the Imāmah by heeding his Firmāns. The issue is really one of how the Qur'ān is interpreted and who is in a position to interpret it. In a sense, for Mawdūdī the Qur'ān speaks for itself. It speaks only to one who is qualified to hear it - a pious man who knows Arabic, who has studied *fiqh, tafsīr,* etc.. The Isma'īlīs believe that an authoritative interpreter is required. Thus, even if one accepts the Āghā Khān's rather modest views of his role, the Sunnīs still have an argument against him. Why must one accept his and only his view of what the Qur'ān means? In the Ismā'īlī context, the Wa'izāt and the *ta'alimāt* (religious teachings) reflect repeated emphasis on the necessity of the Imāmah. Its necessity follows from the necessity of the divine guide (Qur'ān) itself. God sent warners to guide mankind, the last being the Prophet Muhammad. The guidance/Qur'ān must continue to address itself to the changing times after the physical demise of the Prophet. His *nūr* (interchangeably called 'guidance' or 'light'), which is the *nūr* of Allāh must continue to light the path of the seekers of the truth *(haqq)*.[612] It is the Imāms, therefore, who guide the seekers of the truth. In this sense the Imāms are a speaking Qur'ān or the agencies continually mediating its guidance. The Qur'ān is just an historical fact. It becomes relevant when it is interpreted on a living basis. The Imām does this, but Sunnīs lack such an agency with the same capacity to speak the truth.

Obedience towards and recognition *(shanākht)* of the Imām of the time is equivalent to obedience and *shanākht* of Allāh and his Prophet.[613] Therefore, the true *Mu'min* is he who recoginzes and obeys the Imām of the time. The Qur'ān has

612 Qāsim 'Alī Ja'far, **Wa'z, on Divine Guidance,** 1982.

613 ibid.

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two levels of meanings - *ẓāhir and bāṭin.* The Imām, being vested with divine knowledge *('ālim),* interprets and unfolds the *bāṭin* (inner) meaning of the Qur'ān. The Qur'ān and the Imām will, accordingly, remain inseparable for all time.[614]

The description of the role of the Imām in Shî'î terms is, however, complemented by the refusal, on the part of the Ismā'îlîs, to take a polemical position against the Sunnî Muslim Communities. This is evidenced especially in the Wa'iẓāt and various publications emphasizing the Āghā Khān's wish that the Ismā'îlîs "build bridges with other Muslims." Attempts by some individual Ismā'îlîs to revive polemical traditions condemning the first three caliphs and some companions for having usurped the rights of 'Alî are strongly discouraged.[615] Moreover, Shî'î fundamentalism as it has found expression in Iran is not viewed as representing Shî'î Islam. The Āghā Khān, in an interview, asserted that he did not agree with Ayāt Allāh Khomaynî on the current interpretation of Islam in Iran.

> I am concerned about the interpretation of Islam which is given. I think many Muslim leaders are concerned about that...I am not convinced as Imam of the Ismaili community that that interpretation is the right one. Now seen from within Iran there may be a different attitude. I am saying today that law and order in the twentieth century can probably be achieved without the application of law as it is interpreted there.[616]

The Āghā Khān's description of his own *Imāmic* role - as committed to human welfare at large - will be dealt with in the following chapter.

The role of the Imām amongst the Khojah Ismā'îlîs, while it shares with the Ithnā 'asharîs a number of general Shî'î characteristics, has increasingly found expression in the esoteric form of Islam.

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614 ibid.

615 For instance, Abū 'Alî 'Azîz's **Ismā'îlî tarîqah,** Toronto: Islamic Literary and Cultural Association, 1980, was not officially approved for sale among the Ismā'îlîs.

616 Āghā Khān, "Interview", **The Age,** Melbourne, 1979.

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6.1.4 The Ismā'īlī Tarīqah: The Esoteric Form of Islam

The Ismā'īlīs view themselves as belonging to a *tarīqah* in Islam with emphasis on the esoteric dimensions of Islam. The **Ismaili Bulletin** of March 1978, quoted the Āghā Khān's Firmān stating that "I want my spiritual children in the years ahead to understand the two concepts of Islam, the spiritual concept which is ours; and those of certain branches of Islam, namely those who say no, there is no esoteric form to Islam, there is but one an exoteric form."[617]

The Ismā'īlī *ta'līmāt* (teachings) emphasize that the ultimate aim of a *murīd* (follower) is to attain the highest state of spiritual consciousness in his life time. In this state the *murīd* experiences union with the *nūr* of the Imām. The *nūr* of the Imām is the same as that of the Prophet and of Allāh.

> The *makān* (destiny) of the *'ishq* (love) is the *dīdār* (vision) of the Imām ...in such a way that the eyes of the *mu'min* with which he sees, the ears with which he hears, and the hands with which he does become those of the *Murshid-i-Kāmil* in whom resides the *nūr* of Allāh and Muhammad.[618]

To experience *nūrānī dīdār* (the vision of light) is to reach the *aṣl makān,* (the original destiny). In order to arrive at the *makān,* the *mu'min* must participate in the religious practices or rituals corresponding to the two complementary levels of (i) preparation and (ii) contemplation. These religious practices occupy a central position within the activities of the Jamā'at Khānah. The other activities include those which deal with social, economic, and educational aspects of the community's life. For instance, the Education Committee holds seminars on career selection and positive parenting; and the *mayyit* (burial) committee handles all the procedures related to the death of an Ismā'īlī. The Āghā Khān, while commenting on the functions of the Jamā'at Khānah, stated that:

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617 **Ismaili Bulletin** March 1978, p. 4.

618 **Ismā'īlī ta'līmāt,** vol. 9 (1983), p. 20-21.

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> **Jamat Khana acts as a place where the religious tenets of the community are re-affirmed and enacted through the collaboration of ritual observances on a daily basis. This is one of the principal ways in which the tradition of the Ismā'īlī community is maintained.....the Jamat Khana forms the nucleus of the social, cultural and religious life of the community.**[619]

(i) The religious practices at the preparatory level, as seen previously, such as the partaking of *āb-e-safā'* (the pure water) and reciting of the *du'ā'*, facilitate the purification of one's self. "The *maqān* or *manzīl* (the destiny)" is believed to be within oneself and only "with its purification will it radiate the light of God."[620] The Islamic practices of *namāz, rōzah, ḥajj, zakāt,* etc, are interpreted as aimed essentially at cleansing the hearts of the believers.[621]

The emphasis on the purification of self as a pre-requisite for spiritual enlightenment is very intense. This emphasis significantly contributes to the individual's self-awareness, cultivation of one's sense of moral duty, and his strong devotion to the Imām and to the community. The effect of the emphasis on self-purification as a means to experiencing the ultimate reality are therefore visible in the way the Ismā'īlīs have devotedly and diligently worked towards the development of their own social and economic institutions. These institutions will be examined in more detail in the following chapter. The devotion and sincerity with with which the Ismā'īlīs maintain the Imāmat institutions is singled out by the Āghā Khān as a major force behind the efficient functioning of these Institutions.[622]

(ii) At the contemplative or meditative level, those Ismā'īlīs who feel that they have achieved a level of maturity in moral consciousness, volunteer to join *bayt-al-khayāl* - which refers to a meditative state or a gathering *(majlis)*. The ultimate goal of each

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619 **Hidāyat** March 1983, p. 6.

620 Rahîm Bānā, **Wa'z on Spiritual Aspects,** 1981.

621 Kamālluddîn, **Wa'z,** 1980.

622 **Hidayat,** October 1985, p. 4.

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murîd is to attain the highest spiritual experience of union with the *nūr* of the Imām and Allāh. Participation in the religious rituals, such as partaking of the *āb-e-safā'*, reciting of *du'ā* and Gināns, etc., prepares and enables the *murîd* to do *dhikr* with more effective concentration. The Imām gives an *ism-i-ā'zam* (the most exalted word - usually one of the ninty-nine names of Allāh) to the *murîd* to be meditated upon. The practice of meditation is not compulsory for the Ismā'îlîs. The Āghā Khān told the Ismā'îlîs that "the purpose of *bayt-al-Khayāl* is for those spiritual children who wish to participate, who wish to elevate their souls in remembrance of Allāh, in seeking to approach Him - this is what *bayt-al-Khayāl* is".[623] *Bayt-al-Khayāl*, however, is viewed by the Ismā'îlîs as the most important aspect of their religious practices. For instance, a Wā'iz wrote that:

> Mere *du'ā* and other religious rituals do not constitute our *rūhānî* (spiritual) life. It is *bandagî* (meditation) which is the most essential aspect of our *rūhānî* life ..It is through *bandagî* that the self can elevate itself to such an extent that it can become one with the *nūr* (of Allāh from which he was seperated).[624]

The religious practices of the Ismā'îlîs thus reflect a pattern of *Imām-mu'minîn* relationships similar to the *pîr-murîd* relationship of other sūfî *tarîqahs*. In this context the Gināns are viewed as expressions of the pîr's mystical experiences. They are considered to be similar to the *diwān-i-Shams-i-Tabrîzî* of Rūmî, and the writings of Sūfîs like Hāfiz.

> Read philosophy of Rūmî and compare it with that of the Gināns of our *pîrs*... Rūmî says that he was never able to understand the truth until he recognized Shams Tabrîz as his *murshid* (teacher)...our *manzîl* (destiny) is our *Mowlā* ...and let us not be like a hunter who, as Rumi says, is aiming his arrows at the shadows of the birds and not at the birds.[625]

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623 Quoted from **Ismaili Bulletin,** Dec., 1974, p. 9.

624 Zarînā Kamālluddîn, "āpnî bātūnî mānyatā (our inner beliefs)", **Ismaili Bulletin,** vol. 4(1978), p. 22-23.

625 Rahim Bana, **Wa'z: Spiritual Aspects,** 1981.

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The appeal to Ṣūfīsm for defining the role of the Imām represents an attempt by the Ismā'īlīs to reconcile the Āghā Khān's understanding of himself (in terms of a moderate and not an extra-human role) with the community's inherited traditional views. To the extent that Ṣūfīsm is an Islamic phenomenon generally recognized in the community, the similarities between the Ṣūfīs and the Ismā'īlīs ought to serve in making the case that Ismā'īlīs are good Muslims. In this case the Jamā'at-i-Islāmī diverges sharply from the Sunnī orthodoxy.

The Jamā'at-i-Islāmī is vehemently opposed to the view that the saints, *pīrs*, or Imāms are privileged to intercede or perform miracles. Mawdūdī blames Ṣūfīsm and its concept of the *pīrī-murīdī* relationship for the failure of earlier Islamic reform movements in the Indian sub-continent. He maintains that Ṣūfīsm cultivates a slave-like mentality among the *murīds* who then come to identify the guide as a god alongside Allāh.

> It results in the incapacity of all mental powers of discrimination and criticism, of thinking and reasoning, and the disciple is completely obsessed with the guide's personality and authority...therefore, if somebody wishes and plans to revive Islam, he must shun the language and terminology of the Ṣūfīs; their mystic allusions and metaphoric references, their dress and etiquette, the master-disciple institution...[626]

The Khojah Ismā'īlīs, though they emphasized the esoteric forms of Islam earlier, emphasize them even more now in reaction to the growingly rigid and legalistic interpretation of Islam in Pakistan. This emphasis then is not an aspect of adaptation to the prevalent trend but rather a form of resistance to it. More important, the emphasis on the esoteric demonstrates the Ismā'īlī attempt to link the source of religious authority - the Qur'ān - with the location of religious authority - the Imām. In other words, the Ismā'īlīs, by bringing to the surface the esoteric dimensions of Qur'ān, are locating the basis of religious authority in the Qur'ān only in form but not in content. The final authority resides in the Imām.

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626 **A Short History of the Revivalist Movement in Islam,** (1940). Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1972, p. 112-113.

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The Āghā Khān, however, has recently expressed his deep concern that the Ismā'īlīs acquire higher education and give more sublime expression to their religious ideas and themes.[627] As we saw earlier, in part because of the neglect by the Khojah Ismā'īlīs to give intellectual expression to their religious views, tensions have emerged within the community, in its attempt to adjust to the process of Islamization in Pakistan. The Āghā Khān is thus also responding to the failure of the Ismā'īlīs to have given intellectual treatment to the impact of Islamization on their belief structure. While inaugurating the Institute of Ismaili Studies, the Āghā Khān said that his primary concern was:

> to ensure that the work of the Institute is of direct relevance and benefit to my Jamat. In time to come, it is my wish that this institution should assume its correct position in matters such as religious education in the Jamat, through the participation of material and man-power of a superior level. I have, therefore, directed that the Institute as a part of its initial work programme embark on compiling a History of Ismailis and undertake an international training programme for creating waezeen and religion teachers capable of imparting knowledge and understanding of our faith to our young generation.[628]

The Āghā Khān appears to be aware of the Pakistānī situation and seems to want to direct the whole community in ways that at-least implicitly respond to the general situation of Muslim revivalism and, more specifically, to that of Pakistan. The Āghā Khān's willingness to direct the whole community in ways that respond to the Pakistānī situation is demonstrated in the steps he has taken which will be examined in detail in the following chapter. However, two developments may be mentioned here to evidence the Imām's motives vis-à-vis the Pakistānī situation.

1. Commencing this year (1987), the Ismā'īlīs all over the world will be governed by the new 'Constitution of the Shia Imami Ismaili Muslims'. The preamble of the constitution outlines the fundamental beliefs of the Ismā'īlīs, (see the preamble - Appendix A): that they "affirm the *Shahādah 'lā ilāha illallāh,*

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627 **Firmāns,** 1986.

628 Quoted from the **Ismaili Bulletin,** Dec., 1977, p. B.

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Muhammadur Rasūlu-llāh', the *Tawhīd* therein and that the Holy Prophet Muhammad of Allāh *(salla-llāhu 'alayhi wa-sallam)* is the last and final message of Allah to mankind, and is universal and eternal". The rest of the preamble states the Ismā'īlī belief in the Shī'ī doctrine of Imāmah, succession to the Imāmah by way of *nass,* and the act of *bay'ah* as testifying to the Imām's authority, etc.. It is significant to note that the *Shahādah* does not contain the additional Shī'ī testimony that 'Alī is the beloved of Allāh *('Alī-un Walīy Allāh).*

2. The Institute of Ismaili Studies published a series of books for children on the Ismā'īlī faith in 1985. These books are used for teaching religion to the Ismā'īlī children throughout the world whereever the Ismā'īlīs live. These books cover general Islamic topics, such as those dealing with the concepts of *tawhīd,* finality of the Prophet Muhammad, the Qur'an, continuity of divine guidance, etc.. One of the themes emphasized is that of inculcating a strong Muslim identity in the children. The series has avoided the whole issue of religious authority, the position of the Gināns, and the emphasis on Shī'ī Islam.

The Ismā'īlīs have sought to accomodate themselves to the process of Islamization in Pakistan. To this end they have effected changes in their religious out-look. These changes, which affect their long held traditions, beliefs and practices, have found legitimacy in the Imām's authority. The Ismā'īlī attempt at adapting to the Pakistānī situation, however, is far from being a simple procedure to accomodate external dominant trends within the Ismā'īlī belief system.

1. At one level, there certainly have been changes in some of their traditional views of the Imām, mainly those supported by the Ginānic traditions containing Hindu elements. These changes were made through the

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modification or rejection of some Gināns which would arouse the suspicion of other Muslims regarding the Muslim identity of the Ismā'īlīs. Moreover, the validity of the Gināns was sought in the Qur'ān itself in two ways:

a. Firstly, the Gināns now came to be seen as the tool utilized by the *pīrs* to convert Hindus to Islam and, therefore, in reality, they contained the essence of the Qur'ān - but in the vernacular languages of the Hindus to make conversion easier.

b. Secondly, it followed that the Gināns were interpretations of the Qur'ān, and this was demonstrated through drawing parallels between some of the selected themes on *tawhīd, akhlāqīyah,* etc..

2. At the second level, a Sūfī identity for the Ismā'īlīs was claimed in an effort to blunt the charges of the revivalists. The claim for Sūfī identity also provides the basis for an alliance with the majority of Sunnī Muslims. Sūfīsm is generally regarded as an Islamic phenomenon. The Sūfī emphasis on self-purification as a means to attain the highest spiritual union with God is widely acclaimed by the Muslims as a good practice.

3. At still another level are the Imām's efforts and the response to modernist attitudes which will be examined in the following chapter. The Imām has not only defined his role in humanitarian terms and played down the extra human appellations attributed to him by the Khojahs, but has taken steps to effect a transition in Ismā'īlī thought from the mere traditional religious expression to the one which is more in conformity with the current modernist and humanitarian thrusts of the Imām.

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Chapter VII

ISLAMIC MODERNISM AND THE ISMĀ'ĪLĪ IDENTITY

This chapter examines (i) The Āghā Khān's statements on Islam and Modernism and (ii) his contribution to the social and economic life of Pakistan. The Āghā Khān's statements and activities serve to project the official Ismā'īlī view of Islam and the community's commitment to the welfare of the Muslims of Pakistan at large. They serve also as guidelines for the Ismā'īlīs themselves to follow in coming to grips with the Pakistānī situation. The Āghā Khān's views are characterized by their emphasis on a modernist and ethical-humanistic[629] understanding of Islam.

7.1 Islam: The Imām's Statement

The speeches and Firmāns of the Āghā Khān IV indicate a kind of modernist Islam with emphasis on:

1. Islam's compatibility with modern economic and scientific developments;
2. Islam as a 'catalyst' in the promotion of the quality of life in Pakistan and elsewhere, and
3. The strength of diversity in Islam.

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629 Ethical Humanism may be defined as a commitment to "human development" through the creation of conducive moral and "socio-cultural situations", In this sense, "religion is mainly judged by its contribution to moral life". Milton Yinger, **Religion, Society and the Individual,** New York: MacMillan Co., 1957, p. 115.

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7.1.1 Islam - Tradition Versus Modernity and the West.

The role of Islam in Pakistan, according to the Āghā Khān, has not been well defined because of the historical circumstances that have shaped contemporary Muslim thought.[630] The prolonged period of British rule, the Āghā Khān argued, replaced Muslim concepts of state with "concepts which were Western in inspiration as well as practice."[631] He, however, does not, like the revivalists, espouse the idea that there is a fixed system of Islamic Government that has been interfered with by Colonialism, and that Colonialism disrupted the possible evolution of political ideas among the Muslims. He believes that there is no fixed Islamic system, but that Muslims have evolved and developed systems appropriate to the times and circumstances.[632] British rule in India caused a "vacuum" and an interruption in the evolution of the Muslim State machinery. The Muslims have thus experienced a polarization between the Modernists who seek to copy the Western social framework to facilitate Western developed science and technology on the one hand and, on the other, the traditional leaders who turn their backs on the secular, but real, developments in the modern world. The Āghā Khān suggested that both secular and religious leaders must be well grounded in secular developments as well as in Islamic religious and historical traditions:

> How many aspiring Mullahs or Imams today enter secular universities and obtain degrees in secular subjects? And vice-versa, how many unviersity graduates, after completing their degrees, turn their lives to directing the flock of the faithful? ... It will be in our society's interest to have a much wider platform in common between our religious and secular leaders. Our religious leadership must be acutely aware of secular trends, including those generated by this age of science and technology. Equally, our academic or secular elites must be deeply

630 The Āghā Khān's "Convocation Address at the University of Sind" is published, along with his other speeches in **The Muslim World: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow,** Karachi: The Ismailia Association for Pakistan, 1977, p. 16.

631 ibid.

632 These views of his are implicated in the "Interview", **Pakistan and Gulf Economist,** March 1983.

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> aware of Muslim history, of the scale and depth of leadership exercised by the Islamic Empire of the past in all fields.[633]

He thus believes that a proper understanding of the Islamic past will reveal the context in which the Islamic traditions evolved and how they addressed themselves to the requirements of their times. Muslim thought, the Āghā Khān has emphasized, should be revived "without becoming archaic". Thus, the Āghā Khān espouses the bringing back of those values from the past which would help Muslims to transcend "the immediate and largely alien past", and to rebuild Muslim society on the foundations of the Islamic historical strengths.[634]

He urged that the Muslims must introduce the teachings of Muslim writers and philosophers into all the educational institutions to inspire young Muslims to be creative within their own framework. With such measures, he felt, the Muslims would be able to revive Muslim thought without breaking with their past heritage and to build a dynamic Muslim Society:

> It is through the creation of such a new elite, inspired and widely read in everything related to our heritage, that there must come about a revival in Muslim thought.[635]

The problem of espousing the above position is that all the Muslims do not agree on what should be revived. Many Muslims do not accept the Muslim philosophers as good Muslims. There is pride in their fame, but the content of their ideas is rejected. Further, they were as much inspired by Greek Philosophy, perhaps even more so, than by Islam. Furthermore, the revival of the past heritage or of ideas from the past is significant for defining Muslim identity, but how the revival of the past heritage helps the Muslims develop social and economic programs remains unclear. More basically, the appeal to the past is espousal of a kind of traditional authority. In other words, it

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633 Convocation Address, p. 16.

634 ibid.

635 ibid.

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is better to do what was done in the past by one's ancestors. Such a way of seeking legitimization is entirely against the modern spirit which seeks change and progress and believes that the past is always and progressively outlived. The modern source of authority is reason and experience and not the past. The very character of modern life is to fight against historically fixed ideas of identity - nationalism not withstanding.

The Āghā Khān's commitment to bridging the gap between the religion of Islam and secular economic and technological developments appears to be based on the conviction that there is no conflict between Islam and science or between spiritual and material life. In fact, he argued at the Charter Ceremony of the Āghā Khān University Hospital at Karachi, in 1983, that it was Muslims, such as Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Rushd, etc., who, inspired by Islam and its advocacy of love for knowledge, contributed significantly to the growth of science in the West. Since "objective inquiry is the property of no single culture", the Muslims by availing themselves of "wisdom" - even from the West - would perpetuate "truly the finest tradition of Islamic learning"[636]

> In Islamic belief knowledge is two-fold. There is that revealed through the Holy Prophet *(salī Allāh 'alāyhi wa-sallam)* and that which man discovers by virtue of his own intellect. Nor do these two involve any contradiction, provided man remembers that his own mind is itself the creation of God. Without this humility, no balance is possible ... Indeed one strength of Islam has always lain in its belief that creation is not static but continuous, that through scientific and other endeavours, God has opened and continues to open new windows for us to see the marvels of His creation.[637]

This position, however, entails an age-old conflict between reason and revelation. To determine the place of reason in the divine scheme is thus one of the fundamental problems of modernist Muslim thought and of any position that advocates adaptation or change. For the Ismā'īlīs, however, the contradiction between human reasoning and divine authority is resolved through the divinely-appointed Imām/authority. Therefore, the process of social change among the Ismā'īlīs, being linked directly to their concept

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636 Inauguration Ceremony of the Āghā Khān University Hospital. 1983.

637 ibid.

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of religious authority, differs in substance from that of the legalist or revivalist patterns of change. The latter do not attribute divine authority to human agency, but to the Qur'ān and Sunnah alone. In practice, however, Mawdūdī's or an *'ālim's* interpretation of the Qur'ān and Sunnah may become binding. This distinction, for instance, surfaces starkly around the question of what Islamic values are to be revived or conserved. For the Imām the legalist details and the Arab customs, which constitute a significant aspect of the first century of Islam, are not to be revived. For Mawdūdī the laws of God as laid down in Qur'ān and Sunnah are to be revived. Islam is therefore increasingly perceived for the Khojah Ismā'īlīs as essentially concerned with cultivating moral consciousness among Muslims. The Ismā'īlī publications and Wa'izāt frequently quote the Imām's speech on this issue.

> The Holy Prophet's life gives us every fundamental guideline that we require to resolve the problem as successfully as our human minds and intellects can visualize. His example of integrity, loyalty, honesty, generosity both of means, and time, his solicitude for the poor, the weak and the sick, his steadfastedness in friendship, his humility in success, his magnanimity in victory, his simplicity, his wisdom in conceiving new solutions for problems which could not be solved by traditional methods, without affecting the fundamental concepts of Islam....must enable us to conceive what should be a truly modern and dynamic Islamic Society in the years ahead.[638]

The external forms of the rituals accompanying *namāz* and *ḥajj*, such as the ritual of *wudū'*, are explained as being aimed at cleansing one's heart and making it *pāk* (pure). A Wā'iz thus argued that:

> The Imām says that 'as long as a man is in this world, he is like a student...and aquires knowledge to become *qābil* (capable)...'. What are the lessons to be learnt in life and which will ensure success in the final exam. One of them is *pākizgī* - which means to be pure and clean ... your *imān*, *'āmāl* (actions), eyes, and hands should become *pāk*... Qur'ān says that 'we created you from the lowest of the low', but he breathed His *rūh* or *nūr* in the humans, but as time went on they became burdened with worldly interests... Islam tells us to pray, fast, and perform *hajj*... but in all these the object is to become *pāk*. These practices are the branches of the one foundation, which is the

638 "Presidential Address of the Āghā Khān at the International Seerat Conference", **Ismaili Bulletin,** March 1978, p. 1; also in the Wa'izāt by Kamālluddīn, 1981.

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foundation of true piety *(shajrat al-taqwā)*.[639]

This Ismā'īlī emphasis on the Islamic moral teachings, however, seems to be in agreement with the intentions of the Government to inculcate moral values among the Muslims. It does not, however, come at all close to the conservative and revivalist emphasis on the enforcement of the external forms of Islamic practices.

It must also be indicated that, while the Ismā'īlīs like other modernist Muslims are attempting to portray Islam in liberal and moral terms, such an emphasis is at odds with the image of Islam being reflected in its militant and legalist forms. The increasingly militant and legalist expressions of Islam are causing concern among the modernist Muslims who take pride in Islam and who attempt to defend it against its critics. They are concerned that the militant posture of the Islamic resurgence movements has given Islam a bad image in the West where the true understanding of Islam does not exist. The Āghā Khān feels that it is his duty as well as that of the Ismā'īlīs as a whole to correct the mis-perception of Islam, especially in the West. He argued, during his visit to Canada in 1983, that except for academic institutions like McGill, which perceive Islam more accurately, other institutions, and particularly the media, portray Islam in stereo-typed monolithic terms and Muslims as people whose national disputes and upheavals are all part of their religion.[640] The West, he argued, becomes aware of Islamic movements and revolutions only after they occur and tends to see them without their historical contexts. For instance, he argued, Shī'ī Islam is identified totally with the faith of the Iranian revolutionaries in spite of the fact that "there are far more Shī'ah Muslims outside Iran then there are within that country, including my own community".[641]

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639 Kamālluddīn, "Taqwā", **Wa'z,** 1981.

640 See **Speeches of the Aga Khan: Canada Visit,** 1983.

641 ibid.

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The Āghā Khān suggested that the West should not confuse certain political engagements of the Muslims with the faith of the "silent majority of 900 million people" just as one should not confuse the IRA with the Catholic Church. On the contrary, he argued that the majority of Muslims rather seek to bridge gaps and divisions between faiths because they strongly believe in the "tenets of Islam including the brotherhood of man and the appreciation of the wonder of God's creation".[642] He has reiterated in his recent speeches and Firmāns the conviction that there is no conflict between Islam and Christianity as the followers of both are referred to as *Ahl al-Kitāb*.[643] He urged Ismā'īlī students in the West not to react immaturely to the allegations that Islam is militant and that the Muslims are an uncivilized and warlike people. He requested the students to correct the misperception of Islam in the West and not to "fail Islam" by demonstrating with dignity and kindness that Islam is not "hate" or "vengeance".[644]

7.1.2 The Imām as a Humanitarian in the Spirit of Islam

As the Imām of the "Ismaili Community", the Āghā Khān stated during the inauguration of the Silver Jubilee Projects that he is committed to the welfare of Muslims and of the Third World as a whole. The immense problems that face the third world, he argued, must be tackled by such people as himself who have the capacity to effect changes in the societies. The health, education, and economic institutions of the Imāmat, having already served well the prospering Ismā'īlī community, were in a position to serve as a 'catalyst' in promoting the quality of life in some other parts of the world, such as Pakistan:

> Ever since I assumed the responsibilities of the Imamat in 1957 my aim has been not simply to help improve the quality of life of people in the third world, but also to create institutions which would bridge the gulf

642 Āghā Khān, **Speeches: Canada Visit,** 1983.

643 Āghā Khān, speech during opening ceremony of Burnaby Jamā'at Khānah, Vancouver. 1985.

644 Firmān issued to students during the Imam's visit to Canada in 1983.

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> between communities, faith and ethnic groups, as well as between the developed and developing worlds. This aspiration, I feel, is particularly appropriate to the Imamat because of its commitment to broad social objectives within the all-embracing humanistic teaching of Islam and because of the way in which the members of the community are increasingly spanning both worlds.[645]

The Āghā Khān feels that the Ismā'īlīs, particularly students who are acquiring skills and resources in the Western World, are in a unique position to uplift the social and economic conditions of the masses in the rural areas of Pakistan and the third world. The Firmāns and speeches during the Imām's visits to Ismā'īlī centres on the occasion of the Silver Jubilee (marking 25 years of his Imāmat) advised the Ismā'īlī students to acquire the best possible education in Science, Technology, Management, Education and Islamic Studies, etc., and, if circumstances permitted, to go to serve for a few years in the third world.

> I hope that those who live in the Western World, who work in the Western World, who benefit from Western World's education, from her technical knowledge, that the Jamat in the Western World will, over the next decade, contribute substantially to the improvement in the quality of life... of people in other parts of the world.[646]

It seems the Āghā Khān is convinced that the social and economic changes aimed at raising the standard of living of the people in countries like Pakistan would contribute toward breeding stability. This would, in turn, enable various minority religious groups to practice their faith and maintain their identity with fewer restraints. The problem, with this view however, is that there is no necessary connection between stability and economic growth.[647]

This ethical-humanistic vision of the Imām's role is projected backwards into history. The contributions of the Fatimid Imāms towards championing the cause of the Muslims by fostering cultural and scientific developments is often emphasized along

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[645] Āghā Khān, Speech, Silver Jubilee Visit to Canada, 1983.

[646] Firmān issued in London, 1985.

[647] Mancur Olson, **Rapid Growth as a Destablizing Force**, p. 438.

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with the more recent contributions of the Āghā Khān III (1885-1957) towards the creation of Pakistan.

The Āghā Khān's modernist views, therefore, contain the elements of modernist apologetics in the sense that they draw upon the glories of the past. The special edition of the magazine **Hidāyat** (the magazine of the Ismailia Association for Pakistan) covering the inauguration ceremony of the Aga Khan University's Faculty of Health Sciences and The Aga Khan University Hospital, stated that:

> A thousand years ago the forefathers of His Highness the Aga Khan, the Fatimid Caliphs, built one of the great universities in the Muslim World - the al-Azhar in Cairo. It produced Muslim scientists and men of learning who made enormous contributions towards the development of modern science and whose work eventually proved a major catalyst in bringing Europe out of dark ages and into the Renaissance. More recently, Sir Sultan Muhammed Shah Aga Khan's role in the development of Aligarh University in India created a sense of identity for Muslims in the Asian sub-continent and led to the creation of Pakistan. The Aga Khan University follows in this tradition.[648]

The Ismā'īlīs, therefore, view the Āghā Khān's commitment to Islam and humanity as a continuation of the previous functions of the Shī'ī Imāms in history. Many Khojah Ismā'īlīs have responded to the directives of the Āghā Khān to serve the cause of the Muslims at-large by acquiring skills in the West and returning to Pakistan to join the Ismā'īlī institutions.[649]

7.1.3 Islam: Strength and Unity in Diversity

One of the objectives that the Āghā Khān, in his interview with Aftāb Ahmad Khān of the **Pakistan and Gulf Economist,** stated that he had set for the Ismā'īlīs, was to strike a balance "between living in the twentieth century, with all the means in terms of technological knowledge, of aspiration for material well being and, at the same time,

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[648] **Hidāyat,** October 1985, p. 4.

[649] The exact figures on the number of students going back to Pakistan are not available. The trend of going to Pakistan to serve for at least a few years, is growing rapidly among the Khojah Ismā'īlīs of Canada. This observation is based on interviews conducted by the author in Toronto and Montreal.

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the actual turning into practice of the spirit of Muslim brotherhood, the practice of one's faith and the concern for the betterment of the people".[650] To realize this objective, the Āghā Khān said that he and his community were dedicating themselves toward building "bridges" amongst the various *tarīqahs* (paths) in Islam. This Ismā'īlī initiative, he continued, will hopefully minimize polarization and the divisions that "breed weakness". He added however, that unity did not mean that every Muslim is to believe and practice the faith in the same way, nor link every issue - "economic imbalances within the world" or "the cause of demographic dispersal of Muslims throughout the world", etc. - with Islam. Those who impose a singular political view on Muslims of diverse cultural and linguistic backgrounds, he argued, were weakening Islam's strength, which was, in fact, derived from its great diversity. He appealed to the Muslim World that "those people who practice the faith of Islam throughout the world must be supported within their own context, i.e. their own social, economic, demographic and ethnic background". He added that:

> All Pakistanis who are citizens of the country are loyal to that country which was born in the name of Islam and not in the name of any particular tariqah. Any divisions, conflicts and misunderstandings which are occuring outside Pakistan must not be allowed to divide the people of Pakistan.[651]

The Āghā Khān has recently contributed to the revival of some aspects of the Muslim cultural heritage through his involvement in defining the features of Muslim art and architecture. Although such activities will be described later, it is of significance to mention here that the Āghā Khān is of the view that it is possible to revive certain artistic and architectural patterns and to integrate them with contemporary structures, and thus at the same time to "encourage an understanding and awareness of the strength and diversity of Muslim Cultural traditions..".[652]

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650 **Pakistan and Gulf Economist,** March 12-18, 1983, p. 11.

651 ibid.

652 The Āghā Khān's address at the fourth seminar on "Symbols and Signs in Islamic

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The trends of thought espoused by the Āghā Khān concerning Islam's relationship to modern developments, its humanitarian concerns, and Islam's tolerance of its diverse manifestations, indicate that he wants the Ismā'īlīs to think of themselves as Muslims and yet continue to practice their faith in accordance with their traditions. In the process, the Khojah Ismā'īlīs are redefining the role of the Imām and adding new meaning to their inherited concept of the Imām. The Imām is viewed more emphatically as the leader who is committed to the cause of Islam and humanity in the tradition of his ancestors. The Khojah Ismā'īlīs see this role as fitting together with the spirit of the Qur'ān.

7.2 The Imām's Contribution to the Social and Economic Life of Pakistan

The Ismā'īlīs, under the direction of Āghā Khān III, had responded to the reforms introduced by the British in India through the establishment of their own social (health, education, etc.) and economic institutions. The Āghā Khān IV has continued to expand the role of these institutions not only by extending their services to the Muslim population at large but also by providing these services more effectively through the utilization of contemporary management and planning techniques. At the apex of approximately two hundred health institutions, three hundred educational institutions, one hundred economic ventures, and several hundred village organizations, etc., is the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF).[653] It is chaired by the Āghā Khān himself. It was established in 1967 and has 9 branches, including a Pakistan branch - established in 1969. The AKF claims to be apolitical and has been recognized by International Humanitarian Agencies such as UNDP, UNICEF, and WHO, etc., as a non-Governmental Humanitarian Organization.[654]

Architecture", held at Rabat (Morocco), in 1979, **Ismaili Mirror,** p. 17.

653 See the Information Bulletins of the Aga Khan Foundation.

654 ibid.

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The programs initiated in Pakistan, by the Aga Khan Foundation have been recognized by the Pakistan Government as aiding effectively the efforts of the Government to address the social and economic problems of the country as a whole.[655] The resources needed to support such programs are drawn from two main areas. First, the Ismā'īlīs themselves provide major financial and committed human resources for the implementation of the objectives set by the Āghā Khān. For instance, the Ismā'īlīs contributed more than a hundred million dollars for the Aga Khan University Hospital Project alone. Also, several thousand Ismā'īlīs provide voluntary services, on a regular basis, to run the health and education units.[656] Secondly, the technical assistance to direct the Aga Khan projects, is drawn from Muslim and non-Muslim specialists, recruited nationally and globally on the basis of their expertise.[657] These projects are having a significant impact on the Ismā'īlī attitude towards themselves and towards other Muslims. On the one hand, these projects provide an avenue for channelling secular approaches to addressing the social and economic problems of the country and, on the other hand, it is on the strength of the Ismā'īlī religious traditions about the authority of the Imām that these projects exist at all.

In November, 1985, Zia al-Haqq inaugurated the 300 million dollar Aga Khan University Hospital, the first autonomous and privately owned government chartered university hospital in the country, and probably the largest in Asia.[658] It is a 721-bed hospital with the objectives (i) to address specifically the needs of the rural population of the country in primary health care, nutrition, maternity units, etc..[659] (ii) to

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655 **Dawn,** Nov. 11,1985.

656 **Pakistan and Gulf Economist,** p.16.

657 For instance, see the 'Special Report' on contractors, Medical experts, technical staff, etc, in the **Readers Weekly,** Nov. 11-17, 1985.

658 **Dawn,** Editorial of Nov. 13,1985.

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demonstrate leadership in the educational standard of health professionals (to accomodate 500 medical students and 330 nurses) under the direction of McGill, McMaster, and Harvard Universities,[660] (iii) to provide care to approximately 2,000 patients a day;[661] and (iv) most significant, to open avenues to the exchange of ideas between the Muslims of different nationalities on the one hand and, on the other, between "different civilizations".[662] etc..

The Aga Khan Hospital project has contributed significantly to the formation of a positive image of the Ismā'īlī community in Pakistan. During the inauguration ceremony the media extensively praised the role of the Ismā'īlīs in the country's life:

> Unlike other religious leaders, the Aga Khan's role has been more progressive and more outgoing with a view to help his people attain respect and be acknowledged as worthy members of a society... This project required great courage and vision, and the Aga Khan has done a major service to the Islamic World in general and Pakistan in particular.[663]

The other Muslim communities, such as the Memons, and Bohras, pledged moral support and even financial donations to the Hospital project.[664] Many intellectual and political observers noted that the University Hospital, which had already trained approximately 165 nurses, had contributed significantly to augmenting the dignity of the nursing profession which had so far lacked incentives to attract competent applicants.[665] This, and the Hospital's focus on maternity facilities and primary

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659 ibid. See also The Aga Khan Health Services International Newsletters.

660 **Morning News,** Nov. 12, 1985; and the **Orient Times,** Nov.14, 1985.

661 ibid.

662 Āghā Khān, Speech: The Inauguration of the Aga Khan University Hospital, 1985.

663 "Editorial" **Daily News,** Nov. 11, 1985.

664 **The Star,** Nov. 11, 1985.

665 "The idea is not to turnout more nurses, but also to elevate them to the status they truly deserve, and which, it is hoped, will gradually help overcome the prejudice against nursing as a profession". **Dawn,** Editorial. Nov. 13, 1985.

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health care, they believe, will enhance further the role of women in the society. This status of women remains a major problem for Pakistan in the light of the situation imposed by Islamization, also in the light of the customs inherited even before Islamization started.

The Aga Khan University Hospital Complex is designed to reflect patterns of Muslim architecture - with great utilization of calligraphy, spacious courtyards, and indigenous techniques of cooling the complex through careful selection of ventilation angles to maximize the wind cooling effect, etc..[666] The utilization of Islamic symbols in the design of the complex serves more than a decorative purpose; their surroundings encourage the Ismā'īlīs to look beyond their own reality towards the broader Islamic world. This change in the Ismā'īlī atttude is strongly reflected in the increasing usage of Islamic terms in their language and publications. For instance, calligraphic designs forming different patterns of the word 'Allāh' are used extensively either as logograms for Ismā'īlī institutions or as designs on the front covers of the Ismā'īlī publications. (see Appendix 'D'). All the recent issues of **Hidāyat** (after 1982) carry an editor's note which states:

> The sacred Ayats from the Holy Quran and Ahadith have been printed for Tabligh and for increase of your religious knowledge. It is your duty to ensure their sanctity. Therefore the pages on which these are printed in Arabic/English/Gujrati/Sindhi/Urdu should be disposed of in proper Islamic manner.[667]

The more significant changes, however, are occurring in the physical structures of Jamā'at Khānahs. The numbers of pictures displayed on the walls of the Jamā'at Khānahs have been significantly reduced, and selections of Qur'ānic *Ayāts* written in beautiful calligraphy are being increasingly displayed instead.[668] The use of Islamic

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666 **The Star** (Supplement on the Inauguration Ceremony). Nov. 11, 1985.

667 **Hidāyat,** 1982-1984.

668 Some Ismā'īlī students in Karachi informed the author that when they are surrounded by physical structures displaying patterns of Islamic architecture and calligraphy, they feel overwhelmed with the sense of awe and majesty.

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symbols also helps to demonstrate to the Muslims at large the aspirations and loyalties of the Ismā'īlīs to the cause of Islam. The design of the hospital complex, it must be mentioned, is the result of the Āghā Khān's attempt to identify and revitalize certain features of Muslim art and architecture. Since, according to the Āghā Khān, the impact of the environment on the attitude of both individuals and society is immense, it is important to choose and redirect the environmental forces to foster a healthy Muslim identity.[669] According to the Āghā Khān, a healthy Muslim Society, proud of its spiritual heritage, and free from internal strife, could contribute immensely not only to its own social and economic progress but to fostering peace and tranquility in the world.[670]

The Āghā Khān said that he did not intend to copy the past[671] or to search for a single pattern exemplifying Muslim architecture.[672] While recognizing that the world is changing, the Āghā Khān emphasized the need to learn "from the past and whatever solutions we choose as to allow time, evolution and progress to orient us towards the future." Change, the Āghā Khān maintained, without direction, in which the past is not merged with the present, is like "copying" and "mimicking" one another, and it will lose the sense of dynamism and creativity.[673] The Āghā Khān maintained that there does not exist a single definition of Islamic architecture, bu' that this architectural tradition "has reflected different peoples and climates, different times and materials ...that strength which comes from the diversity of the Islamic World." However, he

669 The Āghā Khān's address to the First Conference on the Art and Architecture at Aiglemont, in 1978.

670 The Āghā Khān's address at the Fourth Seminar on symbols and Signs in Islamic Architecture, held at Rabat (Morocco), in 1979.

671 The Āghā Khān's address at the Second Seminar on Conservation at Istanbul, 1978.

672 The Āghā Khān's address to the Asia Society, New York, in 1979.

673 The Āghā Khān's speech at the National Council of Culture and Arts, Pakistan, 1976.

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continued, that there were some basic characteristic features articulated in the "Islamic Design" which reflect the Islamic cultural values.

> In Islamic design the basic forms are balanced and ruled by geometry. There is a sense of stability, tranquility and equilibrium. And with serenity goes modesty. There is a lack of domination and pride. The superiority of man-made structures over natural environment is a concept alien to Islamic beliefs.[674]

Similarly, he argued, the Muslim architectural tradition reflects an attempt at establishing harmony between its traditions and nature in order, for example, to "preserve the ecological balance."[675] Calligraphy, he continued, which forms part of the decoration of Muslim architecture, "was a constant reminder of spiritual content through its common design, the endless expression of the name of God."[676]

Other important activities of the Āghā Khān which serve to create public social support for the Ismā'īlī community in Pakistan include the Aga Khan Rural Support Programs (AKRSP) and the educational facilities extended to the general Muslim population. In 1982, the Āghā Khān established Rural Support Programs to assist villagers in the rural areas of Pakistan, particularly, the Northern Areas, to improve their living conditions. The AKRSP has been joined by the Canadian and Alberta International Development Agencies in providing resources to expand the base for increasing agricultural output in more than three hundred villages, affecting more than half a million people.[677] These activities include building of canals to bring more land into use and to prop up the yeild of existing cultivated lands; construction of access roads; teaching of marketing and management skills to the villagers; etc.. This economy generating activity, supported by health and education facilities, the Āghā Khān believes, will raise the quality of life among the "resilient and industrious" people

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674 ibid.

675 ibid.

676 ibid.

677 See Information Bulletins of the Aga Khan Foundation.

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of a very strategic area of Pakistan in geo-political terms.[678]

The Aga Khan Education Services presently focus on primary education and manage a network of some 117 schools in Pakistan. The Imām's Firmāns do assist in encouraging the parents to send their daughters to schools, particularly in the Northern Areas, where the prevailing customs in certain areas, until recently, were opposed to the idea of sending girls to schools.[679] The Teachers' Development Programme has been introduced to improve and maintain the high standard of education in the Aga Khan Schools.[680]

Another concern of the Āghā Khān has been to encourage, direct, and help Ismā'īlī and non-Ismā'īlī students financially to continue to pursue higher studies in the western countries in order to help the Government fill its need for skilled personnel to man social and economic institutions. Pakistan has suffered recently from the effects of the drainage of skilled manpower from the country because of lucrative opportunities available elsewhere and also because of poor working conditions in Pakistan.

As far as the Ismā'īlīs are concerned, they are increasingly acquiring professional skills through education for another reason as well. The recent political upheavals and socialist experiments in developing countries such as Tanzania, Uganda, Pakistan, Burma, etc, have affected the Ismā'īlī community. The impact of these upheavals was felt more by those Khojah Ismā'īlīs who had been pre-occupied with trade and commerce at the expense of acquiring higher education. In 1976, the Āghā Khān issued a Firmān stating that:

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678 **Partnership in Human Progress,** p. 4.

679 The author visited some areas of Northern Pakistan as a member of Survey Committee sent by Aghā Khān, in 1976.

680 **Partnership,** p. 4.

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> It is fundamental not only because of the potential impact of political problems upon your lives, but every time there is shrinkage in the national economy, it is the stronger, more qualified, better placed individuals who can look to their future with equanimity.[681]

The Firmān of the Imām is therefore aimed at directing the community's attention from trade to the acquisition of professional skills through education.

Along with emphasizing higher education, the Āghā Khān cautioned the Ismā'īlīs about its impact on the Ismā'īlī traditional structure. He reiterated that a secular and a religious life are not separate in Islam. He suggested that the educated Ismā'īlīs should contribute their expertise to running the affairs of the community more efficiently.[682] He cautioned the Ismā'īlīs to be helpful to the community even if it meant giving up some freedom of thought or expression. He argued that "learning means questioning", but questioning "must be for the purpose of understanding, and understanding is a step towards improvement. This is what it should be and not simply an excercise in preparing oneself to question, weaken or destroy.".[683]

The Āghā Khān's modernist definition of Islam and his humanitarian gestures have given new direction to the growing number of educated Ismā'īlīs. They have added a new dimension to the traditional role of the Imām, which transcends the conservatist-revivalist appeals to the authority of Sharī'ah. The Āghā Khān appeals to the quest for an intellectual understanding of reality in order to break the barriers imposed by rigid interpretations of Islam.

> The divine intellect, *'aql-e-kull,* both transcends and informs the human intellect. It is this intellect which enables the man to strive towards two aims dictated by the faith, that he should reflect upon the environment Allah has given him and that he should know himself. It is the light of intellect which distinguishes the complete human being from human animal and developing that intellect requires free inquiry. The man of faith who fails to pursue intellectual search is likely to have only a limited comprehension of Allah's creation. Indeed, it is man's intellect

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681 Firmān, 1976.

682 Firmāns: Canada Visit, 1983.

683 **Firmān Mubārak,** p. 19.

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that enables him to expand his vision of that creation.[684]

The Āghā Khān's appeal to intellectual development has been accompanied by the establishment of the Imāmat institutions. While the former may likely lead to the erosion of the traditional *Imām-mʾuminīn* relationship to some degree, the latter serves to cushion the impact of modernization through the absorption of a growing number of the educated Ismā'īlīs in the community. In other words, the problem is that the rapid social and economic change involves de-éliticization and more individualism. How can one then base one's authority on religious grounds and also control the consequences of accelerated social and economic change? One way of reacting to such a situation, and the one which the Āghā Khān has adopted, is to create an efficient network of social and economic institutions to cushion such consequences. Related to the above, there is another conclusion which we draw from this chapter. It is that the social and economic success of the community strengthens the Ismā'īlī traditional belief in the Imām as the possessor of divine *'ilm* (knowledge). This perception of the Imām has a tremendous impact on the way the Ismā'īlīs run their institutions. There is less likelihood of embezzlement, more devotion and commitment. These institutions, therefore, are trusted by the Jamā'at to an extent that is not ordinarily the case with other institutions in Pakistan. In other words the Imāmat institutions are seen by the Ismā'īlīs as free from corruption although not free from bureaucratic red tape.

Another conclusion we draw from this chapter is that the Ismā'īlīs, in their statements and activities do not appear to be a political group or to encourage political mobilization either for or against the Government in power. They are rather involved more in the development of social and economic institutions.

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[684] Āghā Khān, Speech, Inauguration Ceremony.

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Chapter VIII

CONCLUSION

This study has raised many issues related to the Khojah Ismā'īlī community and the way in which it has come to grips with the problems of the modern-day situation in Pakistan. This situation is characterized by a growing consciousness of Islam among the Muslims of Pakistan, and has posed fundamental problems for the Khojah Ismā'īlī community. The problems arise at two levels: (i) At the level of the nature of Islamic resurgence, constituting the external situation to which the Ismā'īlīs must respond, and (ii) at the level of the changing Ismā'īlī religious attitude to which the Ismā'īlīs relate their inherited syncretic traditions and yet assimilate the ideas espoused by the Islamic resurgence movements.

(i) This study reveals that the phenomenon of Islamic resurgence is something new. It is characterized by a multitude of sharp conflicts and contradictory views. This indicates only that, in Islam, as much as in other religions, the absolute and final truth is unattainable. The problem with Islamic resurgence is that it intends to impose religious relativism, that is, its own interpretations of Qur'ān and Sunnah as the absolute truth on the Pakistānīs. Some of its representatives are willing to adopt violent and political means to attain this goal. At both the intellectual and religious levels, the supporters of Islamic resurgence have failed to see that the prevailing religious ideas are not independent of contemporary social and historical conditions. Islam has meant different things to different peoples at different times. The various meanings of Islam have depended on the cultures from which they arose and on the other cultures with

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which they interacted. To admit that the questions which Islam asked arose out of a given situation and that both the questions and answers are relative to that situation is to admit that humans are finite and, so, open to new ideas and understanding. To claim that the Islamic revelation has laid down specific answers to the problems of future generations is contrary to the spirit of modernization and progress. Modernist Muslims themselves, on the other hand, have not yet dared to awaken other Muslims from their dogmatic slumber by critically examining the Muslim belief about the Qur'ān and the Sunnah.

The Ismā'īlīs are being forced to rethink their attitude towards the Qur'ān and the Sunnah in the way the conservatives and revivalists want them to, that is, to conduct their religious affairs on the basis of the Qur'ān and the Sunnah. This development causes problems for the Ismā'īlīs. The problem emerges from the very nature of the Ismā'īlī response in seeking to adapt to the problem of Islamization.

(ii) For the Ismā'īlīs, no doubt, religious authority is located traditionally in the Imām, who happens to be a modernist. This fact minimizes the extent to which the Ismā'īlīs rely on the authority of the past. However, with the contemporary Ismā'īlī emphasis on the absolute authority of the Qur'ān, the Ismā'īlīs are not only taking the possible risk of down playing the authority of the Imām, but are also falling into the trap of falsifying history and giving the beliefs or doctrines an eternal character. In this respect they resemble both conservatives and revivalists. Once, the beliefs or doctrines are given an eternal character, as in the case of the Gināns, it becomes extremely difficult to modify them or replace them with something else when changed circumstances demand it. The tensions which result from the changing attitude of the Ismā'īlīs towards their principal religious beliefs could destabilize the group and possibly cause a division within it. The Ismā'īlī community of Pakistan has so far neither experienced major dissensions from within nor physical attacks from without because of various factors.

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First, there is the coincidence that the Imām is a modernist. In consequence the location of authority in the Qur'ān and the Sunnah is matched with the modernist interpretation of Islam by the Imām. The modernist orientation of the Āghā Khān and the utilization of this perspective in the effective organization of the community has significantly assisted the community in the absorption of tensions which have arisen as a result of changing religious attitudes among the Khojahs. If, on the other hand, the person exercising religious authority had been a fundamentalist or an anti-modernist, as in the case of the Bohra Ismā'īlīs, the tensions within the community might possibly have weakened the community. In the case of the Bohras, strong opposition to the Sayyidnā emerges from the educated modernist Bohras. In the case of the Khojah Ismā'īlīs, the opposition is very mild and confined to a few individuals who are sympathetic to Islamic resurgence. The latter does not appeal to the Ismā'īlīs in general who are better placed socially and economically than the other Muslim groups.

Second, the official statements of the Ismā'īlīs and their articulation of Islamic symbols, language, respect for whatever is considered sacred by the Muslims, and learning of Qur'ān, etc., has helped the Ismā'īlīs considerably in avoiding antagonism from others. Towards this end, the Āghā Khān in his speeches and Firmāns has often declared his and his community's commitment to Islam which he defines as the religion of "humanity" with "ethical underpinning".[685] This is an outright modernist position in the sense that religion is defined in "functional terms, that is as any set of beliefs, ideas and activities that fulfils certain social functions".[686] A religion which is dominantly characterized in moral or humanist terms lacks those elements of "mystery and majesty for which the deeper aspirations of worship seek".[687] In the case of the Ismā'īlīs, the

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685 See the Āghā Khān's speech at the Convocation Ceremony of the McMaster University, May 15, 1987.

686 Bryan R. Wilson, "Secularization", **The Encyclopedia of Religion,** vol. 13, p. 159.

687 John Macquarre, **Twentieth-Century Religious Thought,** p. 93.

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official Ismā'īlī statements, including the directives of the Imām, are limited in exacting obedience from the community at large on the issues of religious beliefs. This is so because the popular religious ideas of the ordinary Ismā'īlīs always act as the frame of reference in which the new ideas will be measured. In other words, no matter how much the Imām and the Ismā'īlī leaders play down the Ginānic concepts of the Imām's role, the Khojahs at the popular level have their own ways of translating what the leadership says to fit with what they already believe. That is to say that they may use Islamic or secular terms to refer to the Imām and to their religious practices, but the meanings attributed to these terms always carry an inner meaning which remains personal. The Ismā'īlīs' response to Islamization in Pakistan is therefore characterized as both innovative and elusive. It is innovative because the Ismā'īlīs are responding to something new - the phenomenon of Islamic resurgence. It is elusive because the Khojahs are utilizing their own inherited syncretic traditions to legitimize attitudinal change among themselves and, thereby, are strengthening the very traditions they wish to modify. In the Khojah syncretic tradition, the Imām is capable of acquiring an infinity of possible meanings. These possibilities enable the Imām to relate to the requirements of changing situations, thus permitting the Ismā'īlīs to justify changes in their mode of behaviour. As the source of religious guidance, the Imām becomes the focus of Ismā'īlī attention, and everything else in the Ismā'īlī system of beliefs must be viewed strictly in terms of the Imām's authority and not in terms of the teachings of the Qur'ān, the Sunnah, the Gināns etc., alone. This focus on the Imām makes it much easier for the group to acclimatize to changing political, social, and economic situations. Unlike Sunnī Muslims they have no fixed, determinate body of precepts which they have to observe in order to retain their identity. This is the basic difference between the Ismā'īlīs and the Sunnīs. Thus, in the attempt to evolve Ismā'īlī beliefs and practices to accommodate the social and political forces of the environment, the

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Imām has encouraged great changes within the Ismā'īlī system. It is significant that the urging to change and the actual changes themselves do not evoke opposition on a wide scale because of the Imām's authority. This flexibility in the Ismā'īlī response, while contributing noticeably to the group's survival, has made the task of defining the Ismā'īlī doctrine difficult. Any attempt to specify normative doctrines generates tensions within the community. It does so because the statement of correct doctrine is a kind of surrender to Sunnī ideas of religious authority; that is, it is an acceptance of the notion that there is a fixed body of precepts from which one must not depart. These Sunnī ideas of religious authority are themselves the product of history and change. Since the Imām is seen as the focus of everything concerning Ismā'īlī beliefs and practices, it is one of the conclusions of this thesis that the term that could best be used to describe the Ismā'īlīs in the modern world is, "the Imāmīs" - a term which implies the fundamental belief of the Ismā'īlīs that everything changes except the *nūr* (spirit or light) of the Imām who is always available to guide the *mu'minīn*

Third, and more important, the Khojah Isma'ilis - probably due to their being a predominantly business community -, have tended to adopt a middle-path between extreme exclusiveness and total assimilation. While on one hand they have been able to maintain their religious identity, on the other they have been able to foster a minority consciousness more as a *tarīqah* - - a positive variable in the context of Pakistānī efforts at forging political unity as opposed to the negative one of sectarianism. They are, as such, able to interact with the state in a positive manner and hence are in the mainstream of social change and modernization. Unlike the Ithna 'asharīs, the Khojah Isma'ilis neither oppose through agitation the imposition of Islamic reforms, such as *zakāt*, compulsory learning of *Islāmiyāt*, etc., nor do they indulge in activities that provoke the Sunnī Muslims, such as the rituals of *Muharram*. Unlike the Ahmadiyah, they do not carry on proselytizing activities nor do they

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support or oppose any political movement. Economically, they are quite independent and so do not compete with other Muslims for limited employment available in the government sectors. The government, on the contrary, looks upon the private initiatives of Ismā'īlīs as assisting in the development of public service sectors which governments in the third world generally are unable to provide. In response to the appeals of the present government, the recent Ismā'īlī social and economic ventures aimed at benefitting the Muslims of Pakistan at large have significantly equipped the Ismā'īlīs with the ability to influence governmental opinion. In the context of the recent developments in Pakistan where the government is committed to adopting Islam as an ideology for the State, the Ismā'īlī commitment to assist the government in implementing its social (health and education) and economic policies may be understood as the Ismā'īlī contribution to the Muslims' attempt at defining the position of Islam in Pakistan, and so in the modern world.

Fourth, the Islamic resurgence movements in Pakistan, although having stirred up a lot of religious sediment, have mostly indulged in a lot of simple talk about morality, charity and kindness. The contradiction between their moral teachings and militant posture has in fact added more strength to some Muslim elements, especially the women's groups. For Ismā'īlīs, the phenomenon of Islamic resurgence in Pakistan is also a blessing in disguise. To begin with, it has helped to check the consequences of rapid modernization of the Ismā'īlī community. Modernization generally dilutes the bonds of traditional authority. But since the Islamic resurgence movements are anti-modernist, the educated and modernist Ismā'īlīs would rather remain within the community's bounds than be rejected by both the Ismā'īlī community and the Muslim revivalists. This fact has resulted in an increased cohesion of the Ismā'īlīs internally and has thus increased the capacity of the Imām to effect changes within the community and to resist internal agitation. Moreover, the process of Islamization and

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its emphasis on the more rigid and legalist aspects of Islam has enhanced the interest in Ṣūfī and esoteric forms of Islam. The Islamic resurgence has undoubtedly enhanced the role of Islam in Pakistan. But it is in Islam that the Āghā Khān must seek his legitimacy. With the growing Shī'ī Islamic identity of the Ismā'īlīs, whether in reaction or accommodation to Sunnī Islam, the traditional authority of the Imām is enhanced. The Khojahs may focus on the pre-Indian phase of their religious history and draw upon the writings of Qādī al-Nu'mān and al-Sijistānī instead of the Gināns, but the religious authority, in the ultimate analysis, remains located in the Imām. After all, God is "Wholly other" and "unknowable".[688] The Ismā'īlī traditional view of the Imām, as the possessor of the divine *'ilm*, has brought down faith to the existential level in which 'the obedience to the Imām is equated with the obedience to the Prophet and to God'. The Ismā'īlī devotion and commitment to this idea of the Imam is instrumental in the way Ismā'īlī institutions function. The disadvantage in this sort of arrangement is that serious research on Ismā'īlism will most likely come into conflict with the convictions of the administrators of these institutions; and in most cases the intellectual development in religious matters may be compromised. Lastly, the phenomenon of Islamic resurgence has alienated large segments of peasants, Sufis, and conservatives. In this situation, the Isma'īlīs do not feel isolated but convinced that Islam is not monolithic.

This thesis has examined how the Isma'ilis, as a minority Muslim group in Pakistan, while maintaining a sense of continuity with their religious history, have attempted to accomodate contemporary religious forces in their thrust for modernization. It is in the understanding of the religious beliefs of the Isma'ilis that the nature of the changing pattern can be grasped. The Isma'ili belief system in which the

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688 For excellent analysis of Sijistani's views on the relationship between man and God, see Paul Walker, "An Isma'ili Answer to the Problem of Worshipping the Unknowable, Neoplatonic God", **American Journal of Arabic Studies**, (Leiden & Brill), vol 2(1974), p 7-21

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Imām is the only authorized interpreter of Qur'ān and, therefore, the absolute claimant upon Ismā'īlī obedience, provides the Ismā'īlīs with a unique means of responding to the impact of resurgent Islam from the one side and that of Western modernism from the other.

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The Sources for the purposes of this study to a great extent consist of the literature written by the Ismā'īlîs in two phases.

1. In the pre-partition phase, much of the available literature is in Gujrātî. It has had a direct bearing on the formation of the religious consciousness of Ismā'īlîs who later migrated to Pakistan or who were already living in the areas that formed Pakistan. So far no study has been made of this literature although its authority, until recently, was widely accepted and expressed through *Wa'ɪẓāt* (teachings or sermons). Only those texts will be listed below which deal with the issues involved in this study.
2. In the Pakistan context, the publications by the Ismā'īlîs in Pakistan comprise the recent Firmāns and speeches of the Āghā Khān; school text-books on Ismā'īlî *tārīkh* and *ta'līmāt*, a number of *Wa'ɪẓāt* (teachings); revised Ginānic texts; etc.. Much of this literature is available in Urdū, Gujrātî, and to some extent in English.

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3. Chunārā, Vazir A.J., *Nūr-i-Mūbīn,* First published in 1936 by the Bombay Ismailia Association. It is a survey of Ismā'īlī History featuring the Imāms' and the *Pirs'* activities. This was, until recently, the most widely read book among the Ismā'īlīs. It was the first and only major work on Ismā'īlī history available to the Indian Ismā'īlīs. It has been edited four times, and the last edition appeared in 1961. It contains more than 600 pages.

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II . Publications of Pakistan Ismā'īlī Institutions

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2. *Tārīkh Ā'mmiyyah Ismā'īliyyā,* 4 volumes, published in 1983.

3. *Ismā'īlī Ta'līmāt,* 10 volumes, first published in 1980. Third edition was published in 1983

4. *Kalām-i-Mowlā,* published in five editions in Gujrati (the last in 1984) and in Urdū edition (in 1984). As mentioned earlier, this is a collection of sayings attributed to Hz. 'Alī They are highly esteemed for their moral content. They evoke, when recited, a profound sense of awe and piety-mindedness.

5. *Ismā'īlī Imāmo no tūnk Itihās* (a short history of the Imāms) published in 5 parts in four editions, the last having been published in 1983.

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III. Speeches and Firmāns

The Firmāns and speeches of the Imām provide a valuable source for understanding the Ismā'īlī perception of Islam in Pakistan, particularly, the concept of religious authority among them.

Although hard and fast distinctions cannot be maintained in this study between the speeches and the Firmāns, the former are usually addresses at the public level in which the Ismā'īlīs may or may not be directly involved. The Firmans are addressed to the Jamā'at as a whole or to Isma'ilī individuals who seek directives individually. Due to historical circumstances, the Ismā'īlīs treat the Firmāns in a manner that they are least exposed to misrepresentation or misuse.

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(i) Firmāns and Speeches of Āghā Khān III: 1885-1957

Imām Sultān Muhammad Shāh issued *Firmāns* mainly in Hindī-Urdū, Persian, and English. Many Firmāns were inaccurately translated on the spot into Gujrātī by translators or secretaries who varied from place to place. Due to bad translations, some *Firmāns* appear to be inconsistent. For instance, the terms connoting different meanings, such as, *Dharam, Dīn, Madhab,* etc., are used synonymously with religion and faith. These Firmāns, however, reflect the manner in which the Āghā Khān III introduced changes and replaced many superstitious customs that were hampering the process of Islamic Modernism.

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APPENDIX 'A'

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

PREAMBLE: THE ISMĀ'ĪLĪ CONSTITUTION

BISMI-LLAHI-R-RAHMANI-R-RAHIM

Whereas

(A) The Shia Imami Ismaili Muslims affirm the *Shahādah 'Lā ilāha illa-llāh, Muḥammadur Rasūlu-llāh'*, the *Tawḥīd* therein and that the Holy Prophet Muhammad *(Ṣalla-llāhu 'alayhi wa-sallam)* is the last and final Prophet of Allah. Islam, as revealed in the Holy Quran, is the final message of Allah to mankind, and is universal and eternal. The Holy Prophet (S.A.S.) through the divine revelation from Allah prescribed rules governing spiritual and temporal matters.

(B) In accordance with Shia doctrine, tradition, and interpretation of history, the Holy Prophet (S.A.S.) designated and appointed his cousin and son-in-law Hazrat Mawlana Ali *Amīru-l-Mu'minīn ('Alayhi-s-salām)*, to be the first Imam to continue the *Ta'wīl* and *Ta'līm* of Allah's final message and to guide the murids, and proclaimed that the Imamat should continue by heredity through Hazrat Mawlana Ali (A.S.) and his daughter Hazrat Bibi Fatimat-az-Zahra, *Khātūn-i-Jannat ('Alayhā-s-salām)*.

(C) Succession to Imamat is by way of *Naṣṣ*, it being the absolute prerogative of the Imam of the time to appoint his successor from amongst any of his male descendants whether they be sons or remoter issue.

(D) The authority of the Imam in the Ismaili Tariqah is testified by *Bay'ah* by the murid to the Imam which is the act of acceptance by the murid of the permanent spiritual bond between the Imam and the murid. This allegiance unites all Ismaili Muslims worldwide in their loyalty, devotion and obedience to the Imam within the Islamic concept of universal brotherhood. It is distinct from the allegiance of the individual murid to his land of abode.

(E) From the time of the Imamat of Hazrat Mawlana Ali (A.S.), the Imams of the Ismaili Muslims have ruled over territories and peoples in various areas of the world at different periods of history and, in accordance with the needs of the time, have given rules of conduct and constitutions in conformity with the Islamic concepts of unity, brotherhood, justice, tolerance and goodwill.

(F) Historically and in accordance with Ismaili tradition, the Imam of the time is concerned with spiritual advancement as well as improvement of the quality of life of his murids. The Imam's *Ta'līm* lights the murids' path to spiritual enlightenment and vision. In temporal matters, the Imam guides the murids, and motivates them to develop their potential.

(G) Mawlana Hazar Imam Shah Karim al Hussaini, His Highness Prince Aga Khan, in direct lineal descent from the Holy Prophet (S.A.S.) through Hazrat Mawlana Ali (A.S.) and Hazrat Bibi Fatima (A.S.), is the Forty-Ninth Imam of the Ismaili Muslims.

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APPENDIX 'B'

HOLY DU'A

PART I

BISMIL-LĀHIR-RAḤMĀNIR-RAḤĪM.

AUḤMDU LIL-LĀHI RAB-BIL-'ĀLAMĪN; AR-RAḤMĀNIR-RAḤĪM; MĀLIKI YAWMID-DĪN. IY-YĀKA NA'BUDU WA IYYĀKA NASTA'ĪN. IHDINAṢ-ṢIRĀṬAL-MUSTAQĪM. ṢIRĀṬAL-LADHĪNA AN'AMTA 'ALAYHIM, GHAYRIL-MAGHḌŪBI 'ALAYHIM WA LAḌ-ḌĀL-LĪN.

SAJADA WAJHĪ ILAYKA WA TAWAK-KALTU ALAYKA; MINKA QUW-WATĪ WA ANTA 'IṢMATĪ, YĀ RAB-BAL-'ĀLAMĪN.

AL-LĀHUM-MA ṢAL-LI 'ALĀ MUḤAM-MADINIL-MUṢTAFĀ, WA 'ALĀ 'ALY-YINIL-MURTAḌĀ, WA 'ALAL-A-IM-MATIL-AṬHĀR, WA 'ALĀ ḤUJ-JATIL-AMRI ṢĀHIBIZ-ZAMĀNI WAL- 'AṢRI IMĀMINAL-ḤĀḌIRIL-MAWJUD, MAWLĀNĀ SHĀH KARĪMIL-ḤUSAYNĪ.

AL-LĀHUM-MA LAKA SUJŪDĪ WA ṬĀ'ATĪ. (SUJŪD).

PART II

BISMIL-LĀHIR-RAḤMĀNIR-RAḤĪM.

YĀ AY-YUHAL-LADHĪNA ĀMANU, AṬĪ'UL-LĀHA WA AṬĪ'UR-RASŪLA WA ULIL-AMRI MINKUM WA KUL-LA SHAY-IN AḤṢAYNĀHU FI IMĀMIM-MUBĪN.

AL-LĀHUM-MA YĀ MAWLĀNĀ ANTAS-SALĀM, WA MINKAS-SALĀM, WA ILAYKA YARJI'US-SALĀM. ḤAY-YINĀ RAB-BANĀ BIS-SALĀM, WA ADKHILNĀ DĀRAS-SALĀM. TABĀRAKTA RAB-BANĀ WA TA'ĀLAYTA, YĀ DHAL-JALĀLI WAL-IKRĀM.

AL-LĀHUM-MA YĀ MAWLĀNĀ MINKA MADADĪ WA 'ALAYKA MU'TAMADĪ; IY-YĀKA NA'BUDU WA IY-YĀKA NASTA'ĪN. YĀ 'ALY BILUṬFIKA ADRIKNĪ. LĀ ILĀHA IL-LAL-LĀHU, MUḤAM-MADUR-RASŪLUL-LĀHI. 'ALY-YUN AMĪRUL-MU'MINĪN 'ALY-YUL-LĀH MAWLĀNĀ SHĀH KARĪMUL-ḤUSAYNĪ AL-IMĀMUL-ḤĀḌIRUL-MAWJŪD.

AL-LĀHUM-MA LAKA SUJŪDĪ WA ṬĀ'ATĪ (SUJŪD).

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PART III

BISMIL-LĀHIR-RAḤMĀNIR-RAḤĪM.

YĀ AY-YUHAR-RASŪLU BAL-LIGH, MĀ UNZILA ILAYKA MIR-RAB-BIK; WA IL-LAM TAF'AL, FAMĀ BAL-LAGHTA RISĀLATAHU, WAL-LĀHU YA'ṢIMUKA MINAN-NĀS.

LĀ ILĀHA IL-LAL-LĀHUL-ḤAY-YUL-QAY-YŪM; LĀ ILĀHA IL-LAL-LĀHUL-MALIKUL-ḤAQ-QUL-MUBĪN: LĀ ILĀHA IL-LAL-LĀHUL-MALIKUL-ḤAQ-QUL-YAQĪN: LĀ ILĀHA IL-LAL-LĀHU MĀLIKU YAWMID-DĪN:

LĀ FATĀ IL-LĀ 'ALY, LĀ SAYFA IL-LĀ DHUL-FIQĀR.
TAWAS-SALU 'INDAL-MAṢĀYIBI, BI-MAWLĀKUMIL-ḤĀḌIRIL-MAWJŪD SHAH KARĪMIL-ḤUSAYNI.
AL-LĀHUM-MA LAKA SUJUDĪ WA ṬĀ'ATĪ. (SUJŪD)

PART IV

BISMIL-LĀHIR-RAḤMĀNIR-RAḤĪM

IN-NAL LADHĪNA YUBĀYI'ŪNAKA, IN-NAMĀ YUBĀYI'ŪNAL-LĀHA; YADUL-LĀHI FAWQA AYDĪHIM, FAMAN NAKAṮHA, FA IN-NAMĀ YANKUṮHU 'ALĀ NAFSIHI WA MAN AWFĀ BIMĀ 'ĀHADA 'ALAYHUL-LĀHU, FA SAYU'TĪHI AJRAN 'AZĪMĀ.

AL-LĀHUM-MAGHFIR LANĀ DHUNŪBANĀ, WARZUQNĀ, WARḤAMNĀ, BIḤAQ-QI RUSULIKAL-MUQAR-RABĪN, WA Ā-IM-MATIKAL-MUTAH-HARĪN, WA BIḤAQ-QI MAWLĀNĀ WA IMAMINĀ, SHĀH KARĪMIL-ḤUSAYNI
AL-LĀHUM-MA LAKA SUJŪDĪ WA ṬĀ'ATĪ. (SUJŪD)

PART V

BISMIL-LĀHIR-RAḤMĀNIR-RAḤĪM.

YĀ AY-YUHAL-LADHĪNA AMANŪ, LĀ TAKHŪNUL-LĀHA WAR-RASŪLA, WA TAKHŪNŪ AMĀNĀTIKUM, WA ANTUM TA'LAMŪN.

RAB-BANAGHFIR LANĀ DHUNŪBANĀ, WA SAH-HIL UMŪRANĀ, WARZUQNĀ, WARḤAMNĀ,; IN-NAKA 'ALĀ KUL-LI SHAY-IN QADĪR.

YĀ 'ALY YĀ MUḤAMMAD YĀ MUḤAMMAD YĀ 'ALY.

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YĀ IMĀMAZ-ZAMĀN, YĀ MAWLĀNĀ, ANTA QUWWATĪ, WA ANTA SANADĪ, WA 'ALAYKAT-TIKĀLĪ, YĀ HĀḌIR YĀ MAWJŪD, YĀ SHĀH KARĪMUL-ḤUSAYNĪ, ANTAL-IMĀMUL-ḤAQ-QUL-MUBĪN.

AL-LĀHUM-MA LAKA SUJUDI WA ṬĀ'ATĪ (SUJŪD)

PART VI

BISMIL-LĀHIR-RAḤMĀNIR-RAḤĪM.

QUL HUWAL-LĀHU AḤAD, AL-LĀHUṢ-ṢAMAD. LAM YALID WA LAM YŪLAD WA LAM YAKUL-LAHU KUFU-WAN AḤAD.

AL-LĀHUM-MA BIḤAQ-QI MUḤAM-MADINIL-MUṢTAFĀ WA 'ALY-YINIL MURTAḌĀ WA FĀTIMATAZ-ZAHRĀ, WAL-ḤASANI WAL-ḤUSAYN.

AL-LĀHUM-MA BIḤAQ-QI MAWLĀNĀ 'ALY; MAWLĀNAL-ḤUSAYN; MAWLĀNĀ ZAYNIL-'ĀBIDĪN; MAWLĀNĀ MUḤAM-MADINIL-BĀQIR; MAWLĀNĀ JA'FARIṢ-ṢĀDIQ; MAWLĀNĀ ISMĀ'ĪL; MAWLĀNĀ MUḤAM-MADIBNI ISMĀ'ĪL; MAWLĀNĀ WAFĪ AḤMAD; MAWLĀNĀ TAQĪ MUḤAM-MAD; MAWLĀNĀ RAḌIY-YID-DĪN ABDIL-LĀH, MAWLĀNĀ MUḤAM-MADINIL-MAHDĪ; MAWLĀNAL-QĀYIM; MAWLĀNAL MANṢŪR; MAWLĀNAL-MU'IZ; MAWLĀNAL-'AZĪZ; MAWLĀNAL-ḤĀKIM BI AMRIL-LĀH; MAWLĀNAZ-ZĀHIR; MAWLĀNAL-MUSTANṢIRI BIL- LĀH; MAWLĀNĀ NIZĀR; MAWLĀNAL-HĀDĪ; MAWLĀNAL-MUHTADĪ; MAWLĀNAL-QAHĪR; MAWLĀNĀ 'ALĀ DHIKRIHIS-SALĀM; MAWLĀNĀ A'LĀ MUḤAM-MAD; MAWLĀNĀ JALĀLID-DĪN ḤASAN; MAWLĀNĀ 'ALĀ-ID-DIN MUḤAM-MAD; MAWLĀNĀ RUKNID-DĪN KHAYR SHĀH; MAWLĀNĀ SHAMSID-DĪN MUḤAM-MAD; MAWLĀNĀ QĀSIM SHĀH; MAWLĀNĀ ISLĀM SHĀH; MAWLĀNĀ MUḤAM-MADIBNI ISLĀM SHĀH; MAWLĀNAL-MUSTANṢIRI BIL-LĀH; MAWLĀNĀ 'ABDIS-SALĀM; MAWLĀNĀ GHARĪB MĪRZĀ; MAWLĀNĀ ABĪ DHAR 'ALY; MAWLĀNĀ MURĀD MĪRZĀ; MAWLĀNĀ DHIL-FIQĀR 'ALY; MAWLĀNĀ NŪRID-DĪN 'ALY; MAWLĀNĀ KHALĪLIL-LĀH 'ALY; MAWLĀNĀ NIZĀR; MAWLĀNASSAY-YID 'ALY; MAWLĀNĀ ḤASAN 'ALY; MAWLĀNĀ QĀSIM 'ALY; MAWLĀNĀ ABĪL-ḤASAN 'ALY; MAWLĀNĀ KHALĪLIL-LĀH 'ALY; MAWLĀNĀ SHĀH ḤASAN 'ALY; MAWLĀNĀ SHĀH 'ALY SHĀH; MAWLĀNĀ SULTĀN MUḤAM-MAD SHĀH.

WA BIḤAQ-QI MAWLĀNĀ WA IMĀMINAL-ḤAḌIRIL-MAWJŪD SHĀH KARĪMIL-ḤUSAYNIRḤAMNĀ (OR ḤUSAYNĪ IRḤAMNĀ) WAGHFIR LANĀ. IN-NAKA 'ALĀ KUL-LI SHAY-IN QADĪR. WAL-ḤAMDU LIL-LĀHI RAB-BIL-'ĀLAMĪN.

AL-LĀHUM-MA LAKA SUJUDI WA ṬĀ'ATĪ (SUJŪD)

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APPENDIX 'C'

SHARIAT BILL

TEXT OF SHARIAT BILL
(as introduced in the Senate On 13 July 1985)

SHORT TITLE, COMMENCEMENT AND EXTENT

1 (a) This Act may be called the Enforcement of Shariah Act (b) It shall come into force at once after passing through various stages of enactment (c) It shall extend to the whole of Pakistan, save the personal laws of non-Muslims

2. A) Legal definition of Shariah means that particular way of life which Almighty Allah has, through the last Prophet Hazrat Muhammad (peace be upon him), enjoined upon His subjects

B) The main source of Shariah is the Quran and Sunnah and an act of Shariah shall be based on them

C) An act or rule based on consensus shall also be deemed to be an act of Shariah

D) The injunction codified by the accepted and recognised juris-consults deriving their sanctity from the Quran and Sunnah shall also be deemed to be acts of Shariah, provided that such consensus is not against the Quran and Sunnah

3. SUPREMACY OF SHARIAH. All suits shall be decided in accordance with the Shariah A decision which is against the Shariah shall be void and it shall be challengeable in the Federal Shariah Court, Execution on it shall stand suspended till the final decision of the Shariah Court.

4. All the courts of the country shall be bound to decide all kinds of cases, including financial etc., according to the Shariah, and the cases decided in contravention of the Shariah shall be void

5 The jurisdiction, admissibility and decision on a case by the Federal Shariah Court shall be final on all other types of cases without exception All the restrictions imposed through Interim Constitutional Order, Constitutional Amendment 1985 upon the jurisdiction of the Federal Shariah Court shall be lifted at once

6. No office of the executive, including the President and the Prime Minister, shall give directions which are against the Shariah, and any direction so given shall be void and may be challenged in a court of law

7. A decision of the Shariah Court shall apply to all office bearers of the Government, including the President, and no citizen of Pakistan shall be above scrutiny in accordance with the Islamic law

8 The personal affairs of the recognised Muslim sects shall be decided in accordance with their own figh

9 The non-Muslim citizens shall be free to have religious education for their children and shall teach their religion among their co-religionists and shall have the right to get their personal affairs decided in accordance with their own religious law

10 Experienced, outstanding and recognised Ulema shall be appointed as Judges and amicus curiae in all the courts, as deemed necessary

11. Effective arrangements shall be made for the training of Judges so that the specialists in Shariah and Judges well versed in Islamic law become available

12 The interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah shall be such as does not go against the elective interpretation given by the Companions of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him), the accepted and recognised juris-consults of the Ummah and the established principles of Shariah

13 Every member of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary shall observe all injunctions of Shariah and shall refrain from all acts prohibited by it

14 Mass media shall be purged of such programmes which are against the Shariah

15 All earnings of wealth through forbidden means and dealings contrary to Shariah shall be banned

16 No order will be passed against the fundamental rights given by the Shariah to citizens of the country and any order so passed shall be void and may be challenged in a court of law

The objects and reasons of draft of law of Enforcement of Shariah are as under:

(A) The God gifted state of Pakistan is an ideological country

(B) It was established on Islamic ideology

(C) The objects and reasons of this draft are to obtain the blessings of God and solidarity of Islamic ideology in the country

(D) To satisfy the people of the country who have been restlessly waiting for the system since long

(E) To maintain law and order and Islamic equality in an appropriate Islamic society.

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NINTH AMENDMENT

TEXT OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT.

A BILL further to amend the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Whereas it is expedient further to amend the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the purposes hereafter appearing,

It is hereby enacted as follows:

1. SHORT TITLE AND COMMENCEMENT. (1) This Act may be called the Constitution (Ninth Amendment) Act, 1985 (2) It shall come into force at once

2 AMENDMENT OF ARTICLE 2[3] OF THE CONSTITUTION In the Constitution of the Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the Constitution, in Article 2, after the word 'Pakistan", at the end, the words "and the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah shall be the supreme law and source of guidance for legislation to be administered through laws enacted by the Parliament and provincial assemblies, and for policy making by the Government" shall be added

3 AMENDMENT OF ARTICLE 203 B[4] OF THE CONSTITUTION In the Constitution, in Article 203B, in paragraph (c)

(A) For the comma after the word "Constitution" a full stop shall be substituted, and

(B) The words, comma and semi-colon "Muslim Personal Law, any law relating to the procedure of any court or tribunal or, until the expiration of ten years from the commencement of this chapter, any fiscal law or any law relating to the levy and collection of taxes and fees or banking or insurance practice and procedure, and" shall be omitted

4 AMENDMENT OF ARTICLE 203 D OF THE CONSTITUTION: In the Constitution, in Article 203 D, after Clause (3) the following new clause shall be added namely

(3A) Notwithstanding anything contained in this chapter, in respect of any fiscal law relating to the levy and collection of taxes and fees of banking or insurance practice and procedure, the court shall, in case of law held by it to be repugnant to the injunctions of Islam, in consultation with persons having special knowledge of the subject, recommend to the Government specific measures and a reasonable time within which to take adequate steps and amend such law so as to bring it in conformity with the injunctions of Islam,

Provided that the decisions of the court shall not have retrospective effect and no right or claim shall be based thereon accordingly directly or indirectly

(3B) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution, including this chapter or Clause (3A) or anything done pursuant thereto, or any law or any judgement of any court to the contrary, all existing laws relating to the levy and collection of taxes and fees or banking or insurance practice and procedure, which are the subject matter of decision of the court referred to in Clause (3A), shall continue to remain in force until such time as appropriate laws are enacted by the legislature in substitution of such existing laws as a consequence of the final decision of the court, as stated in Clause (3A) and until the said laws have been enforced,

Provided that nothing contained in Clause (3A) and (3B) shall apply to assessments made, orders passed, proceedings pending and amounts payable or recovered before the enforcement of the laws enacted in pursuance of Clause (3A)

STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS: In consonance with the provisions of articles 2 and 227 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which respectively provide that Islam shall be the State Religion of Pakistan and that all laws shall be brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam, as also the Objectives Resolution, this Bill seeks to amend Articles 2, 203 B and 203 D of the Constitution so as to provide that the injunctions of Islam shall be supreme law and source of guidance for legislation and policy making and to empower the Federal Shariat Court to make recommendations for bringing the fiscal laws and laws relating to the levy and collection of taxes in conformity with the said injunctions[5]

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APPENDIX 'D'

SPECIAL ISSUE

ismaili mirror
OCTOBER 1980

THE AWARD LOGO

The name ALLAH in Kufic Script reflecting and repeating itself, forms the basis of the logo design.



AGA KHAN AWARD FOR ARCHITECTURE 237

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

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

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

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